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•_A "iC^ ,, } K . 



>'V 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 

I^UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



ll^^ 



THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS AND 

MILITARY HISTORY OF 

U. S. GRANT 



VERSUS 



THE RECORD OF THE ARMY OF THE 
POTOMAC 



CARSWELL McCLELLAN 

BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL U. S. VOLUNTEERS, TOPOGRAPHICAI. 

ASSISTANT, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, AND SPECIAL 

AIDE, ON STAFF OF GENERAL ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS, 

JUNE, 1862, TO APRIL, 1864 




MAY 18^1887'/) 



BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 

1887 



-Aim 



^' 



Copyright, 1887, 
Bt CARSWELL McCLELLAN. 

AU rights reserved. 



The Riverside Press, Cambridge : 
Electrotyped and Printed by H. 0. Houghton & Co. 



PREFACE 



% 



I 



This volume has grown from what was, at 
first, intended to be a brief memorandum of 
review for private use. It is offered to the 
public, not as an attempt to write or correct 
history, but earnestly to ask that history already 
written shall be remembered. 

Saint Paul, Minn., May^ 1887. 



y 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 
CHAPTEB 1 

I. Introductory 

II. Generai. Grant's Command 

ni The Relations established by General Grant 
* WITH General Meade and the Army of the ^^ 

Potomac 

IV. General Grant's Statements with ^^^^^^ ^ 
Movement to Spottsylvania Court House, and 
HIS Reflections on General Meade in connec- ^ 

TION THEREWITH 

V. Cold Harbor. June 1, 1864. - Crossing of the 
Chickahominy, June 13, 1864. - Attack on Pe- 

TERSBURG, JuNE 15, 1864. - GENERAL MeADE AT ^^ 

Jetersville, April 5, 1865 

VI General Warren at Spottsylvania, C. H. . 
VIL General Warren at Spottsylvania Court House, 
May 19, and at Cold Harbor, June 1 and ^ . 
VIH. White Oak Road and Dinwiddie Court House, 

March 31, 1865 *t * qi 

IX. General Warren from Afternoon of March 61 ^^^ 
TO Morning of April 1, 1865 ^^^ 

X. Five Forks • * * _ 

XL General Sheridan's Richmond Raid, May, 1864. 

Mention of General A. A. Humphreys in the 
Memoirs. - Battle of Sutherland Station, 

April 2, 1865 * 

Xn. From Jetersville to Appomattox Court House . 



101 

129 

152 

177 
196 



220 
252 



INDEX 



273 



GRANT VERSUS THE RECORD, 



CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

With the emphasis of rapidly approaching 
death upon his words, General Grant concludes 
the Preface to his " Personal Memoirs " with 
the words : " I have used my best efforts, with 
the aid of my eldest son, F. D. Grant, assisted 
by his brothers, to verify from the records every 
statement of fact given. The comments are my 
own, and show how I saw the matters treated 
of whether others saw them in the same light 
or not. 

" With these remarks I present these volumes 
to the public, asking no favor but hoping they 
will meet the approval of the reader." 

While through and between the characteristic 
lines, and woven among statements of facts, er- 
rors and omissions, in the work thus proffered 
as an applicant for place in history, the thought- 
ful reader finds much that surprises him, and 
much that justice forbids should pass unnoticed ; 



2 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

no one can wish to doubt the sincerity of words 
thus written, though obvious infatuation sadly 
burdens faith with wonder. 

Naturally one hesitates before taking ground 
agamst testhnony given as General Grant's has 
been. There cannot but be difadence in oppos- 
ing one so exalted by his countrymen. It b 
no grateful task to stand before the tomb at 
Riverside and bring evidence against the words 
of hhn whose form lies there. But there are 
voices calling from other graves; there are 
memories shrining other names precious to com- 
rades and countrymen ; and it were craven to 
stand in acquiescent silence while bias strives 
anew to mar the record of manly effort with 

detraction. 

It is not contemplated to attempt a technical 
criticism of the plans, on which were based the 
campaigns of General Grant. However military 
authorities may review them from the vantage 
ground of science; however strong may seem 
the theoretic proof that other plans, if carried 
out with equal energy and the same support, 
might, or would, have attained the same results 
at a less cost of life and time and treasure, — 
the fact remains established and accepted, that 
success crowned the adopted method with prac- 
tical approval. The campaigns of General Grant 
have spoken for themselves for more than a 
score of years. Doubtless the study of his oper- 
ations will bear fruit should war come again 



INTRODUCTORY. 3 

upon our land ; but it is not purposed now tp 
enter upon tlie labor of conjecturing what might 
have been or may be. „ tt c n 4-" 

It is the "Personal Memours ot U. b. Ijrant, 
in their relation to the record upon which they 
purport to be founded, which now invite atten- 
tion; for in them have been revived issues oi 
the past which might well have been left be- 
neath the veil that time was kmdly drawing 
over them, and through them false impressions 
find their way to-day into the hearts and minds 
of thousands. , 

In examining the legacy General Grant has 
left, no reflection should be east upon his exer- 
cise of the undoubted right to preferences for 
individuals among those cooperating with or 
under hhn. Such preferences were inevitable. 
They were within his prerogative as much as 
any exercise of judgment. Neither will an at- 
tempt now be made to defend those of whom 
tL Memoirs appear to treat unjustly further 
than may be necessary to iUustrate the character 
of the offered statements. Within the compass 
of the work designed, an exhaustive criticism 
would be impossible. The object a^ned at now 
is to rneite investigation which shall decide the 
historic mine of this widely jmhUshed work 

Had General Grant confined himself to ex- 
pressions of opinions, none would gainsay his 
riffht; but when, in sustaining his opinions, he 
throws broadcast on the winds assertions as to 



4 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

facts, the record claims its place beside his state- 
ments. Some portions of the evidence seem to 
have escaped the notice of the author of the Me- 
moirs and his assistants, and the reader is now 
asked to examine somewhat of the matters treated 
of in the light of neglected facts and author- 
ities. 

It is difficult to separate the " Personal Me- 
moirs" of General Grant from the "Military 
History of U. S. Grant." So identical in sub- 
ject matter, so harmonious in style and treat- 
ment, so consistent in mutual inconsistency, and 
so united in intent are the two works, it is 
impossible to escape the conviction that each is 
but the duplicate and authorized complement of 
the other. While General Grant has noticeably 
intensified some reflections contained in General 
Badeau's books, he has offered no protest to any- 
thing therein, except in the single instance of 
General Butler's operations at Bermuda Hun- 
dred. Moreover, he makes several references to 
"Badeau's history of my campaigns " as reliable 
authority, and thus accepts and endorses the 
statements of the earlier work. Constant effort 
will be made, however, to keep distinct all refer- 
ences to either. 

Able pens have commented on events leading 
up to the operations of 1864 and 1865, and it is 
only to the record of the campaigns of those 
years, in which the Army of the Potomac par- 
ticipated, that attention will now be directed. 



INTRODUCTORY. 5 

The " Military History of U. S. Grant/' writ- 
ten by General Adam Badeau, Military Secretary 
and Aide-de-Camp to General Grant, was pub- 
lished in 1881. In 1883 Charles Seribner's Sons 
published " The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 
1865," written by General Andrew A. Hum- 
phreys, Chief of Engineers U. S. Army. The 
well-known intimate acquaintance of General 
Humphreys with all the campaigns of the Army 
of the Potomac, he having served continuously 
therein from 1861 to the close of the war in 
1865 ; the positions of Chief of Staff of the 
Army, and afterwards of Corps Commander, in 
which he had served with marked distinction 
during the campaign of which he wrote ; his 
acknowledged ability as a soldier thoroughly 
schooled and experienced ; and his character as 
a man, — all combine to render his work an au- 
thority of the highest order. It is believed that 
not one material fact as recorded by him has 
been questioned or controverted. To this Gen- 
eral Grant bears silent but positive testimony. 
Although General Humphreys has noted and 
corrected some of the deviation^ from the record 
into which General Badeau had wandered, and 
which General Grant has persistently followed, 
the entire ignoring in the Memoirs of the name 
of General Humphreys, as far as the matters 
treated of will in any way permit, is the only 
discoverable evidence that General Grant, or his 
assistants, have been aware of the existence of 



6 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

" The Virginia Campaign of 1864: and 1865." 
The supposition that they were in actual igno- 
rance of this authority cannot be entertained; 
nor can it be believed that they would have 
failed to produce antagonistic authorities had 
such been obtainable. 

It is proposed, therefore, for the convenience 
of the reader, to use, with very little other ref- 
erence, the work of General Humphreys, as em- 
bodying substantially the established record, as 
far as it shall be necessary to examine it. 



CHAPTER II. 

GENERAL GRANt's COMMAND. 

Entering upon the proposed examination, it 
is well, especially for the non-military reader, to 
recall the position from which General Grant 
contemplated and judged the events of the clos- 
ing- year of the war. His authority and juris- 
diction first suggest themselves in this connec- 
tion. 

On March 9, 1864, by order of the President, 
General Grant assumed command of the armies 
of the United States, and under circumstances 
very different from those that had been accorded 
to any predecessor. The battle of Gettysburg 
had been fought and won ; the armies in the 
field were veteran troops inured to all the de- 
mands of war ; and at last it had come to be 
acknowledged by the government at Washing- 
ton, in theory at least, that but one chief must, 
or could, direct. The Army of the Potomac 
had not fought and suffered altogether in vain. 
With his commission as lieutenant-general there 
were pledged by the President to General Grant 
absolute freedom of action and the heartiest sup- 
port for all his plans. That the pledge was 



8 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

redeemed General Badeau bears testimony when 
he says : " Probably no commander ever found 
a government more anxious to assist him, or 
more efficient in carrying out his plans ; " ^ and 
again, when stating the effective strength of the 
armies under General Grant's command to be 
five hundred and thirty-three thousand men, he 
says : " Over this force Grant was as absolutely 
supreme, as free to dictate its every movement, 
as any general not a monarch who ever took the 
field." ^ The new era had dawned for the gen- 
eral-in-chief. 

Of the forces composing his command, a brief 
summary only is necessary. He found the Union 
armies divided into seventeen distinct commands 
which had hitherto been acting separately and 
independently. He writes : " I determined to 
stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of 
the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Mem- 
phis along the line described as our position at 
the time, and north of it^ the right wing ; the 
Army of the James, under General Butler, as 
the left wing, and all the troops south, as a 
force in the rear of the enemy." ^ 

His general plan, as stated, was to concentrate 
all the force possible against the Army of North- 
ern Virginia on the south bank of the Rapidan, 
and against the Army under General Joseph E. 
Johnston at Dalton, Georgia. To this end, he 

1 Mil. Hist, vol. ii., p. 29. » Id., p. 32. 

8 Mem., vol. ii., p. 127. 



GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 9 

arranged for a simultaneous movement all along 
the line of his extended command. General 
Sherman v/as to move from Chattanooga, having 
General Johnston's army and Atlanta for his ob- 
jective points. General Crook, commanding in 
West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of 
the Gauley Kiver, and, with a cavalry force and 
artillery, strike the Virginia and Tennessee Kail- 
road. General Sigel, who was in command in 
the Valley of Virginia, was to advance up that 
valley. General Butler was to advance by the 
James River, having Richmond and Petersburg 
as his objective. General Banks, in the depart- 
ment of the Gulf, was ordered to assemble at 
New Orleans all the troops he had, in time to 
join the general move, Mobile to be his ob- 
jective. 

The armies were to move for the accomphsh- 
ment of a single object. They were to act as a 
unit as far as such a thing was possible over 
such a vast field. General Lee, with the capital 
of the Confederacy, was the main end to which 
aU were to work. General Johnston, with At- 
lanta, was so important an obstacle in the way of 
accomplishing the main result as to be almost 
an independent objective. All other troops were 
to be employed exclusively in support of the two 
chief movements. This was the plan.' Truly a 
mighty plan, and a tremendous line of battle, 
that would tax the full ability and closest care 

1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 129-146. 



10 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

of the mightiest merely human mind to guide 
in concert to success. 

Of his lieutenants in chief subordinate com- 
mands. General Sherman, commanding his ex- 
treme right wing, was notedly his intimate friend 
and trusted adviser; and General Meade, com- 
manding the centre, was known to him as the 
commander who, but three days after being 
placed at the head of the Army of the Potomac 
when in motion to overtake General Lee's invad- 
ing army, had fought and won the battle from 
which dated the downfall of the Confederacy. 

On March 9, General Grant received his com- 
mission as lieutenant-general. On March 10, he 
for the first time visited the Army of the Poto- 
mac, and, as General Humphreys states,^ then 
announced to General Meade his intention of 
making his headquarters with that army. March 
11, he returned to Washington, and at once 
started for Nashville to install his successor in 
the command of the western, or right, wing of 
his army. On March 17, he formally assumed 
command of all the armies. On March 23, he 
arrived again at Washington, and on March 26, 
established his headquarters at Culpeper, a little 
country town, not fifteen miles from the Rapi- 
dan, " a few miles south of the headquarters of 
the Army of the Potomac," ^ and about seventy 
miles by rail southwest from Washington. 

The order announcing the advancement of 
1 Va. Camp., p. 5. ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 121. 



GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. H 

General Grant to the supreme command was is- 
sued March 12, 1864, as foUows : — 

"Major-General Halleck is, at his own re- 
quest, reheved from duty as General-in-Chief of 
the Army, and Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant 
is assigned to the command of the Armies of the 
United States. The headquarters of the army 
will be in Washington, and also Avith Lieutenant- 
General Grant in the field." ^ 

On March 11, 1862, the President had issued 
War Order No. 3, as follows: -Major-General 
McUellan, having personally taken the field at 
the head of the Army of the Potomac,"^ untH 
otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the com- 
mand of the other military departments, he 
retaining command of the Department of the 
Potomac." 

These orders, separated by an interval of just 
two years, while they furnish another indication 
of the scope conceded to General Grant, do not 
appear to show that the question of the proper 
location for the headquarters of the general-in- 
chief had been positively settled. The old plan 
of division still obtained. WhHe the fact seems 
to have been accepted that where the personal 
presence of the directing chief could most aid 
the accomplishment of the plans in hand, there 
he should be, and there his headquarters must 
for the time perforce accompany him, it was evi- 

1 Mil, Hist, vol. ii., p. 14. 

2 All italics are the writer's unless otherwise stated. 



12 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

dently held that the permanent location should 
still remain at Washington. That there were 
strong practical arguments sustanung this ^as* 
conclusion General Grant bears witness. Writ- 
ing of his arrival in Washington to assume his 
new command, he says : 

"It had been my intention before this to re- 
main in the West, even if I was made lieutenant- 
general ; but when I got to Washington and 
saw the situation, it was plain that here was the 
point for the commanding general to be. Wo 
one else could, probably, resist the pressure that 
would be brought to bear upon him^ to desist 
from his own plans and pursue others." 

General Badeau states the same, and adds : 
"The transcendent miportance of the issues in 
Virginia, upon which the fate of both the na- 
tional and the rebel capital depended, made it 
apparent at the outset that the new general-m- 
chief must either remain at Washington, in or- 
der to direct the movements in that vicinity, or 
take the field in person with the Army of the 
Potomac. For the entire rebel strength culnii- 
nated in Virginia; whatever efEorts were made 
elsewhere, however sturdy a defence at the bouth 
or West, only here could the battles be fought 
which would absolutely end the war."^ 

Elsewhere this same authority would seem to 
have offered strong arguments against the latter 
alternative of assuming a personal command ot 



GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 13 

the Army of the Potomac, or any other of the 
armies composing his forces. Having stated the 
firm determination of General Grant to neglect 
none of the advantages of force or skill, to leave 
no door open for failure, but to apply all the re- 
sources at his command to secure the success of 
his plans for the overthrow of the rebellion/ he 
repeatedly impresses upon his readers the fact^ 
necessary to be borne constantly in mind, " that 
the campaign from the Rapidan was only one 
part of a comprehensive scheme." ^ His impres- 
sion (evidently the correct one) of the proper 
and only location of the point from which the 
influence of a guiding chief could best be exer- 
cised, may be inferred from his statement, that 
on May 12, before Spottsylvania Court House, 
'' Grant's headquarters were in a thickly-wooded 
dell, from which it was impossible to distinguish 
any portion of the field, hut the necessity of re- 
maining at a j^oint where he could be readily 
reached by every corps commander left him no 
option:'^ If that necessity existed upon the 
comparatively contracted field at Spottsylvania 
Court House, with practically but two corps 
claiming his attention (for General Meade was 
there in command of the Army of the Potomac), 
it certainly applied with equal if not greater 
force upon the mighty field which, stretching 
from Virginia and the Ohio Eiver to the Gulf 

1 Mil. Hist., vol, ii., p. 10. 2 i^^^ p, i37_ 

3 Id., pp. 173, 174. 



14 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

of Mexico, and from the Atlantic Ocean to and 
beyond the Mississippi River, claimed the care 
of the general-in-chief . General Grant had been 
elevated to the chief command expressly that he 
might give his constant and most energetic su- 
pervision to this field ; and only from Washing- 
ton could he readily, and without loss of time or 
power, reach the seventeen component parts of 
his widespread command. 

We learn from General Badeau : " During the 
last year of the war, while Grant was actually in 
the field, most of his orders to important subor- 
dinates were transmitted first to Halleck, and by 
him repeated in Grant's name. So, also, many 
of the reports of generals at a distance were ad- 
dressed originally to Halleck, as Chief of Staff, 
and then forwarded to Grant. The lieutenant- 
general himself, was obliged to send all his tele- 
grams to Washington, as his only line of com- 
munication lay through that city ; and he there- 
fore proposed that, for the sake of uniformity, 
all his messages for the government should be 
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Army. In 
consequence, very few communications passed di- 
rect between the general-in-chief and the Pres- 
ident or the Secretary of War." ^ 

This, of course, was the only method practica- 
ble in the absence of the commanding general 
from the seat of government and centre of com- 
munication. It was evidently hoped, if not ex- 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 81. 



GENERAL GRANT ^S COMMAND. 15 

pected, that under the new dispensation it would 
be found more satisfactory than previous experi- 
ments could be said to guarantee. On the night 
of May 4, while the Army of the Potomac was 
crossing the Rapidan, General Grant and Gen- 
eral Meade, while upon the southern bank dis- 
cussing plans for the morrow, received the infor- 
mation that Generals Sherman, Butler, and Crook 
had advanced as contemplated and ordered. 
Thereupon General Badeau's enthusiasm writes : 
" It had never happened before in the history 
of war that one man directed so completely four 
distinct armies separated by thousands of miles 
and numbering more than a quarter of a million 
soldiers ; ordering the operations of each for the 
same day, and receiving at night reports from 
each that his orders had been obeyed. The 
cooperation so long desired and planned had at 
last begun." ^ 

Subsequent experience, soon to be encoun- 
tered, hardly sustained this sanguine conception. 
It was three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7, 
when a messenger from Washington reached 
General Grant, with the information that Gen- 
eral Butler had landed his force at City Point on 
the 5th, and that General Sherman expected to 
give battle to General Johnston on the Tth.^ It 
was not until noon of May 9th that General 
Grant learned that on the 7th, in a dispatch to 
Washington containing " dubious " news, Gen- 

1 Ma. Hist, vol. ii., p. 100. 2 id^ p 133 



16 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

eral Butler had applied for reinforcements.^ It 
was only on May ITth that the lieutenant-gen- 
eral received the news of General Sigel's defeat 
at Newmarket on the 15th, and learned that 
General Butler had been shut up within his in- 
trenchments at Bermuda Hundred on the 16th ; 
the information reaching him in General Hal- 
leck's despatch, reading : " Sigel is in full retreat 
on Strasburg. He will do nothing hut run ; 
never did anything else. . . . Butler is falling 
back. Don't rely on him." ^ 

From the James Eiver, on June 24th, General 
Grant informed the President as follows : " Dur- 
ing the last raid, the wires happened to be down 
between here and Fortress Monroe, and the cable 
broken between there and Cherrystone. This 
made it tahe from twelve to twenty-four hours, 
each way, for desi^atches to pass. Under such 
circumstances, it id as difficult for me to give or- 
ders or directions, because 1 coidd not tell how 
the conditions might change during the transit 
of despatches.''^ ^ 

These instances, taken at random from the 
acknowledged record, would seem to intimate 
that if the cooperation so long desired and 
planned had at last begun, it was at best but 
partial and temporary, and that the necessity of 
remaining at a point where he could be readily 
reached by his subordinate commanders offered 
serious objections to the continued presence of 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 150. 2 i^., p. 2OO. s j^., p. 453. 



GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 17 

General Grant with any one of the armies of his 
command. 

General Badeau suggests another argument 
which seems to bear upon this point. Writing 
of the relations which existed between General 
Grant and General Meade, and the opinion en- 
tertained by some of those attached to General 
Grant's person and headquarters that it would 
have been better had General Meade been re- 
lieved from the command of the Army of the 
Potomac, he says : " If Grant could communi- 
cate direct with his corps commanders, it was be- 
lieved that he might convey or infuse something 
of his own spirit and character, but the result 
of having a middleman was to make the whole 
organization wooden. Meade severed the nerve 
between the general-in-chief and the army. He 
was a non - conductor." ^ It would seem that 
this, also, applies with greater force to the greater 
command, — in fact, that the application of the 
idea embodied in the argument to the manage- 
ment of all the armies in the field, was the 
prime reason calling for the elevation of Gen- 
eral Grant to the high rank he held. 

This appears to have been President Lincoln's 
impression. Having seen General Grant's de- 
spatch of August 1, 1864, directing the disposi- 
tions to be made after his discovery of the fact 
that General Wright's pursuit of General Early 
" was feeble because of the constant and con- 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 187. 



18 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

trary orders he had been receiving from Wash- 
ington, while I (Grant) was cut off from imme- 
diate communication by means of our cable 
across Chesapeake Bay being broken/' ^ he de- 
spatched to General Grant, under date of Au- 
gust 3, 1864, as follows : — 

" I have seen your dispatch in which you say, 
' I want Sheridan put in command of all the 
troops in the field, mth instructions to put him- 
self south of the enemy, and follow him to the 
death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops 
go also/ This I think is exactly right, as to 
how our forces should move. But please look 
over the dispatches you may have received from 
here, even since you made that order, and dis- 
cover, if you can, that there is any idea in the 
head of any one here of ' putting our army south 
of the enemy,' or of ' following him to the death ' 
in any direction. / repeat to you it will neither 
be done nor attempted unless you watch it every 
day, and hour, and force it." 

General Grant replied that he " would start 
in two hours /or Washington'''^ 

The character of the existing channels of 
communication in and through Washington was 
well known to General Grant even before he left 
his western command. It certainly could not 
have surprised him that when, on July 12, 1864, 
General Early threatened Washington during 

1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 315, 316. 

2 Id., vol. ii., pp. 318, 319. 



GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 19 

the absence of the general-in-chief, the result 
was what General Badeau terms "a period of 
confusion and distracted counsels, of blunders in 
the cabinet and mismanagement in the field, al- 
most unparalleled during the war." ^ He does 
not appear to have been surprised when General 
Hunter informed him " that he was so embar- 
rassed with orders from Washington moving him 
first to the right and then to the left that he 
had lost all trace of the enemy." ^ When, in 
speaking of the orders he forwarded to General 
Sheridan, about October 10th, he says : " But 
this order had to go through Washington where 
it was intercepted ; and when Sheridan received 
what purported to be a statement of what I 
wanted him to do it was something entirely 
different,"^ he seems simply to be relating an 
incident such as he had contemplated when de- 
ciding that in Washington was the point for 
the commanding general to be. 

But General Grant himself suggests another 
objection to the location of the headquarters of 
the armies of the United States with one of the 
armies in the field, when, bringing his gravest 
imputation, often repeated in substance, against 
General Warren, he says : " Warren's difficulty 
was two-fold : when he received an order to do 
anything, it would at once occur to his mind 
how all the balance of the army should be en- 

1 Mil. Hist , vol. ii., p. 444. ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 319. 

3 Id., p. 337. 



20 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

gaged so as properly to cooperate with him. 
His ideas were generally good, but he would for- 
get that the person giving him orders had 
thought of others at the time he had of him. 
In like manner, when he did get ready to exe- 
cute an order, after giving most intelligent in- 
structions to division commanders, he would go 
in with one division, holding the others in re- 
serve until he could superintend their movements 
in person also, forgetting that division command- 
ers could execute an order without his presence. 
His difficulty was constitutional and beyond his 
control. He was an officer of superior ability, 
quick perceptions, and personal courage to ac- 
complish anything that could be done with a 
small command." ^ In other words, an instinct- 
ive impulse on General Warren's part to com- 
bine in his single person, at one and the same 
time, the army, corps and division commands 
and cares, and the resultant inability to confine 
himself to his proper sphere of action, neutral- 
ized his usefulness in spite of his ability, per- 
ception and courage. General Grant mentions 
no instance where General Warren exhibited the 
fault imputed to him; but he does state what 
would seem to be an illustrative case in point, 
when he relates that, on May 10th, the general- 
in-chief, whose attention had been absorbed by 
the battle waged by the Army of the Potomac, 
ordered General Burnside, who at the time was 

^ Mem.j vol. ii., pp. 214, 215. 



GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 21 

not under General Meade's orders, to fall back 
from a position he had gained within a few hun- 
dred yards of Spottsylvania Court House, com- 
pletely turning General Lee's right, as he (the 
general-in-chief ) did not at the time know of the 
advantage that had been gained.^ 

No one will dispute the greatness of the fault 
thus imputed to General Warren ; but many will 
fail to see, even through the sophistries of Gen- 
eral Badeau, how this specific trait, so reprehen- 
sible in a subordinate, can become commendable 
and prove unerring judgment in a superior. 

Why the opinion formed by General Grant on 
his arrival in Washington, March 9th, " that here 
was the point for the commanding general to 
be," was changed in the few hours intervening 
between that arrival and his visit to the head- 
quarters of the Army of the Potomac, is not 
stated in terms. General Badeau says, in addi- 
tion to what has already been quoted as bearing 
on this point, that " from the moment, there- 
fore, when it was decided that he should be en- 
trusted with supreme command. Grant had no 
doubt whatever of his duty or his design. In 
Washington he would not stay in time of war ; 
he must then direct in person the campaigns of 
that renowned Army of the Potomac which had 
passed through so many vicissitudes, encountered 
so many hardships, and withstood so many dan- 
gers, and still seemed as far from its goal as if 

1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 225. 



22 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

those vicissitudes and hardships and dangers liad 
never been endured."^ Whether there is any 
connection between this statement of General 
Badeau and the remark of General Grant else- 
where that " it was not an uncommon thins* for 
my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers, 
^ Well Grant has not met Bobby Lee yet/ " ^ 
can only be inferred. Whether the ultimate de- 
cision was one of the " judgments, made appa- 
rently at the moment, which he never reversed, 
and which the world has never seen reason to 
reverse," ^ it is not necessary now to decide. 

Whether General Sigel would have retii-ed as 
rapidly as he is said to have done, or General 
Butler have caused what General Badeau calls 
" the total failure of one part of his scheme ; a 
part too, which he had every reason to expect 
would have proved of so great assistance,'' had 
they been more immediately under the direction 
of the lieutenant-general, who had planned their 
movements for them; whether General Banks 
would have failed so utterly, or his failure have 
so entirely " eliminated the use of forty thousand 
veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign 
had been expected ; " whether General Hunter 
would have been better able to interpret the or- 
ders he received, or to locate the enemy with 
greater accuracy than has been credited to him ; 
whether General Early could have terrified as 

1 MU. Hist, vol. ii., p. 14. 2 jif^^n., vol. ii., p. 292. 

8 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 21. 



7W 



GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 23 

thoroughly as he is supposed to have done the 
government at Washington, or Generals Forrest 
and Morgan have preyed at will upon the Fed- 
eral communications in the west; whether, in 
fact, any advantage would have been gained, 
had the directing general remained at a point 
where he could be readily reached by, and from 
which he could readily reach, his subordinates 
in command of his widespread forces, can never 
now be positively known. 

It is sufficient for the present purpose to note 
that, with reference to his command. General 
Grant confessedly did not maintain a position 
such as his authorized historian distinctly states 
was necessary for the commander of an army to 
occupy ; and that his choice and decision, while 
undoubtedly in his judgment for the best, not 
only were open to, but invited, criticism. Under 
such circumstances, no matter how complete the 
triumph which ultimately crowned the vicissi- 
tudes, hardships and dangers of the Army of 
the Potomac, Generals Grant and Badeau, as 
historians of the campaign of 1864 and 1865, 
labor at an irremediable disadvantage. Of this 
the desperate rhapsodies, penned by General 
Badeau and complacently adopted by General 
Grant, bear witness. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE RELATIONS ESTABLISHED BY GENERAL GRANT 
WITH GENERAL MEADE AND THE ARMY OF THE 
POTOMAC. 

Following an examination of the bearing of 
the location of General Grant's headquarters 
upon his authority and jurisdiction, and the con- 
sequent effect upon his historical efforts, there 
should be considered in the same connection the 
relations established by that location between 
General Grant and the Army of the Potomac 
and its commander. 

In his account of the advance from Shiloh 
upon Corinth in 1862, General Grant says : 
" General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing 
on the 11th of April and immediately assumed 
command in the field. ... I was named second 
in command of the whole, and was also supposed 
to be in command of the right wing and reserve. 
. . . For myself I was little more than an ob- 
server. Orders were sent direct to the right 
wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were 
made from one line of intrenchments to another 
without notifying me. My position was so em- 



GRANT AND MEADE. 25 

barrassing in fact that I made several applica- 
tions during the siege to be relieved. 

" General Halleck kept his head-quarters 
generally^ if not all the time, with the right 
wiiig, . . ." ^ 

From his own experience, therefore, General 
Grant understood the unenviable position in 
which his choice of location for his permanent 
headquarters would of necessity place General 
Meade. Writing of the first meeting of the 
lieutenant-general with the commander of the 
Army of the Potomac, General Badeau says : 
" The position of Meade was now one of pecul- 
iar delicacy. . . . Although he had not, indeed, 
been superseded, another was set over him, with 
the especial idea of controlling the movements 
of that army which he had led to decided vic- 
tory. He might very naturally have been dis- 
contented ; but no manifestation of such a feeling 
was apparent. He displayed, on the contrary, a 
marked magnanimity." ^ 

Both General Grant and General Badeau re- 
late how, in this first interview with his new 
superior in command, General Meade himself 
referred to the possibility that General Grant 
might desire to place some one with whom he 
was personally better acquainted in command of 
the Army of the Potomac, and requested that, if 
such was the case, he would not hesitate to act 
as his judgment dictated, adding the assurance 

1 Mem., vol. i., pp. 371-377. ^ mh ffigf^ y^i n^ p. 15. 



26 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

that, as for himself, he would serve to the best of 
his ability wherever placed. General Grant com- 
ments on this : " I assured him that I had no 
thought of substituting any one for him. . . . 
This incident gave me even a more favorable 
opinion of Meade than did his great victory at 
Gettysburg the July before. It is men who 
wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from 
whom we may always expect the most efficient 



service." ^ 



General Badeau adds his testimony, as fol- 
lows : " It was this spirit which animated all of 
Grant's greatest subordinates, which inspired 
Sherman, and Thomas, and others whose story I 
have yet to relate, and made them, instead of 
rivals, co-adjutors of their chief, and enabled him 
to be secure of their support in the most trying 
emergencies, and with their aid to accomj^Iish 
what, without just such cordial cooperation, 
and just such self-sacrifice, could never have 
been achieved. 

" But Grant had no desire for the removal of 
Meade. . . . The question of Meade's removal 
was never mooted between the administration 
and the lieutenant-general." ^ 

In his official report General Grant specifically 
defines the relations established between them. 
He says : " Major-General George G. Meade had 
the immediate command of the Army of the Po- 
tomac, from where I exercised general super- 
vision of the movements of all our armies. 

1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 117. 2 j^jn jUgi^^ ^ol. ii., pp. 15, 16. 



GRANT AND MEADE. 27 

"... I may here state that, commanding all 
the armies as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to 
leave General Meade in independent command of 
the Army of the Potomac. My instructions for 
that army were all through him, and were gen- 
eral in their nature, leaving all the details and 
the execution to him. The campaigns that fol- 
lowed proved him to be the right man in the 
right place. His commanding always in the 
presence of an officer superior to him in rank, 
has drawn from him much of that public atten- 
tion that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and 
which he would otherwise have received." ^ 

In his dispatch to the Secretary of War, dated 
Spottsylvania C. H., May 13, 1864, he had pre- 
viously put on record : " General Meade has more 
than met my most sanguine expectations. He 
and Sherman are the fittest officers for large 
commands I have come in contact with."^ 

It must be accepted that General Grant ap- 
preciated, in some degree at least, the position 
of his subordinate, the character he evinced, and 
the consideration which was his due. 

But commenting upon the despatch just quoted. 
General Badeau says : " In this estimate of 
Meade's ability Grant never wavered, although 
soldiers and civilians of importance often sought 
to change his mind. 

" To some indeed of Grant's well-wishers, one 
thing seemed evident, after this week of battle, 

1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 558, 563, 564. 2 i^_^ p, 235. 



28 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

and that was the impolicy of retaining an officer 
in the position of Meade, who could not, it was 
thought, exert a legitimate influence over his 
own subordinates with a superior immediately 
present, known to be directing all his move- 
ments ; while Grant's personal traits lost half 
their force, obscured by an intermediary. 

"It does not need to suppose that Meade was 
lacking either in ability or earnestness, to see 
that he might be an impediment. He certainly 
had succeeded when he had been more untram- 
melled, and his magnanimous loyalty has been 
already shown ; but, if his energies ever flagged 
when Grant's were fresh, if he failed to appre- 
ciate in any particular the designs of his chief, 
if the two were not on every occasion in perfect 
intellectual accord, there was one chance more 
of failure. 

" These ideas were pressed upon General 
Grant by a few, to whom he allowed a sufficient 
degree of intimacy, some of whom were besides 
convinced that Meade lacked many of the quali- 
ties essential in a great commander. The gen- 
eral-in-chief, however, always defended his sub- 
ordinate, and believed, as he said when the war 
was over, that Meade was the right man in the 
right place." 

It seems manifest from these last quotations, — 



GRANT AND MEADE. 29 

taken from six consecutive pages ^ devoted to the 
subject by the versatile writer who, as has just 
been seen, ranked General Meade among those 
whose cooperation was a vital factor in the achieve- 
ment of General Grant's success, that no matter 
how clear may have been General Grant's convic- 
tion of the merits of his subordinate, or how unin- 
terrupted the friendliness of their relations, the 
Q-eneral-in-chief of all the armies was surrounded 
by an atmosphere at least threatenmg the mani- 
tenance of the accuracy of his judgment. That 
he was conscious the relations he had established 
were debatable, if not incongruous, is indicated 
by the acknowledged necessity for the statement 
quoted from his official report ; and that the ar- 
guments of the " soldiers and civilians of impor- 
tance " who surrounded him had some influence 
upon his mind may be inferred from the modi- 
fied language with which, in the Memoirs, he 
repeats in substance the frank statement in his 
report. He says : " Meade's j^osition afterwards 
proved embarrassing to me if not to him. He 
was commanding an army and, for nearly a year 
previous to my taking command of all the ar- 
mies, was in supreme command of the Army of 
the Potomac — except from the authorities at 
Washington. All other general officers occupy- 
ing similar positions were independent in their 
commands as far as any one present with them 
was concerned. I tried to make General Meade's 

1 Mil. Hist., pp. 186-192. 



30 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

position as nearly as possible what it would have 
been if I had been in Washington or any other 
place away from his command. I therefore gave 
all orders for the movements of the Army of 
the Potomac to Meade to have them executed. 
To avoid the necessity of having to give orders 
direct, I established my head-quarters near his, 
unless there were reasons for locating them 
elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and I had 
on occasion to give orders direct to the troops 
affected." 1 

These last sentences recall General Grant's 
own embarrassing experiences in the Shiloh-Cor- 
inth campaign and suggest one complication 
certain to arise under the conditions deliberately 
established here by himself. In a foot-note ap- 
pended to his account of the movements of Gen- 
eral Hancock's corps at Spottsylvania Court 
House, May 9-10, General Humphreys remarks : 

" There were two officers commanding the 
same army. Such a mixed command was not 
calculated to produce the best results that either 
singly was capable of bringing about. It nat- 
urally caused some vagueness and uncertainty as 
to the exact sphere of each, and sometimes took 
away from the positiveness, fulness, and earnest- 
ness of the consideration of an intended opera- 
tion or tactical movement that, had there been 
but one commander, would have had the most 
earnest attention and corresponding action." ^ 

1 Mem.y vol. ii., pp. 117, 118. 2 Va. Camp., p. 83. 



GRANT AND MEADE. 31 

It is not intended to criticise the judgment 
which brought about the relations here consid- 
ered, or to discuss the point of which commander 
should have been withdrawn in favor of the 
other, but only to recognize the facts ; and it is 
enough at present to note, as an indication of 
one disadvantage under which General Grant as 
historian has labored, that, while General Meade 
remained constantly in the definitely specified 
command to which he had been assigned, it is 
General Headers position which embarrassed 
General Grant and called forth General Ba- 
de'au s labored pleadings. When Lieutenant- 
General Grant, exercising his command from the 
position he himself selected, stood embarrassed in 
the presence of his illustrious subordinate, one 
scarce need wonder at the anomalies encountered 
in the Memoirs. The urgently suggested but 
ungrateful proposition that General Grant could 
have succeeded better had he been relieved from 
the presence and cooperation of General Meade 
in command of the Army of the Potomac, is 
now, at best, no less problematic than the convic- 
tion held by many competent to judge, that the 
tragedy which commenced in the Wilderness on 
May 4, and ended at Cold Harbor on June 3, 
1864:, would have been unnecessary had General 
Meade been unhampered by the constant over- 
ruling presence of General Grant. 

No one will dispute with the author of the 
" Military History of U. S. Grant " when he as- 



32 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

serts : " The whole campaign against Lee was his, 
and the whole responsibility." ^ In his official 
report General Grant says : " The movement of 
the Army of the Potomac commenced early in 
the morning of the 4:th of May, under the imme- 
diate direction and orders of Major-General 
Meade, jpursuant to instructions.''^ ^ There can 
be no question on the point, and here the obli- 
gations arising from the relations assumed to- 
ward that army by the lieutenant-general sug- 
gest themselves for brief consideration. 

Describing the position held by General Lee 
on the southern bank of the Rapidan, General 
Badeau writes : " The right, commanded by 
Ewell, was covered not only by Mine Run itself, 
but by a strong entrenched line, outside of which 
lay an impenetrable region called the ' Wikler- 
ness,' a forest miles in extent, with few and 
narrow roads, and a dense and tangled under- 
growth, the most impracticable country possible 
for the manoeuvres of an army ; . . . 

" It was of course out of the question to make 
a front attack on an army thus strongly situated, 
and Grant's first problem was to force or tempt 
the rebels out of their works to fight. With 
this view, he decided to plunge direct into the 
Wilderness, and threaten the right of Lee. It 
was not his object to avoid the enemy ; not even, 
as some have supposed, to pass beyond him ; he 
did not desire to out-flank the rebel army, in a 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 49. ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 564. 



GRANT AND MEADE. 33 

purely strategic sense, so much as to bring it to 
speedy battle. Lee could not possibly remain 
within his works when the national troops ad- 
vancedj for that would be to abandon his com- 
munications and supplies ; so that by moving to 
the right of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
Grant really compelled either immediate battle 
or the immediate retreat of Lee. Accordingly, 
the orders were issued for the Army of the Po- 
tomac to cross the Rapidan at Germanna and 
Ely fords, and to march into the Wilderness by 
the roads nearest the rebel lines." 

And he remarks further, in a foot-note : " The 
absurd idea that Grant hoped or desired to pass 
unobserved by his right, and reach his rear with- 
out a battle, could never have been entertained 
by a soldier ; " and, recording the despatch sent 
by General Grant to General Halleck on the 
night of May 4, he notes : " This despatch suffi- 
ciently disproves the assertion that Grant ex- 
pected to advance without a battle." The de- 
spatch was as follows : — 

"Crossing of the Rapidan effected. Forty- 
eight hours will now demonstrate whether the 
enemy intends giving battle this side of Rich- 
mond, Telegraph Butler that we have crossed 
the Rapidan." ^ 

General Humphreys says concerning this : 
" The objection to moving by our left consisted 
in the character of the country south of the 

1 Mil Hist, vol. ii., pp. 96-100. 



34 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Rapidan, through which we must pass for the 
distance of ten or fifteen miles after crossing the 
river, and in which we might be obliged to fight 
the first battle. . . . There was some reason to 
believe, however, from our experience in the 
movement against Lee in the preceding Novem- 
ber, that by setting the whole army in motion 
at midnight, with its reserve artillery and great 
trains of over four thousand wagons, it might 
move so far beyond the Rapidan the first day 
that it would be able to pass out of the Wilder- 
ness and turn, or partly turny the right flank of 
Lee before a general engagement took place." 

He continues : " The movement by the left 
flank was adopted, and I was requested by Gen- 
eral Meade to prepare a project for it. Two 
were sketched out by me, the one turning Lee! 8 
right by the Catharpin and Pamunkey roads in 
comparatively open country, the other by roads 
having about the same general direction as the 
Pamunkey, but from five to eight miles eastward 
of it, passing tAvo to four miles west of Spottsyl- 
vania Court House. The two projects were co- 
incident for the first day and for a part of the 
second, and both were subject to material modi- 
fication or entire abandonment on the second 
day, dependent upon the movements of Lee. 

" The first project was adopted, and the order 
of movement was prepared by me in conformity 
to it. The order for continuing the movement 
/>n the 5th of May, issued on the evening of the 



GRANT AND MEADE. 35 

4th, also conformed to it, but owing to indica- 
tions of the enemy's movement on the 4th, the 
order of march was partial only, and held in 
view the probability of a general engagement on 
that day." ' 

In addition he refers directly to the account 
given by General Badeau, as follows : " Greneral 
Badeau, in his ' Military Life of General Grant,' 
appears to intimate that General Grant intended 
to bring on a general engagement on the 5th of 
May, in the preliminary position directed to be 
taken up in the order of march issued on the 
4th. But that view is not consistent with the 
orders issued nor with what was best to do. Had 
he really wished to fight a battle on the 5th, the 
Second Corps, after crossing at Ely's Ford on 
the 4th, should have moved out the Orange 
plank road to New Hope Church ; the Fifth 
Corps out the pike to Robertson's tavern ; the 
Sixth Corps to Old Wilderness tavern ; and, on 
the morning of the 5th, to position between the 
Second and Fifth Corps ; Wilson's cavalry out 
the Orange plank road in advance of the Second 
Corps, and moving to the left at New Hope 
Church. That would have brought on a battle 
in more open and better ground for the Army 
of the Potomac than that of the Wilderness. 
Had Lee gone into the strong, intrenched posi- 
tion of Mine Run, or had he withdrawn to it 
after the battle, we could have moved to turn his 

1 Va. Camp., pp. 10-13. 



36 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

right as soon as the trains were sufficiently ad- 
vanced to admit of it, and in doing so should 
have found still more open country. I do not 
perceive that there is anything to induce the be- 
lief that General Grant intended or wished to 
fight a battle in the Wilderness. His doing so 
was, under the circumstances, unavoidable, not 
a matter of choice. Further, it would have been 
strange if the Chief of Staff of the Army of the 
Potomac, whose special occupation concerned the 
operations of that army, its movements and 
battles and their object, should not have known 
of this intention if it had any existence." ^ 

Aside from the indisputable statement of Gen- 
eral Humphreys, it is difficult to believe that the 
general whose "first problem was to force or 
tempt the rebels out of their works to fight," 
would, as General Badeau seems intent on main- 
taining, have projected, or expected, his first 
battle itnmediately in front of the strong lines 
of Mine Run, to which the enemy could retire 
at will, and in " the most impracticable country 
possible for the manoeuvres of an army : " a 
country so densely wooded that, while neither 
army might, before battle was joined, hold any 
advantage of position, the attacked lines retained 
advantages equivalent to intrenchments, and the 
attacking forces (as General Hancock proved) 
were debarred from discovering, or efficiently 
following up, any success they might achieve. It 

1 Va. Camp., p. 56. 



GRANT AND MEADE. 37 

is far more reasonable to suppose that General 
Grant, while determined to fight at any cost 
wherever he met the enemy, desired and ex- 
pected to carry out, in some measure at least, his 
favorite movement '" to get south " of his adver- 
sary before joining in a general engagement ; 
but General Lee proved not to be General Pem- 
berton. 

But, be that as it may, the indignant protests 
of General Badeau establish here another obsta- 
cle to be overcome by General Grant and the 
historian of his campaign, in that they mani- 
festly feel called upon to offer ambiguous expla- 
nation and defence of the initial and governing 
movement of that campaign professedly aggres- 
sive. 

When General Warren, under orders pursuant 
to instructions given by General Grant, halted 
at the Wilderness Tavern on May 4, there re- 
mained only to fight it out on that line, or retire. 
After that halt, again and again the favorite 
movement was attempted, and again and again 
it was met and foiled, till the James River was 
reached and crossed, and the army took breath 
to count the strategic value of " mere attrition."^ 
And through all, right loyally, that renowned 
Army of the Potomac responded to the orders 
and seconded the efforts of the lieutenant-gen- 
eral commanding all the armies of the United 
States. Repeating the story often told of Gen- 

^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 556. 



38 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

eral Warren's troops at Mine Eun in November, 
1863, standing steadily before the impregnable 
lines they expected to be hurled against, and 
noting their recognition of the desperateness of 
the task before them by quietly pinning upon 
their blouse-breasts slips of paper bearing their 
names and army designations, the Comte de 
Paris writes : " If it is only a legend ... it is 
worth being quoted, for it perfectly describes 
the character of the Army of the Potomac." 
That army fully understood the magnitude of 
the price it must pay for victory in that spring 
of 1864, no matter who might be its commander ; 
and, — though " even Shiloh was not compara- 
ble with theVilderness," ^ — through the Wil- 
derness—through Spottsylvania, bloodier still 
— to cruel, murderous Cold Harbor, right man- 
fully it paid the price to the uttermost precious 

drop. . . 

What of its recompense? Reviewing the 
Wilderness, General Grant declares : " More 
desperate fighting has not been witnessed on 
this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of 
May. Our victory consisted in having success- 
fully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the 
face of the enemy, and in getting the army to- 
gether as a unit. ... As we stood at the close, 
the two armies were relatively in about the same 
condition to meet each other as when the river 
divided them. But the fact of having safely 

1 Mil Hist., vol. ii., p. 127. 



GRANT AND MEADE. 39 

crossed loas a victory.'' ^ When General Al- 
bert Sidney Johnston marched his army unob- 
served some sixteen miles from Corinth, and, 
without loss, formed in triple line of battle 
around the Federal camps which he pressed back 
upon Pittsburg Landing in April, 1862, General 
Grant denounced all claims to a Confederate 
victory as absurd : " The victory was not to 
either party until the battle was over."^ The 
battle joined May 5, 1864, was not over until 
April 9, 1865. Looking backward from Cold 
Harbor, General Badeau cannot but admit : 
" The campaign had lasted thirty days of inces- 
sant battle, and the Army of the Potomac had 
neither captured Richmond nor conquered Lee. 
The contest was still at its height and appar- 
ently undecided J' ^ 

The campaign and the whole responsibility 
were General Grant's, as his historian affirms. 
However much his views may be regretted, no one 
doubts the sincerity of his statement when, in 
writing of his plans officially, he says : " Whether 
they might have been better in conception and 
execution is for the people, who mourn the loss 
of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecu- 
niary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I 
have done has been done conscientiously, to the 
best of my ability, and in what I conceived to 
be for the best interests of the whole country ;" * 

1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 204. 2 j^?., vol. i., p. 364. 

8 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 324. ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 556. 



40 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

but, to account the leader of a campaign con- 
fessedly fruitful almost solely of carnage, as the 
untrammelled relator of its story, is to hold him 
deified, — and this is not the day of Herod An- 
tipas. 

Concluding General Badeau's pages, bearing 
upon the continuance of General Meade in the 
command of the Army of the Potomac, from 
which quotation has already been made, the fol- 
lowing paragraph occurs : — 

" But more than all, Grant had political rea- 
sons for his course, political in the highest sense 
of the word ; reasons based on the peculiarities 
of human nature, as well as on purely military 
considerations. He believed that the removal of 
Meade would have a direct unfortunate influence 
on the army, more than counterbalancing any 
good which it might secure. There undoubtedly 
existed in the Army of the Potomac a dissatis- 
faction, half expressed, perhaps only half formed, 
that a Western man should have been brought 
to command it, who had not shared its earlier 
campaigns and difficulties and dangers. If that 
Western man should now remove the comman- 
der who had already led it to decided victory, a 
greater soreness still might be occasioned ; its 
spirit might be galled, its working become less 
harmonious. Grant's military ability was always 
based upon his knowledge of human nature ; he 
selected his generals for their personal character- 
istics as well as for their professional qualities or 



GRANT AND MEADE. 41 

acquirements, and he looked upon an army not 
as a macliine, but as a mass of human beings, 
with prejudices and partialities and passions, like 
us all. He was also most unwilling to excite 
anything approaching to sectional feehng. So, 
while asserting always the military ability and 
loyalty of Meade, he believed besides, that even 
if some evils were created by his retention, others 
still more alarming were certain to arise, in case 
he was removed. In this view he persisted, and 
with this view Meade was retained^ and Grant 
stood by him unwaveringly." ^ 

Concluding the one protest he has seen fit to 
offer against anything written in the " Military 
History of U.S. Grant," — in amends for a fig- 
urative expression used in his official report, and 
which was repeated by his historian, — General 
Grant says : ^ — 

" I make this statement here because, although 
I have often made it before, it has never been in 
my power until now to place it where it will cor- 
rect history ; and I desire to rectify all injustice 
that I may have done to individuals, particularly 
to of&cers who were gallantly serving their coun- 
try during the trying period of the war for the 
preservation of the Union. General Butler cer- 
tainly gave his very earnest support to the war ; 
and he gave his own best efforts personally to 
the suppression of the rebellion." And yet, af- 
ter acknowledging the personal disadvantage he 

1 Mil Hist, vol. ii., pp. 191, 192. 2 Mem., vol. ii., p. 152. 



42 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

caused General Meade to suffer by his (General 
Grant's) continued presence with the Army of 
the Potomac, and after his unqualified commen- 
dations of his faithful subordinate as the right 
man in the right place and the peer of the re- 
nowned General Sherman, he silently sanctions 
these stultifying statements of General Badeau. 
Here candid history seems obscured. 

General Grant silently acknowledges the views 
imputed to him by his biographer. He could 
not comprehend the Army of the Potomac and 
its leaders. 

That army was composed of citizens of our 
entire Union — men of the North and South, and 
East and West, stood side by side in its ranks 
and led its columns. The conquering of " sec- 
tional feeling " was the very duty that had called 
out and created, from an untrained mass of pat- 
riots, an army of loyal veterans — " the grandest 
army gathered on this continent, at all times true 
to its commander-in-chief, whoever it might be." 
There was no vain boasting in the grim story 
written all along the way from the James Kiver 
up to Gettysburg, and invincible indeed must be 
the prejudice that failed to read the deep-marked 
crimson lines. Its soldiers had prejudices, it is 
true. No unreasoning herd, they gave their toil 
and suffering for freedom's sake, and not to set 
on high a Gessler cap. They had partialities, 
and strong ones ; but their patriotism was 
stronger. However blind they may have been 



GRANT AND MEADE. 43 

to the personal identity of " that Western man " 
with the cause for which they fought/ they 
never failed to see and own the authority of 
their land vested in any accredited commander. 
They had passions — yes — and brightest and 
strongest among them burned their loyalty. The 
haunted jungle of the Wilderness, the hideous 
" angle " at Spottsylvania, and the death-filled 
trenches at Cold Harbor, attest that duty could 
ask no effort they would shrink from, — and 
their leader proved it in himself. 

^ General Badeau (on p. 191, vol. ii.) describes "General 
Rawlins, the nominal Chief of Staff of the General-in-chief," as 
" simply an earnest, able man, who devoted himself absolutely to 
serving his country, and for him this was synonymous with serving 
Grant:' 



CHAPTER IV. 

GENERAL GRANT's STATEMENTS WITH REGARD 
TO MOVEMENT TO SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT 
HOUSE, AND HIS REFLECTIONS ON GENERAL 
MEADE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. 

Specifying it as an evidence of unparalleled 
confidence, General Badeau states that General 
Grant " was anxious to give Sherman every op- 
portunity to achieve a separate renown/' ^ and 
certainly the Memoirs contain nothing antago- 
nistic to the statement. General Grant seems 
desirous of rendering unstinted tribute to the 
splendid leadership of his eminent friend, and 
the confidence thus manifested unquestionably is 
unique, as regards his pages. To General Sher- 
man and General Sheridan, alone of all his sub- 
ordinates, is this recompense awarded. 

One seeks in vain for words of commendation 
of any specific act of General Meade in the con- 
duct of his arduous and exacting duties, save in 
the single instance of the " mine explosion " be- 
fore Petersburg, which, at the request of Gen- 
eral Meade, had been officially investigated by 
order of the authorities at Washington. On the 

1 Mil. Hist, vol. ii., p. 24. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 45 

contrary, naturally resultant from the conditions 
and relations which have been considered, much 
is found not only adverse to the terms of general 
commendation used, but inconsistent with a will- 
ingness unqualifiedly to acknowledge the service 
rendered by the commander of the Army of the 
Potomac. The passages already quoted, which 
sustain this statement, are not exceptional. 

General Grant's version of the opening of the 
battle of the Wilderness illustrates the unvary- 
ing habit of his Memoirs in noting the move- 
ments of the Army of the Potomac. In it he 
says : " At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's 
store, Warren discovered the enemy. He sent 
word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt 
and prepare to meet and attack him. . . . Meade 
moved his head-quarters on to Old Wilderness 
Tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as 
it was light enough to see the road. I remained 
to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in 
position. Burnside at this time was not under 
Meade's command, and was his senior in rank. 
Getting information of the proximity of the en- 
emy, / informed Meade, and, without waiting to 
see Burnside, at once moved forward my head- 
quarters to where Meade was." ^ 

General Badeau says : " The general-in-chief 
was promptly informed of the approach of Lee, 
and, at 8.24 a. m., he sent word to Meade : 
'Your note giving movements of enemy and 

1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 192, 193. 



46 GRANT VS, THE RECORD. 

your dispositions received, . . .If any oppor- 
tunity presents itself for pitching into a part of 
Lee's army, do so, without giving time for dis- 
positions.' " ^ And again, in a foot-note defend- 
ing General Grant from the charge of having 
been surprised in the Wilderness, he says : " As 
early as 7.30 a. m., Meade infonned Grant of 
the appearance of the enemy ^ ^ 

General Humphreys states in substance that, 
by six o'clock in the morning of May 5, General 
Warren discovered the enemy in force on the 
Pike about two miles from the Wilderness Tav- 
ern. General Meade received a despatch to this 
effect from General Warren at a quarter past 
seven, when on his way to the headquarters of the 
Fifth Corps. He at once hastened to General 
Warren and ordered him to halt his column and 
attack, sending at the same time orders to Gen- 
eral Hancock to halt his corps at Todd's Tavern, 
and to General Sedgwick to move out, attack the 
enemy, and connect with General Warren on the 
Pike. He also informed General Grant of the 
situation and was soon after joined by him.^ 

But the general terms of commendation vouch- 
safed to General Meade by Generals Grant and 
Badeau are modified by more than innuendo. 
Positive statements invite investigation, and con- 
cerning the movements from the Wilderness to 
Spottsylvania Court House, it is necessary to 
quote at length from General Badeau, who says : 

1 Mil Histy vol. ii., p. 104. 2 7^?., vol. ii., p. 112. 

3 Va. Camp., pp. 23, 24. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 47 

"On Saturday, the 7th of May, the Brock 
road, as far as Todd's tavern, was in the hands 
of Grant, while the more western route, by Shady 
Grove, remained in the possession of Lee. The 
rebels also held the intervening country, a strip 
about three miles wide, and in this space, cov- 
ered by their entrenchments, were several less 
important roads, by which they commanded a 
somewhat shorter line to Spottsylvania. . . . Be- 
yond Todd's tavern, the Brock road itself was 
occupied by Stuart's cavalry, which had retreated 
in this direction after Sheridan's fight on Satur- 
day afternoon. This almost amounted to a pos- 
session of Spottsylvania by the enemy ; ... he 
might very well delay the national advance until 
the rebel infantry arrived. 

..." The river Po, a tortuous stream, with 
rugged banks and difficult to ford, crosses the 
Catharpen road at Corbyn's bridge, two miles 
west of Todd's tavern, and in its after-windings 
strikes the road from Shady Grove to Spottsyl- 
vania, at a wooden bridge west of the Block- 
house; and again at Snell's bridge, it crosses 
the road running south from the court-house to 
Richmond. These bridges were of the first im- 
portance, for they commanded Lee's only ap- 
proaches to Spottsylvania, and Sheridan, who 
had been ordered to keep a good look-out toward 
the enemy, disposed his force so as to secure all 
three positions. Wilson was ordered to advance 
on the left, by the Fredericksburg road, to take 



48 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

possession of the court-house, and then move 
into position at Snell's bridge ; while Gregg and 
Merritt, on the right, were directed to proceed 
to the same point crossing the Po at Corbyn's 
bridge, and then advance by Shady Grove and 
the Block-house road. The cavalry had been 
marching and fighting incessantly for now four 
days, and the battle at Todd's tavern, on the 
7th, had lasted until after dark, but all three 
divisions were to move again at daylight. Had 
these orders been carried out, every avenue to 
Spottsylvania would have been closed to the 
rebel army. 

"But Meade arrived at Todd's tavern at mid- 
night, where Gregg and Merritt were bivou- 
acked. Sheridan's orders had not yet arrived, 
and Meade at once issued new and different 
ones, Gregg being simply instructed to move to 
the vicinity of Corbyn's bridge, and watch the 
roads from Parker's store, while Merritt was or- 
dered to open the Brock road to Spottsylvania ; 
Snell's bridge and that on the Block-house road, 
the most important points of all, being utterly 
ignored. Meade, indeed, directed Merritt to 
place a brigade at the Block-house, and to picket 
the roads leading to the court-house ; but the 
Block-house was a mile from the bridge, which 
was not mentioned in the order ; and one brigade 
could hardly withstand the rebel army. Sheridan 
had ordered two divisions to hold these points. 

" The blunders, however, were not all on one 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 49 

side. Lee had early discovered the movement 
of Grant's trains, . . . But the rebel leader read 
the signs entirely wrong, and supposed that 
Grant was falling back on Fredericksburg. Un- 
der this delusion, on Saturday night, he ordered 
Anderson, now in command of Longstreet's 
corps, to move to Spottsylvania in the morning} 
The woods, however, were on fire, and Anderson 
could find no place to bivouac, and began his 
march at once, without the sanction of Lee, who 
remained in his mistake all night. Even on the 
8th, Early, . . . was ordered ' to move by Todd's 
tavern, along the Brock road^ to Spottsylvania 
court-house, as soon as his front was clear of the 
enemy ' ; and still later, Lee telegraphed the 
good news to Richmond : ' The enemy has aban- 
doned his position, and is moving towards Fred- 
ericksburg. This army is in motion on his right 
flank, and our advance is now at Spottsylvania 
court-house.' His advance had arrived there so 
soon, by accident, . . . the whole movement of 
the rebel army was based on a blunder of its 
commander, one entire corps being ordered to 
move hy a road actually in possession of 
Grant. Yet these very mistakes were destined 
to thwart the well-laid scheme of the national 
general. So manifold and marvellous are the 
chances of war. 

" Wilson moved promptly on the morning of 
the 8th, according to Sheridan's orders, which, 

^ Italics in original. 



60 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

in his case, had not been reversed by Meade ; 
. . . Merritt, meanwhile, had encountered greater 
difficulty in carrying out Meade's instructions, 
for the Fifth corps was already moving on the 
Brock road, by which he had been ordered to 
advance, and the infantry and cavalry soon be- 
came entangled. Great confusion and delay en- 
sued, and when Merritt's men at last made their 
way to the front, they were met by Stuart's cav- 
alry, which had thrown up temporary breast- 
works to obstruct the national advance. . . . 
But by this tune Anderson also had come upon 
the field, having crossed the Po without opposi- 
tion,^ . . . The two accidents, that Sheridan's 
orders had been changed by Meade, and that 
Lee's orders had been transcended by Anderson, 
had frustrated the purpose of the national move- 
ment. . . . Lee, however, could claim no credit 
for having out-generalled his rival. He had ut- 
terly misapprehended Grant's design, and acted 
on the misapprehension. ... It was the sol- 
dierly instincts of Stuart, leading him to oppose 
the national advance, although he j^rohahly had 
no idea of its meaning^ and the rapid marching 
of Anderson, also loithout any specific object, 
that secured Spottsylvania for Lee. . . . But if 
fortune was thus thrust upon Lee by his lieu- 
tenants, it was just the other way with Grant. 
He had been baffled by the same accidents that 
had assisted his adversary, and by circumstances 

1 Mil. Hist.^ vol. ii., p. 137 et seq. 



SPGTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 51 

which his own generals should have rendered 
impossible. . . . and it certainly seems that a 
greater degree of vigor shown by the corps com- 
manders at the front would not have allowed 
the prize of the entire movement to slip from 
their grasp." ^ 

General Grant, giving in the Memoirs an out- 
line of the movement, endorses, substantially, 
General Badeau's statements, even including 
the indiscreet disparagement of the adversary 
who for very nearly a year withstood his most 
strenuous efforts, and writes specifically as fol- 
lows : — 

" Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fight- 
ing during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at 
Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field 
his at the close. He issued the necessary orders 
for seizing Spottsylvania and holding the bridge 
over the Po River, which Lee's troops would 
have to cross to get to Spottsylvania. But 
Meade changed Sheridan's orders to Merritt — 
who was holding the bridge — on his arrival at 
Todd's Tavern, and thereby left the road free 
for Anderson when he came up. Wilson, who 
was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his 
division of cavalry ; but he could not hold it 
against the Confederate corps which had not 
been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it 
would have been but for the unfortunate change 
in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted to 

1 Mil. Hist, vol. ii., p. 145. 



52 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would 
have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry 
the bridge over the Po River which Anderson 
had to cross, and must have detained him long 
enough to enable Warren to reinforce Wilson 
and hold the town." ^ 

Not as an unnecessary defence of General R. 
E. Lee, but as illustrative of the general charac- 
ter of the " Military History" and " Personal Me- 
moirs," a brief consideration of the strictures 
upon General Lee's ability seems to be a perti- 
nent introduction to the examination of the 
further statements in these passages. 

Both General Grant and General Badeau state 
that General Lee supposed the Federal army 
was falling back on Fredericksburg, and so tel- 
egraphed to Richmond, and General Badeau 
quotes, from a despatch without address or date, 
in substantiation of the assertion. No such de- 
spatch, however, appears in the official war rec- 
ords. But it would really seem to matter little 
whether General Lee clearly divined the ulti- 
mate object of General Grant's movement on the 
night of May 7, or not, so long as he compre- 
hended enough to enable him to defeat it. The 
Wilderness had already proven that unerring 
prediction could not be demanded of the brightest 
military mind. The course of the Federal trains 
in the afternoon had, as was apprehended, told 
General Lee that an eastern movement would be 

1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 211-213. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 53 

attempted that night, and the presence of the 
Federal cavalry informed him that the Brock 
Road would be used. That his own cavalry were 
pushed back upon the Catharpen Road only far 
enough to clear Todd's Tavern, may have sug- 
gested the thought that Fredericksburg was the 
objective; but however strong this erroneous 
surmise, he certainly did not move blindly or 
inertly. Major H. B. McClellan, Assistant Ad- 
jutant-General of the Cavalry Corps Army of 
Northern Virginia, in his " Life and Campaigns 
of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart," page 407, 
says : "The movement was discovered in time, 
and Fitz Lee's division was thrown in front of 
the Federal column, to delay it until Longstreet's 
corps, under Anderson, could reach Spottsylva- 
nia Court House.'^ 

In a recent communication the same authority 
informs the writer that General Stuart rem^ained 
with the main army, in close proximity to Gen^ 
eral R. E. Lee, during the 6th and 7th, the 
actual fighting of the cavalry being intrusted to 
General Hampton and the two Lees ; and that, 
on the night of the 7th, General Stuart bivou- 
acked near General Anderson's (Longstreet's) 
Corps, and marched with the advance of that com- 
mand, that night, to Spottsylvania Court House. 
His explanation of these unusual circumstances 
is that, probably. General Lee wished to have 
his chief of cavalry with or near him, to enable 
him to direct the movements of that corps in 



54 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

the most certain and speedy manner, with the 
view to obtaining the earliest and most accurate 
information of the Federal movements, that he 
might meet them promptly and properly; and 
that he probably also desired to have the benefit 
of General Stuart's judgment, on which he had 
learned to place great reliance. It would seem, 
therefore, that General Lee must be allowed a 
share in the " soldierly instincts " accorded to 
General Stuart by General Badeau. The Con- 
federate cavalry divisions were not handled in 
such a way as to indicate ignorance of the object 
in view, and they undoubtedly succeeded in de- 
laying the Federal column until General Ander- 
son reached Spottsylvania Court House. 

The statement that General Anderson was ac- 
cidentally driven by the fires in the woods into 
moving his corps during the night of the 7th, 
instead of on the morning of the 8th, as it is 
claimed his orders directed, is insisted upon by 
both Generals Grant and Badeau as being one 
of the explanations of the failure of the Federal 
movement. But no authority is cited in either 
the Memoirs or the Military History for the state- 
ment that General Lee "ordered Longstreet's 
corps — now commanded by Anderson — to 
move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania," 
nor for the declaration that "the woods were 
on fire, and Anderson could find no place to 
bivouac, and began his march at once, without 
the sanction of Lee, who remained in his mistake 



SPOTTSLYVANIA COURT HOUSE. 55 

all night." General Anderson had remained 
in position duriiig the 7th, and until ordered 
to move to Spottsylvania, in spite of the hum- 
ing woods; and the supposition that he was 
by that fire driven into transcending the orders 
he received cannot be entertained on mere as- 
sertion. The troops of the Army of Northern 
Virginia have been everywhere credited with a 
greater discipline than would have been evinced 
by any commander who should, for any cause, 
leave his post in line of battle eight hours before 
the time assigned him and without the sanction 
of his superior. 

The report of Brigadier-General W. N. Pen- 
dleton, Chief of Artillery Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, from May 4 to December 1, 1864, and 
dated February 28, 1865, contains the following 
paragraph bearing on this point : — 

" About dark of the 7th the general chief of 
artillery [was] directed by the commanding gen- 
eral to send to General Anderson, who had on 
General Longstreet's being wounded succeeded 
to the command of the First Corps, a staff -of&cer 
who could guide that general along the new road 
cut out that day. The general chief of artillery 
went himself to General Anderson, described the 
route, and left an officer as guide. Here a cir- 
cumstance occurred which should be specially 
noticed. General Anderson stated that his or- 
ders were to march by 3 [o'clock] next morn- 
ing. He was preparing to start at 11 [o'clock] 



58 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

that niglit. Those four hours anticipated proved 
of incalculable value next day. The artillery of 
the First Corps, which as already mentioned had 
not been able to find opportunity in the battle 
of the Wilderness, received orders to march on 
the night of the 7th, and from its several posi- 
tions struck into the column e/i route for Spott- 
sylvania Court-House." 

From this it appears that General Anderson 
was ordered to march hy three o'clock on the 
morning of the 8th, and that his being ready to 
start at 11 o'clock p. m. on the 7th attracted the 
particular attention of General Pendleton, who 
does not mention the burning woods at all. It 
is to be noticed also, that General Anderson's 
march was guided by a staff officer, who accom- 
panied him hy order of General Lee, and was 
over a new road which had been cut out on the 
7th, in anticipation of his movement; and 
further, that it was about dark of the 7th, when 
General Pendleton was ordered to send the guide 
to the First Corps. The preparation of the new 
road is inconsistent with the supposition that 
the movement of the corps was without any 
specific object, and it is highly improbable that 
General Pendleton returned to General Lee from 
General Anderson, or issued the orders necessary 
to reunite the artillery with the First Corps, 
without reporting the time at which it would 
move ; or that General Stuart, after being de- 
tained for two days in close proximity to Gen- 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 57 

eral Lee, left with General Anderson's advance 
without General Lee being aware of the time of 
his departure. 

In view of the further facts that General 
Ewell in his report states : "On the night of the 
7th the general commanding sent me word to 
extend to the right in conformity to the move- 
ments of the troojjs there, and if at daylight^ 
I found no large force in my front, to follow 
General Anderson toward Spottsjlvania " ; and 
that General Early was ordered to move by 
Todd's Tavern along the Brock Road to the 
same place as soon as his front was clear of the 
enemy, and, in carrying out those orders, de- 
tained General Hancock at Todd's Tavern till 
the 9th : there would really appear to have been 
a specific object in General Lee's " blunder," if 
such his movement can be called when bearing 
the practical endorsement of success. And the 
arguments of the Military History and Memoirs 
are not subversive of the fact. In addition to 
what has been quoted, General Badeau, in vol. 
ii., page 143, states : " Meanwhile, the move- 
ment of Early towards Todd's tavern had been 
discovered, . . . Hancock at once sent out a 
force on the Catharpen road, and the rebel ap- 
proach was checked without much difficulty . . . 
hut Hancoch was of course detained to cover 
the right flank and the rear of the armyr In 
a foot-note, on page 144, he explains further : 
" The disposition thus made of Hancock's force 



58 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

has been severely criticised by writers who were 
ignorant of the fact that Early's entire corps was 
on the Catharpen road all day, on the 8th, mov- 
ing towards Todd's tavern. Of course, if Han- 
cock had not been detained at this very point. 
Early might have advmiced upon the rear and 
flank of Meade, and done infinite damage'^ 
Then, on the next page, immediately opposite 
this foot - note, he remarks : " Even when he 
(General Lee) thought his enemy was retreating, 
he did not propose to follow till the next day, 
and then he divided his army and sent a third of 
it on the wrong road, wasting the strength of 
Early's entire command for twenty four hours!^ 
General Grant remarks upon this point: "Early 
only found that he had been following us when 
he ran against Hancock at Todd's Tavern. His 
coming detained Hancock from the battle-field 
of Spottsylvania for that day ; but he, in lilie 
manner, kept Early back and forced him to move 
by another route." ^ 

But to return to the narrative as it affects 
General Meade. General Badeau's account states 
that the Federal forces held the Brock Road as 
far as Todd's Tavern, and that the Confederate 
forces held the same road from beyond the tav- 
ern, and the country up to the Shady Grove 
Road, which " almost amounted to a possession 
of Spottsylvania by the enemy." He states that 
General Sheridan, who had been ordered to keep 

1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 215. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 59 

a good look-out towards the enemyj disposed 
his forces so as to secure the Corbin, Block- 
house, and Snell bridges, and he further adds 
that " the battle at Todd's tavern, on the 7th, 
had lasted until after dark, but all three divi- 
sions were to move again at daylight/^ and all 
the avenues to Spottsylvania were to be closed 
to the enemy by that movement. General Grant 
says that General Sheridan "issued the necessary 
orders," the context implying, immediately after 
the fight at the tavern ; that General Merritt 
under those orders " toas holding the hridgej^ 
and that General Meade, on arrivinsr at Todd's 
Tavern, " changed Sheridan's orders " ; while 
General Badeau expresses it : " Sheridan's orders 
had 7iot yet arrived, and Meade at once issued 
new and different ones,'^ and both agree that, 
by thus interfering with the cavalry corps. Gen- 
eral Meade left Spottsylvania open to the enemy. 
General Humphreys, in "' The Virginia Cam- 
paign," pages 57-70, establishes the following 
facts. After the cavalry engagement at Todd's 
Tavern, on the afternoon of May 7, General 
Hampton retired a short distance on the Cathar- 
pen Road and held it with his division, while 
General Fitz Lee with his command held the 
Brock Road, east of the tavern. When General 
Meade arrived at midnight he found General 
Gregg bivouacked at the tavern, holding the 
junction of the roads against General Hampton, 
while General Merritt' s command was halted 



60 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

upon the Brock Road about a mile east of Gen- 
eral Gregg and confronted by General Fitz Lee. 
General Meade then discovered that neither Gen- 
eral Gregg nor General Merritt had orders for 
their further movement, and he directed General 
Merritt to push forward, at once, to and beyond 
Spottsylvania Court House, so as to open the 
roads for the infantry, and also to hold the 
Shady Grove Road at the Block-house and bridge, 
and to picket the roads approaching the Court 
House. General Gregg he directed to move at 
once, to the vicinity of Corbin's Bridge and 
watch the roads coming from Parker's Store ; 
and, when the Second Corps arrived at Todd's 
Tavern, to put a force to watch the Brock Road 
in the direction of the Wilderness. These or- 
ders loere given at one a. m. 

General Merritt proceeded to carry out the 
orders he received. There was no entangling of 
cavalry and infantry, such as General Badeau 
describes. General Merritt's command had made 
its way to the front and had been met by Stu- 
art's cavalry, late in the afternoon preceding, 
and had bivouacked in contact with it. General 
Warren, with the head of his column, did not 
reach General Merritt's headquarters till about 
half -past three a. m. Here he halted and 
massed his troops while General Merritt con- 
tinued his efforts, which had commenced some 
time before General Warren's arrival. There 
was delay, but it arose from the darkness 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 61 

of the night, the thickness of the brush and 
timber, and the obstructions that General Lee's 
troopers had been able to improvise. General 
Merritt forced his way ahead as rapidly as was 
possible under such circumstances ; but at about 
six A. M. he suggested to General Warren that 
infantry with rifles could push the enemy faster 
than he could with his carbines, and General 
Warren then ordered up his leading division, 
under General Robinson, who relieved General 
Merritt's command without confusion or diffi- 
culty. In reporting this change to General 
Meade, General Warren noted his appreciation 
of General Merritt' s efforts by the remark : "It 
is difficult to do much with troops in an expedi- 
tious manner in these dense woods." 

General Gregg's division had not been able 
to reach the vicinity of Corbin's Bridge. When 
General Hancock reached Todd's Tavern about 
nine o'clock on the morning of the 8th, he found 
General Gregg still engaged with General Hamp- 
ton's cavalry in front of the tavern. The ex- 
planation is obvious, and not detrimental to 
General Gregg. 

General Anderson's command (Longstreet's 
Corps), under orders for Spottsylvania Court 
House, moved out from General Hancock's front 
on the Wilderness lines, at eleven o'clock on the 
night of the 7th. Following a road leading 
south from the right of its position, this corps, 
after marching about two miles, reached the Ca^ 



62 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

tharpin Boad between Todd's Tavern and Cor- 
bin's Bridge, presumably about one a. m. They 
then followed the Catharpin Road to the Shady 
Grove Road, and thence to Spottsylvania Court 
House, reaching the bridge crossing the Po 
River, a mile west of the Block House, about 
daylight of the 8th. 

General Ewell was under orders to move at 
daylight, if he then found no large force in his 
front, and follow General Anderson to Spottsyl- 
vania Court House. He moved accordingly past 
Parker's Store and by the Shady Grove Road, 
reaching Spottsylvania about five p. m. 

General Early, having while on the road been 
assigned to the command of General Hill's corps, 
moving through by-roads leading into the Ca- 
tharpin Road south of Todd's Tavern, en- 
countered a reconnoissance from the Second 
Corps under General Miles about half-past five 
p. M., and was aided in the skirmish which fol- 
lowed by General Hampton's division of cavalry, 
which still held the Catharpin Road confronting 
General Miles at Corbin's Bridge. 

General Sheridan's order, the changing of 
which by General Meade is claimed by General 
Grant and General Badeau to have cost General 
Grant the possession of Spottsylvania Court 
House, was not received when General Meade's 
order was given. This General Badeau con- 
fesses. The order, as General Gregg received 
it, is as follows : — 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 63 

" May 8th, 1 a. m. 

^' Move with your command at 5 a, 3i., ou the 
Catharpin road, crossing at Corbin's bridge, and 
taking position at Shady Grove Church. Gen- 
eral Merritt will follow you, and at Shady Grove 
Church will take the left hand, or Block House 
road, moving forward and taking up position at 
that point [viz.. Block House]. Immediately 
after he has passed, you will move forward with 
your division, on the same road, to the crossing 
of Po Kiver, where you will take up position 
supporting General Merritt. General Wilson 
with his division will march from Alsop's by 
way of Spottsylvania Court House and the Gate 
to Snell's bridge, where he will take up position. 
. . . The infantry march to Spottsylvania to- 
night.''' 

It is scarcely necessary to note the fact that 
the order entirely ignores the presence of Gen- 
eral Fitz Lee's cavalry on the Brock Road ; or 
that the movements ordered were not to com- 
mence until five a. m. on the 8th, by which time 
the Fifth Corps was expected, as the order an- 
nounces, to be in position at Spottsylvania Court 
House ; nor is it necessary to make prominent 
the fact that the order placing General Merritt 
at the Block House, with General Gregg sup- 
porting him at the bridge over the Po River, re- 
versed the arrangement usual in such cases, and 
placed the cavalry confronting the Fifth Corps 
and with their backs to the enemy, for whom 



64 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

they were to watch. The one fact is sufficient 
that when the order was written, the enemy, as 
is stated by General Badeau and as is shown by 
their movements just noted, held the Shady 
Grove Road and the country intervening up to 
the Brock Road, including that road from about 
a mile and a half east of the tavern. They held 
every avenue of approach to Spottsylvania Court 
House from the west ; and the successful execu- 
tion of General Sheridan's order required the 
defeat of General Hampton's cavalry division 
backed by at least one corps of Confederate in- 
fantry. General Badeau's comment, " the whole 
movement of the rebel army was based on a 
blunder of its commander, one entire corps he- 
ing ordered to move hy a road actually in 
possession of Grant^^ reads here with a pecul- 
iarly reflex emphasis. 

It is evident to the most casual observation 
that General Meade gave the only directions 
that were in any way practicable when he found 
his cavalry waiting orders at Todd's Tavern. 
General Humphreys tells the whole story when 
he says : ^ " The presence of Fitzhugh Lee's cav- 
alry on the Brock road, and Hampton's cavalry 
and Longstreet's Corps on the Shady Grove 
road, settled the question as to who should first 
hold the Court House with infantry, whatever 
might have been the disposition of our cavalry." 

Ignoring stated truth does not substantiate 

1 Va. Camp., p. 70. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 65 

repeated error, and it is impossible to escape re- 
gret that General Grant should have seen fit not 
only to endorse, but even to repeat with added 
emphasis, the glaring errors which had been so 
clearly exposed by General Humphreys's state- 
ments. One cannot but believe it would have 
been far better had he confined himself to the 
simple candor of his official report, which says : 
" On the night of the 7th, the march was com- 
menced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the 
Fifth Corps moving on the most direct road. 
But the enemy having become apprised of our 
movements, and having the shorter line, was 
enabled to reach there first." ^ 

This examination would be incomplete without 
recalling that the orders for movements on May 
7 were issued from headquarters of the Army of 
the Potomac at three p. m. Trains were ordered 
to commence moving at four P. M. and the 
troops at half-past eight p. m. ; and Major-Gen- 
eral Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, was 
directed to have a sufficient force on the ap- 
proaches from the right to keep the corps com- 
manders advised in time of the approach of the 
enemy .^ At half -past three a. m. on the 8th, 
eleven and a half hours after the trains, accord- 
ing to orders, had been set in motion, the head 
of the infantry column found the cavalry only so 
far advanced on the Catharpin Road as barely to 
clear Todd's Tavern on the flank ; and so far on 
1 Mem.y vol. ii., p. 565. ^ y^^ Camp., p. 425. 



66 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

the Brock Road, the direct line of march, as to a 
point only about a mile and a half east of the 
tavern. The cavalry corps of the Army of the 
Potomac numbered about twelve thousand men, 
and that of the Army of Northern Virginia 
about eight thousand men/ 

^ Va. Camp., pp. 14 and 17. 



CHAPTER V. 

COLD HARBOR, JUNE 1, 1864. CROSSING OF THE 

CHICKAHOMINY, JUNE 13, 1864. ATTACK ON 

PETERSBURG, JUNE 15, 1864. — GENERAL MEADE 
AT JETERSVILLE, APRIL 5, 1865. 

Recalling General Badeau's reference to 
General Meade as a detrimental intermediary be- 
tween the general-in-chief and the Army of the 
PotomaCj it seems well to notice an instance re- 
corded as connected with the intermediary staff 
attached by the exigencies of the service to the 
headquarters of the lieutenant-general. 

In General Humphreys's account of the Cold 
Harbor movements we read : — 

" General W. F. Smith had landed about 
twelve thousand five hundred men at the White 
House by three o'clock in the afternoon of the 
Slst, and leaving General Ames there with two 
thousand five hundred men to guard the land- 
ing-place, marched with ten thousand men and 
all his artillery, sixteen guns, toward New Castle 
on the Pamunkey, to which place he had been di- 
rected to proceed by despatches of the 28th from 
General Rawlins, General Grant's Chief-of-Staff. 
All his troops had not arrived, nor had any of 



68 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

his wagons or ammunition. About ten o'clock 
at night he halted at Bassett's, near Old Church, 
his troops suffering from the heat of the day, 
and from being unaccustomed to heavy march- 
ing. Reporting by despatch for orders, the 
next morning at dayhght he received an order 
from General Grant's Headquarters to proceed 
at once to New Castle Ferry, and take position 
between the Fifth and Sixth Corps. Cold Har- 
hor was intended. Marching at once. General 
Smith perceived, upon arriving at New Castle 
Ferry, that there must be some mistake in his 
order, and sent word to General Grant, who, in 
the mean time, hearing of the mistake that had 
been made, had sent Colonel Babcock to correct 
it. Some four or five hours were lost in this 
way, and the march of the troops increased sev- 
eral miles." ^ 

General Badeau's account of the same reads : 
" Smith had arrived at the White House at 
eleven o'clock on the morning of the 30th, with 
sixteen thousand men on transports. He de- 
barked his troops that afternoon, and as time 
was of the first importance, took up his march 
on the 31st, without waiting for supply wagons, 
or even for ammunition, beyond what the men 
carried in their cartridge-boxes. That night he 
halted at Old Church, on the Cold Harbor Road, 
and before daylight of the 1st of June, he re- 
ceived an order to move direct to New Castle, on 

1 Va. Camp., pp. 172, 173. 



COLD HARBOR. 69 

the Pamunkey River, and place himself between 
the Fifth and the Sixth Corps. A battle was 
imminent, and he started at once, not even al- 
lowing his men time to make their coffee; but 
when he arrived at New Castle, the Fifth and 
Sixth Corps were nowhere in the vicinity. A 
mistake, it was evident, had occurred, and he 
sent at once to ask for an explanation ; but be- 
fore his messenger returned, another arrived 
from Grant, to say that Smith should have 
marched to Cold Harbor instead of to New Cas- 
tle. The officer who wrote out the order had 
substituted the wrong name. The command 
was at once marched back over the road it had 
just travelled, but this time in the direction of 
Cold Harbor. The day was intensely hot, and 
the dust stifling; the men from Butler's com- 
mand were unused to marching, and fatigue and 
exhaustion thinned their ranks ; one division had 
been left at the White House, to guard that 
point ; but the remainder of the column, now not 
more than ten thousand strong, pushed on, and 
soon after three o'clock. Smith had reached his 
place between Wright and Warren. He had 
marched more than twenty live miles." ^ 

In the Memoirs (vol. ii., p. 265) we find : 
'^ Smith, who was coming up from White House, 
was also directed to march directly to Cold Har- 
bor, and was expected early on the morning of 
the 1st of June : but by some blunder the order 

1 Mil Hist, vol. ii., pp. 278, 279. 



70 GRANT VS. THE RECORD, 

which reached Smith directed him to New Castle 
instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder 
Smith did not reach his destination until three 
o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and 
worn-out men from their long and dusty march. 
He landed twelve thousand five hundred men 
from Butler's command, but a division was left 
at White House temporarily and many men had 
fallen out of ranks in their long march." 

These three accounts are quoted at length for 
comparison. They show that the mildest censure 
is withheld from an officer in responsible position 
upon the staff of the lieutenant-general, when he 
had been guilty of a blunder which could have 
originated only in either carelessness or igno- 
rance of no ordinary degree. This is the more 
striking for the reason that the order to General 
Smith was to bring him into position in line of 
projected battle ; and, on page 187 of his sec- 
ond volume. General Badeau states that General 
Grant " always wrote his own orders for battle, 
and with rare exceptions, his orders in battle ; 
he wanted no intermediary then." It has already 
been seen, and will hereafter appear in even 
stronger light, that General Meade and corps 
commanders of the Army of the Potomac have 
not escaped detraction when censure is based not 
on facts, but solely on conjecture and assertion. 

Continuing his remarks upon the page last 
noted. General Badeau laments: "but having: 



COLD HARBOR. 71 

sent his orders to Meade, they percolated through 
two or three brains, before they reached a corps 
commander." To illustrate the evils which 
might thus possibly arise, in a foot-note on pages 
187 and 188, he instances the fact that on May 
11, in issuing his orders to his corps com- 
manders. General Meade omitted to use a certain 
expression contained in General Grant's instruc- 
tions to him. It appears, however ("Virginia 
Campaign," p. 91), that the conditions necessi- 
tating the use of that expression did not exist at 
the time General Meade's order was given, and 
it is evident that General Badeau was in igno- 
rance of the details of the line of battle of the 
Army of the Potomac. 

General Grant's order dated Cold Harbor,ya., 
June 11, 1864, giving directions to General 
Meade for withdrawing from Cold Harbor and 
crossing the Chickahominy, is a more practically 
suggestive illustration in this connection, though 
with a significance directly opposite to that in- 
tended by General Badeau. It contains the fol- 
lowing expHcit instructions: "... The 5th 
Corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on 
the Long Bridge Road to its junction with 
Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy. 

"The other three corps will follow in such 

order as you may direct, one of them crossing at 

Long Bridge, and tv/o at Jones's Bridge. . . . " ^ 

The general direction of the Long Bridge 

p. 286. 



72 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Road from the Chickalioniiny is south-westerly. 
Six mHes out, it is entered by the Charles City 
Road, running south-easterly from Richmond, 
and by the Quaker Road, coming north from the 
River Road at Malvern Hill. Riddle's Shop is 
here located. About three miles still farther to 
the south-west the Long Bridge Road is entered 
by the Darbytown or Central Road, and about 
a^mile still farther on it unites with the River 
Road. Three direct lines of communication with 
Richmond thus centre at Riddle's Shop. But, 
about a mile east of Riddle's the Long Bridge 
Road is entered by the road from White Oak 
Swamp Bridge, a Httle more than a mile from 
that bridge, which is not only reached by two 
roads from Richmond, but is on the direct hue 
of approach from Cold Harbor. The instruc- 
tions which reached the Fifth Corps commander, 
after percolating through the headquarters of 
the Army of the Potomac, were : — 

" 2. During Saturday, the 11th instant, Major- 

General Warren will move the two divisions of 

his corps now held in reserve to Moody's, by 

way of Parsley's MiU and Prospect Church, etc., 

so as to avoid the observation of the enemy. At 

dark on the evening of the 12th instant, he wiU 

move his whole corps to Long Bridge, by the 

shortest route, across the Chickahommy, and 

move on the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge 

(called Long Bridge Road) and hold that road, 

looking toward the crossing of White Oak 



CHICKAHOMINY. 73 

Swamp and Charles City, Central and New 
Market roads, during the passage of the army 
toward James River." ^ 

Explanatory of this, General Humphreys says : 
" In preparing the programme of movement, it 
appeared to me important that General Warren 
should move out the Long Bridge Road, not only 
far enough to cover the crossing of the Chicka- 
hominy by the army, but so far as to hold the 
bridge over the White Oak Swamp, and to look 
toward the three roads to Richmond already 
mentioned, which substantially met at Riddle's 
shop, about a mile in advance of the position 
General Warren was directed to take. He could 
not loell advance to Eiddle's shop, since that 
icoidd have exposed him to attack in rear from 
White Oak Bridge. It was expected that such 
a movement by General Warren would deceive 
Lee, and give him the impression that the Army 
of the Potomac was advancing upon Richmond, 
or, if intending to cross the James, that it would 
do so near Malvern Hill, at City Point, or above. 
The movement made the desired impression upon 
him, and to a greater extent than was contem- 
plated, for, ... he was uncertain what the 
Army of the Potomac was doing until the after- 
noon of the 17th of June." ^ 

General Grant simply says: "As soon as 
Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it 
marched out and joined the cavalry in holding 

1 Va. Camp., p. 426. 2 1^., pp. 20I, 202. 



74 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

the roads from Eichmond while the army passed. 
No attempt was made by the enemy to impede 
our march, however, but Warren and Wilson 
reported the enemy strongly fortified in their 
front." 1 

General Badeau TVTites somewhat more at leno^th, 
on pp. 348 and 349 of his second volume, and 
states : " . . . Warren and Wilson now reported, 
from the other side of the Chickahominy, that 
the enemy in their front had seized and fortified 
strong positions, north of the James. Lee, in- 
deed, had discovered the movement at daybreak, 
and telegraphed to Richmond that the army of 
Grant had left his front. He seemed, however, 
unable to divine the intentions of the national 
commander, for Warren's disjjositions com- 
pletely masked the operations of the Army of 
the Potomac ; some sharp skirmishing occurred 
at Riddle's shop, in the White Oak Swamp, and 
Lee doubtless supposed a direct advance on 
Richmond to be the object of Grant, for he 
entrenched in front of Wilson and Warren. His 
appearance here indicated one of the dangers to 
which Grant's army was exposed, that of attack 
on the right, in the midst of the flianking move- 
ment. ..." 

It is safe to say that if the original order of 
General Grant had been carried out as given, a 
more extended account and a more direct refer- 
ence to the headquarters of the Army of the 
Potomac would have been developed. 

1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 289. 



PETERSBURG. 75 

Turning now to the accounts of the passage 
of the James River by the Army of the Potomac 
and the attack upon Petersburg by General W. 
F. Smith, June 15, 1864, we find in the Memoirs 
(vol. ii., pp. 293-295) as foUows : — 

" I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran 
up to Bermuda Hundred to see General Butler 
for the purpose of directing a movement against 
Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the 
Potomac were crossing. 

" I had sent General W. P. Smith back from 
Cold Harbor by the way of White House, thence 
on steamers to City Point for the purpose of 
giving General Butler more troops with which to 
accomplish this result. General Butler was or- 
dered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, 
as far as that could be conveniently done, from 
other parts of the Army of the James. ... 

" The distance which Smith had to move to 
reach the enemy's lines was about six miles, . . . 
Smith was to move under cover of night, up close 
to the enemy's w^orks, and assault as soon as he 
could after daylight ... I informed General 
Butler that Hancock's corps would cross the river 
and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case 
the latter was successful, . . . 

" I returned down the river to where the troops 
of the Army of the Potomac now v/ere, com- 
municated to General Meade, in writing, the 
directions I had given to General Butler and 
directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock's corps 



76 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

over under cover of night, and push them forward 
in the morning to Petersburg; halting them, 
however, at a designated point until they could 
hear from Smith. I also inf orm-ed General Meade 
that I had ordered rations from Bermuda Hun- 
dred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to 
issue them speedily, and to lose no more time 
than was absolutely necessary. The rations did 
not reach him, however, and Hancock, while he 
got all his corps over during the night, remained 
until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. 
He then moved without them, and on the road 
received a note from General W. F. Smith, asking 
him to come on. This seems to be the first in- 
formation that General Hancock had received of 
the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that 
anything particular was expected of him. Oth- 
erwise he would have been there by four o'clock 
in the afternoon." 

On page 298 of the same volume. General 
Grant continues this last thought as follows : " If 
General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been 
communicated to him, that of&cer, with his usual 
promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon 
the ground around Petersburg as early as four 
o'clock in the afternoon of the loth. The days 
were long and it would have given him consider- 
able time before night. I do not think there is 
any doubt that Petersburg itself could have been 
carried without much loss ; or, at least, if pro- 
tected by inner detached works, that a line could 



PETERSBURG. 77 

have been established very much in rear of the 
one then occupied by the enemy. This would 
have given us control of both the Weldon and 
South Side railroads. This would also have saved 
an immense amount of hard fighting which had 
to be done from the 15th to the ISth, and would 
have given us greatly the advantage in the long 
siege which ensued. " 

It is difficult to see how General Grant's in- 
sinuation can be applied justly to General Meade, 
as it is evidently intended it shall be. General 
Grant himself says that he went to see Gen- 
eral Butler, "for the purpose of directing a 
movement against Petersburg, while our troops 
of the Army of the Potomac were crossing^ 
The movement was to be made by General W. F. 
Smith, who was to report back to General Butler 
for that purpose, and who was to be reinforced 
from General Butler's command. General Ba- 
deau says that " Grant proceeded, by transport, 
to Bermuda Hundred, to issue the necessary or- 
ders for the immediate capture of Petersburg," ^ 
and the circumstances would seem to justify the 
confidence of the language used. Nearly four- 
teen thousand infantry, two thousand four hun- 
dred cavalry and a proper proportion of artillery, 
certainly constituted a force that could reasonably 
be expected to capture the city when guarded, as 
it was, by far less than five thousand men all 
told.^ General Grant evidently looked upon the 

1 Mil Hist., vol. ii., p. 352. 2 y^. Camp., pp. 206, 207. 



78 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

matter in that light ; for he says that he informed 
General Butler that General Hancock would 
move to Petersburg " to support Smith in case 
the latter was successful^ He also says that 
" Smith was to move under cover of night, up 
close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon 
as he could after daylight^'' and that he directed 
General Meade " to cross Hancock's corps over 
under cover of night, and push them forward in 
the morning to Petersburg." After using all 
possible despatch, the Second Corps had only 
crossed the James River at daylight of the 15th, 
and then, by the most direct route, was at least 
sixteen miles from the outer defences of Peters- 
burg, and could not, by any possibility, partici- 
pate in the assault as projected. Rations were 
also to be issued ; and General Badeau states that, 
when ordering the sixty thousand rations to be 
sent to Windmill Point for General Hancock, 
General Grant informed General Butler that 
" without this precaution, the services of this corps 
cannot be had /or any emergency to-morrow ^ ^ 
General Grant directed General Meade, after 
issuing rations with as little delay as possible, to 
push the Second Corps " forward in the morn- 
ing to Petersburg; halting them, however, at a 
designated j^oint until they coidd hear from 
Smith'^ ; and General Badeau states that, after 
returning to Wilcox's Landing from Bermuda 
Hundred, General Grant, at 8 p. m., sent word to 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 354. 



PETERSBURG. 79 

General Butler that " General Hancock's corps . . . 
will march in the morning direct for Petersburg, 
with directions however to halt at a point on 
that road nearest City Point, unless he receives 
further orders. If the force going into Peters- 
burg finds reinforcements necessary, hy sending 
hack to General Hancock he will push for- 
ward." ^ 

General Meade's duty under the orders he 
received would seem to have been to get Gen- 
eral Hancock with his corps to this " designated 
point " with the least possible delay, that the re- 
inforcements might be available if needed ; and 
this he certainly accomplished. 

From General Badeau it appears that, at 
half past eight a. m. of the 14th, General Meade 
directed General Hancock to begin crossing the 
James River on transports, and that, at half past 
nine, he said : " You need not spend any time in 
taking up a line, but hold yourself ready to move, 
as you may receive orders to march to Peters- 
hurg, in which case rations will be sent you from 
City Point." 2 

General Humphreys states as follows : "On 
the evening of the 14th he [Hancock] was di- 
rected by General Meade to hold his troops in 
readiness to move, and was informed that it was 
probable he would be instructed to march toward 
Petersburg, and that rations for his command 
would be sent him from City Point. At ten 

1 Mil Hist, vol. ii., pp. 353, 354. 2 i^., pp. 351, 352. 



80 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

o'clock that night the following despatch was sent 
him by General Meade : ' General Butler has 
been ordered to send to you at Windmill Point 
60,000 rations. So soon as these are received 
and issued, you will move your corps by the most 
direct route to Petersburg, taking up a position 
where the Citj^^ Point Railroad crosses Harrison's 
Creek, where we now have a work. After Bar- 
low has crossed you will cross as much of your 
artillery and ammunition train as possible up to 
the moment you are ready to move, and if all is 
quiet at that time the ferriage of the rest can be 
continued and they can join you.' But the ra- 
tions did not arrive, as expected, that night or 
the next morning, and the corps marched with- 
out them at half past ten on the 15th." ^ In a 
foot-note he states further : — 

"At 7.30 A. M. of the 15th, after receiving 
several despatches from General Hancock con- 
cerning the rations, and the readiness of the 
corps for movement. General Meade sent a de- 
spatch to him saying : ' You will not wait for the 
rations, but move immediately to the position 
assigned you last evening,' etc., etc. Then, con- 
tinuing, ' Your despatch just received ' (concern- 
ing the reported arrival of rations, which turned 
out to be erroneous). ^ It is important you should 
move. Exercise your judgment as to which will 
be best, to issue rations now, or send them as 
directed in the foregoing.' At nine o'clock, 
1 Va. Camp., p. 205. 



PETERSBURG. 81 

finding that the rations had not arrived, General 
Hancock ordered the corps to move, but the 
signal officer by whom the order was sent failed 
in some way to communicate it ; and the boat in 
which Colonel Morgan, who carried the same 
order, crossed the river grounded, so that the 
column did not begin to move until half-past 
ten." 

All accounts show that, as far as General 
Meade and General Hancock were concerned, no 
unnecessary delay occurred in crossing and start- 
ing upon the march ; for the corps finally moved 
without the rations which General Grant had, 
with such emphasis, ordered to be supplied by 
General Butler. It is clear also that — in crossing 
the Second Corps as expeditiously as possible; 
in starting it upon the prescribed route without 
delay ; and in instructing General Hancock, who 
never needed urging, that it was important he 
should move immediately to the position as- 
signed him — General Meade had carried out 
General Grant's orders as General Grant says 
they were given to him. 

Unquestionably, General Hancock was in- 
formed by General Meade that Petersburg was 
his ultimate objective point ; but, under the 
orders given hy General Grant, he could not 
have reached, or have been expected to reach, 
that place sooner than he did, for he was con- 
fined to the indistinctly " designated point," 
" where the City Point Railroad crosses Harri- 



82 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

son's Creek, where we now have a work/' until 
he received further orders which could only 
come from General Grant or hy his authority. 
This is sustained by General Badeau's statement 
that at 3.30 p. m., on the 15th, General Grant 
said to General Butler : " The Second Corps, 
28,000 strong, was directed to march this morn- 
ing, on the direct road from Windmill Point to 
Petersburg, stopping at Harrison's Creek, in the 
absence of further orders. ... I have sent 
back orders to hurry up this corps. If you 
require it, send back to General Hancock, under 
cover to General Gibbon, with directions for him 
to read, and the corps will push forward with all 
speed." ^ It is also sustained by the fact stated 
by General Humphreys, on p. 208, that it was 
ahout four o'clock in the afternoon when 
General Grant, through a staff officer, informed 
General Smith that the Second Corps was march- 
ing towards him. Had his orders been simply to 
move to Petersburg by the most direct route 
from Windmill Point, General Hancock undoubt- 
edly would have reached there by four o'clock 
in the afternoon. The " designated point," 
however, at which he was so expressly ordered to 
halt, was at some unknown distance to the right 
of the most direct route through Prince George 
Court House, and he had not yet reached this 
point, nor indeed been able to locate it, at 
half past fivje in the afternoon, when he received 

^Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 379. 



PETERSBURG. 83 

General Grant's order to hasten to the assistance 
of General Smith, and General Smith's request 
that he would come up as rapidly as possible.^ 

General Hancock's report as quoted by Gen- 
eral Badeau states ^ : " The messages from Lieu- 
tenant-General Grant and from General Smith 
which I received between five and six p. m., on 
the 15th, were the first and only intimations I 
had that Petersburg was to be attacked that day. 
Up to that hour I had not been notified from 
any source that I was expected to assist General 
Smith in assaulting that city." General Grant 
regards this as established. By his statement 
that he "communicated to General Meade, in 
writing, the directions I (he) had given to Gen- 
eral Butler," and his suggestion that " if General 
Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communi- 
cated to him," success would have followed the 
movements of the day, he evidently intends to 
place upon General Meade the responsibility for 
General Hancock's want of information and con- 
sequent failure to reach Petersburg at four o'clock 
in the afternoon. 

In his "History of the Second Army Corps," 
just published. General Francis A. Walker (then 
assistant adjutant-general of the corps), after 
referring to the delay caused by waiting for 
rations and the endeavor to find the " desig- 

1 Va. Camp., p. 209 ; and Walker's Hist. Second Army Corps, 
pp. 529, 530. 

2 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 377. 



84 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

nated point," on p. 528 states very positively : 
" Although the immediate cause of this loss of 
time was found in the misunderstandings and 
miscarryings related, the real cause lay in the 
failure of General Grant to inform General 
Meade of Smith's contemplated attach^ Gen- 
eral Walker is not disproved by General Grant 
or General Badeau. 

On p. 377 of his second volume, General 
Badeau quotes General Meade's endorsement 
upon General Hancock's request for an investi- 
gation as follows : " Had General Hancock and 
myself been apprised in time of the contemplated 
movement against Petersburg and the necessity 
of his cooperation, I am of the opinion that he 
could have been pushed much earlier to the 
scene of operations ; but as matters occurred, 
and with our knowledge of them, I do not see 
how any censure can be attached to General 
Hancock and his corps." 

General Badeau resents the intimation that 
General Grant had not properly informed his 
subordinates as to his plans, and presumably pre- 
sents his strongest attainable arguments against 
it. He first scouts the idea of ignorance, on the 
part of Generals Meade and Hancock, of Gen- 
eral Grant's plans as intimated by the movement 
of the Second Corps, as refuted by the military 
reputation of either officer. General Grant, how- 
ever, does not agree with his historian on this 
point ; for, as we have seen, he claims ignorance 



PETERSBURG. 85 

on General Hancocivs part as the basis for an 
attempted reflection on General Meade, but pro- 
duces no evidence further than his own insinua- 
tion. Continuing his argument, after repeating 
as evidence the orders and despatches which have 
been considered, and after stating that, on the 
evening of the 14th, " Grant communicated his 
plans to Meade in conversation^ as was often 
the case," General Badeau says : " At 6.30 p. 
M.^ on the 15th, hefore Meade could have heard 
of Hancock^ s arrival at the front, he ordered 
Burnside * to cross the river immediately and 
move up to Harrison's Creek, and form on Han- 
cock's left. Harrison's Creek is about two and 
a half miles from Petersburg. General W. F. 
Smith advanced on Petersburg this morning, 
and has been engaged with the enemy all day, 
Hancock left this morning for the same place 
or Harrison's Creek, and is supporting Smith, 
The commanding general directs that you do the 
same.' " The italics in this quotation are General 
Badeau's. He evidently feels that he here makes 
a strong point. He seems to have forgotten that 
but a few leaves back in this same volume, on 
p. 363, he had said : " This day. Grant's head- 
quarters were removed to City Point, and, during 
the afternoon, the general-in-chief became satis- 
fied that Lee was crossing the James, in force, 
near Drury's Bluff. He at once sent word to 
Meade, at Windmill Point, to dispatch another 
corps to Peter shiirg. ' A night march,' he said, 



86 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

' may be necessary.' This order was received at 
six o'clock, and Bur7iside, still on the northern 
bank, was immediately put in ^notion, crossing 
the James by the pontoon bridge." Certainly 
this does not weaken General Meade's state- 
ment. 

In the conclusion of his argument, on p. 379, 
General Badeau states : " Hancock moved ex- 
actly as he had been ordered; and when six 
miles from Petersburg, received Grant's orders 
to advance in support of Smith. He did advance 
promptly, connecting with that commander, 
' about five o'clock.' The comhination was com- 
plete. Grant found no fault with Meade or 
Hancock, and so informed them, stating that 
no investigation was necessary." 

In consideration of the acknowledgments con- 
tained in this passage one would willingly over- 
look the inexactness of a few hours in the time 
mentioned therein, but justice requires that the 
subject should conclude with a further quotation 
from General Walker's " History of the Second 
Corps." In a foot-note on page 530, that author, 
now unquestionably the highest living authority 
upon the point in question, says : " A great deal 
has been made of the despatch said to have been 
sent by General Hancock to General Butler, in- 
forming that officer that his (Hancock's) leading 
division connected with General Smith ^ about 
five o'clock.' Badeau uses this to disprove the 
statements of Meade and Hancock relative to the 



JETERSVILLE. 87 

operations of the 15th. Such a despatch was sent, 
but the hour named was not five o'clock. At 
that time Hancock was still several miles from 
Petersburg, and had not the faintest notion that 
General Smith was assaulting that place. The 
hour written was probably eight o'clock, the 
figures 5 and 8, when written in pencil, on a 
scrap of paper, by the light of a camp-fire, being 
easily confounded." The italics are General 
Walker's. 

One reference more will suiBce to indicate the 
spirit manifest in both the " Military History " 
and the "Personal Memoirs" towards General 
Meade. In General Badeau's statement of 
events connected with the movements around 
Jetersville, April 3 to 5, 1865, we find ^ : 

"Meanwhile, discovering that Lee and his 
army were certainly at Amelia, Sheridan hurried 
up the Fifth Corps, and ordered Griffin to in- 
trench across the railroad until he could be rein- 
forced. The isolated command went into position, 
throwing up breastworks as it arrived, and Sheri- 
dan at once sent information back to Grant that 
he had intercepted Lee. As Meade, however, 
was nearer than the general-in-chief, and time 
was of inestimable importance now, he despatched 
an aide-de-camp also to the head-quarters of the 
Army of the Potomac, at Deep Creek, where 
Humphreys had gone into camp — a long day's 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., pp. 553-556. 



88 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

march from Jetersville. It was well into the 
night before the messenger arrived. Meade was 
unwell, and had taken to his soldier's bed, but 
he roused himself at the stirring news. His 
men were weary with their march, and with 
helping wagons out of the mire; they had no 
rations in their haversacks, and the supply trains 
were far in the rear. But the sick commander 
issued an order to march at three o'clock in the 
morning. 

" At 10.45 p. M., he sent word to Grant : ' I 
have ordered Humphreys to move out at all 
hazards at three a. m. ; but if the rations can be 
issued to them prior to that, to march as soon as 
issued ; or if the temper of the men on hearing 
the despatch of General Sheridan communicated 
to them leads to the belief that they will march 
with spirit, then to push on at once as soon as 
they covdd be got under arms. . . . You may 
rest assured that every exertion will be made by 
myself and subordinate commanders to reach the 
point with the men in such condition that they 
may be availahlefor instant action, . . .' Meade 
was full of fire on this occasion. Every-thing he 
said and did was in splendid soldierly spirit. 
' The troops will be put in motion,' he said in 
his order, ' regardless of every consideration but 
the one of ending the war. . . . The major- 
general commanding impresses on all, of&cers 
and men, the necessity of promptitude, and of 
undergoing the necessities and privations they 



JETERSVILLE. 89 

are herein enjoined to. The major-general com- 
manding feels he has but to recall to the Army 
of the Potomac the glorious record of its repeated 
and gallant contests with the Army of Northern 
Virginia, and when he assures the army that, in 
the opinion of so distinguished an of&cer as 
Major-General Sheridan, it only requires these 
sacrifices to bring this long and desperate contest 
to a triumphant issue, the men of his army will 
show that they are as willing to die of fatigue 
and of starvation as they have ever shown them- 
selves ready to fall by the bullets of the enemy.' 

" Meade himself was willing to make his own 
sacrifices. He was the senior of Sheridan in 
rank and service, but he sent him word : ' The 
Second and Sixth Corps shall be with you as soon 
as possible. In the meantime your wishes or 
suggestions as to any movement other than the 
simple one of overtaking you will be promptly 
acceded to by me, regardless of any other con- 
sideration than the vital one of destroying the 
Army of Northern Virginia.' This was the stuff 
of which commanders should be made. 

"Humphreys moved between one and two 
o'clock, and Wright at three in the morning, both 
corps without rations. Meanwhile Sheridan had 
recalled Merritt and Mackenzie from the right, 
and the head of Meade's command encountered 
the cavalry marching in the darkness. The 
double column crowded the road, and the infan- 
try was delayed till Merritt's troopers had 



90 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

passed. ... It was indispensable, however, that 
the cavalry should have precedence, and Hum- 
phreys accordingly gave way, but took advan- 
tage of the enforced halt to issue rations to his 
command. Between seven and eiofht a. m. he 
moved as^ain. 

" At night on the 4th, Grant was at Wilson's 
station, on the Southside road, with the Army of 
the James. . . . 

"Before daylight on the 5th, Grant received 
Meade's despatch of the night before, and repHed 
at once, from his bivouac at Wilson's station : 
'Your note of 10.45 last night and order for 
movement this morning is received. I do not see 
that greater efforts can be made than you are 
making to get up with the enemy. We want to 
reach the remnant of Lee's army wherever it may 
be found, by the shortest and most practicable 
route. That your order provides for, and has my 
very hearty approval. 

After notinof that General Sheridan sent Gen- 
eral Davies, on the morning of the 5th, to Paine's 
cross-roads, and the result, General Badeau, on 
page 559 of his third volume, says : " By two 
o'clock Meade had arrived at Jetersville, in ad- 
vance of the Second Corps, which came up an 
hour later. Meade, however, was still unwell, 
and requested Sheridan to put the Army of the 
Potomac in position as it arrived. Accordingly 
Sheridan put two divisions of Humphreys on the 
left of the Fifth Corps, and one on the right. 



JETERSVILLE. 91 

while Meade retired to a little house near by, 
where Sheridan had slept the night before. Mer- 
ritt had also now come up, and was placed on the 
left of the infantry. The vigorous movement 
against Crook on the left led Sheridan to believe 
that Lee was attempting to escape in that direc- 
tion, and he was anxious to attack at once with 
the force in hand — his cavalry and two corps of 
infantry ; but at this juncture Meade felt himself 
well enough to come out and assume command, 
and, much to Sheridan's mortification, he decided 
not to attack until the arrival of the Sixth 
Corps." 

General Grant's account of the approach to 
Jetersville is somewhat more condensed than that 
of General Badeau. He says ^ : " Griffin's corps 
was intrenched across the railroad south of Jeters- 
ville, and Sheridan notified me of the situation. / 
again ordered Meade up with all dispatch, 
Sheridan having but the one corps of infantry 
with a little cavalry confronting Lee's entire army. 
Meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now 
pushed forward with great energy, although he 
was himself sick and hardly able to be out of 
bed." 

Continuing the narrative from where it is left 
by the last quotation from General Badeau, he 
adds^: "At this juncture Sheridan sent me a 
letter which had been handed to him by a col- 
ored man, with a note from himself saying that 

1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 465, 466. ^ j^j.^ pp. 468, 469. 



92 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

he wished I was there myself. ... I received 
a second message from Sheridan on the Sth, in 
which he urged more emphatically the importance 
of my presence. This was brought to me by a 
scout in gray uniform. ... It was nearly night 
when this letter was received. I gave Ord direc- 
tions to continue his march to Burkesville . . . 
I then started with a few of my staff and a very 
small escort of cavalry, going directly through the 
woods, to join Meade's army. The distance was 
about sixteen miles ; but the nig^ht bein<r dark our 
progress was slow through the woods in the ab- 
sence of direct roads. However, we got to the 
outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and 
after some little parley convinced the sentinels of 
our identity and were conducted in to where Sher- 
idan was bivouacked. We talked over the situa- 
tion for some little time, Sheridan exj^laining to 
me what he thought Lee was trying to do, and 
that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the 
right flank, would give him the coveted opportu- 
nity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him. 
"We then together visited Meade, reaching 
his headquarters about midnight. I explained to 
Meade that we did not want to follow the enemy ; 
we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his 
orders would allow the enemy to escape, and be- 
sides that, I had no doubt that Lee was moving 
right then. Meade changed his ordei^s at once. 
They were 71oid given for an advance on Amelia 
Court House, at an early hour in the morning, as 



JETERSVILLE. 93 

the army then lay ; that is, the infantry being 
across the railroad, most of it to the west of the 
road, with the cavaby swung out still farther to 
the left." 

Why "Humphreys had gone into camp — a 
long day's march from Jetersville " on the night 
of the 4th, should here be briefly stated. On the 
night of the 3rd, the Fifth Corps and the cavalry 
camped at Deep Creek, the Second Corps not far 
behind. General Grant and General Meade, with 
the Sixth and Ninth Corps, camped at Sutherland 
Station.^ At daylight on the 4th, General Mer- 
ritt moved toward the Appomattox, General 
Crook toward the Danville Road south of Jeters- 
ville, and the Fifth Corps toward Jetersville. 
General Grant accompanied General Ord's com- 
mand on the Cox Road along the Southside Rail- 
road. " The roads were all bad, and the cavalry 
often cut into the infantry columns, which were 
instructed always to give it way."^ General 
Grant, at noon, was informed by General Sheridan 
of his movements, and communicated the same 
to General Meade, with the direction : " If you 
cannot find roads free from trains, let your troops 
pass them and press on, making as long a march 
today as possible." ^ This was received by Gen- 
eral Meade by 2.30 p. m., and is undoubtedly the 
order to which General Grant refers when (Mem., 
vol. ii., p. 464) he says : " After I had received 
the despatch from Sheridan saying that Crook 
1 Mil Hist., vol. iii., p. 547. 2 i^., p. 549. 3 la., p. 550. 



94 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

was on the Danville Road, I immediately ordered 
Meade to make a forced march with the Army 
of the Potomac." General Badeau, continuing, 
says : " The Second Corps arrived at Deep Creek 
between seven and eight o'clock. The men were 
fatigued, having been marching, working, or 
standing for fourteen hours ; they were out of 
rations, expecting to receive them during the 
night. Meade, therefore, directed Humphreys 
to go into bivouac." ^ 

General Humphreys says : " The Second and 
Sixth Corps had followed the Fifth Corps closely 
until about eleven o'clock in the morning of the 
4:th, when Merritt's cavalry, coming in from the 
right, and having precedence, necessarily delayed 
the progress of the infantry, so that it was night 
by the time it reached Deep Creek." ^ In a foot- 
note on the next page he adds : " Large working 
parties from the Second and Sixth Corps were at 
work on the roads during the 3d, 4th, and 5th, for 
they were nearly impassable for wagon trains." 

According to General Badeau, it was well into 
the night when the aide-de-camp sent by General 
Sheridan to General Meade, to notify him of 
the situation at Jetersville at the time that he 
sent the same information to General Grant, 
reached General Meade. He states also that, at 
10.45 P.M., General Meade informed General 
Grant as to the orders he had issued for the im- 
mediate movement of the Second and Sixth 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., p. 550. 2 y^^ Camp., p. 374. 



JETERSVILLE. 95 

Corps^ and that General Grant received and an- 
swered General Meade's despatch " before day- 
light on the 5th." General Grant was then at 
Wilson's Station, and General Meade at Deep 
Creek, about half-way between Wilson's Station 
and Jetersville. If General Grant received Gen- 
eral Meade's despatch at, say, four a. m., more 
than an hour before day-break, it would have 
been over five hours in reaching him. As General 
Meade was halted on the most direct route from 
Jetersville to Wilson's Station, it is not probable 
that General Sheridan's communication reached 
General Grant much, if at all, in advance of 
General Meade's, if indeed it did not accompany 
it. It is difficult, therefore, to understand how 
General Grant could possibly have " again ordered 
Meade up with all dispatch," and that order have 
been the incentive to General Meade's exer- 
tions ; for General Meade had started the Second 
Corps upon the road at one o'clock, and the 
Sixth Corps followed an hour later, or at least 
an hour hefore General Grant could have re- 
ceived the despatches from Jetersville, and at 
least five hours before an order from General 
Grant, based on those despatches, could have 
reached him. General Grant evidently had 
neither desire nor intention that General Meade 
should '' achieve a separate renown." 

In connection with the statements given of Gen- 
eral Sheridan's anxiety to move at once, after the 
arrival of the Second Corps at Jetersville, in an 



96 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

attack upon General Lee at Amelia Court House, 
it is well to remember that, on the afternoon of 
the 5th, General Lee advanced towards Jetersville 
for the purpose of attacking General Sheridan 
if he had not been reinforced.^ General Lee had 
with him General W. H. F. Lee's cavalry ; and 
General Longstreet's, General Ewell's, General 
Anderson's, and General Gordon's corps : ^ ac- 
cording to General Badeau's estimate (vol. iii., 
p. 551), "more than forty thousand soldiers." 
Informed by his cavalry that General Sheridan 
had been reinforced, General Lee turned to the 
right and crossed Flat Creek, about five miles 
from the position held by General Meade ; Gen- 
eral Longstreet, with the head of his column, 
reaching Amelia Sulphur Springs just after sun- 
set.^ At Sailor's Creek, the next day, the cav- 
alry corps, with the Sixth Corps, were engaged 
with not over one fourth of General Lee's com- 
mand, attacking them in flank and rear while in 
retreat and without artillery ; ^ and the record of 
that affair would seem to indicate that General 
Meade had made no injudicious decision when 
he determined to await the arrival of the Sixth 
Corps at Jetersville before making a front attack 
upon the whole command in position to receive 
him. 

General Badeau's account of the situation on 
General Grant's arrival at Jetersville on the night 

1 Va. Camp., p. 376, 2 j^., p. 375. 

8 Id., pp. 382, 383 ; and MU. Hist., vol. iii., p. 567. 



JETERSVILLE. 97 

of the 5th, reads : " He found the eavahy com- 
mander more than anxious lest Lee should effect 
his escape. The Sixth Corps had arrived at six 
o'clock, and was placed by Meade on the right 
of the army, but no arrangement had been made 
to advance before morning." And he says further : 
"Meade's orders all contemplated a movement 
by the right flank, . . ."^ General Grant is 
equally vague in his statement with regard to 
this order. Neither author offers any informa- 
tion as to its requirements or instructions, and 
both here ignore General Meade's despatch of 
8.30 A. M. April 5, which is quoted by General 
Badeau (vol. 3, p. 55S) as saying: "Sheridan 
moving the cavalry would indicate the situation 
of affairs at Jetersville changed. I have sent 
forward to inquire, and if it is not necessary to 
go to Jetersville, I will move on the most direct 
road to FarmvilleJ^ 

General Humphreys more explicitly says : 
" At eight o'clock on the night of the 5th, Gen- 
eral Meade, m Ms despatch to General Grant, 
who had not yet arrived at Jetersville, informed 
him that as the Sixth Corps could not get up 
until about six o'clock, he was unable to attack 
that night, but that he would attack Lee at six 
o'clock on the morning of the 6th with the 
Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, in conjunction 
with General Sheridan. In accordance with that 
despatch, he directed those corps to advance the 

1 MIL Hist., vol. iii., p". 563. 



98 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

next morning at that hour on the enemy at 
Amelia Court House, and attack him, the Fifth 
Corps to move along the rail-road^ the Second 
Corps on its left, the Sixth Corps on its right.'' ^ 
There is in this no hint of any changed orders 
or of any ordered movements by either flank. 

As Jetersville is about two and a half miles 
south, and over six miles west, of Amelia Court 
House, and as General Lee must move west- 
ward, or south, if he left the latter place at all, 
one fails to understand how General Meade could 
possibly have arranged, even in contemplation, 
the project of a movement for attack hy his right 
flank and in pursuit of his enemy. His estab- 
lished reputation as a soldier forbids the suppo- 
sition that, having reached Jetersville after the 
severest toil and exertion, undergone for the 
express purpose of intercepting General Lee's 
retreat, his next movement would have been to 
retrace, unnecessarily, any of the steps so pain- 
fully taken.2 



1 Va. Camp., pp. 377, 378. 

2 Since the above was written, the following information, 
kindly taken by General Fred. T. Locke from his diary while 
assistant adjutant-general Fifth Army Corps, has been received : 
"We received orders (the Fifth Corps) on the 5th of April, 
1865, in the afternoon, I think, to report to General Meade, 
commanding A. of P. Order came from General Sheridan. 
The same evening received orders from General Meade to march 
at 6 A. M. April 6th to Amelia C. H. April 6, marched at 6 
A. M. in the direction of Amelia C. H., halted within three 
miles of the C. H., and were ordered by General Meade in person 
— General Grant being with him — to take the Pridenville road 



JETERSVILLE. 99 

On the morning of the 6th, General Ord was 
notified by General Sheridan that General Lee 
was apparently moving direct for Burkes ville 
Junction.^ On the morning of the 7th, General 
Humphreys was informed from headquarters that 
General Lee was probably moving toward Dan- 
ville ; ^ and at about four o'clock in the afternoon 
of the same day General Grant informed him 
that General Lee could not recross to the south 
bank of the Appomattox at Farmville.^ 

Bearing these facts in mind, together with the 
constantly close and often retarding connection 
maintained between the cavalry corps and the 
infantry of the Army of the Potomac, and re- 
calling the accounts of the movement of the 
Army of the Potomac from the Wilderness to 
Spottsylvania Court House, one is not unpre- 
pared to find Generals Grant and Badeau again 
in error as to orders issued by General Meade. 

We have more than once referred to General 
Grant's acknowledgments of the character and 
ability of General Meade, which culminate in 
coupling his name with that of General Sherman 
in official commendation. We have seen that 
General Badeau repeats the same expressions; 
and, in quotations just made, that he recognizes 
the " splendid soldierly spirit " of General Meade, 

and march via Painesville to Ligonton Ford on the Appomattox 
— reaching the Ford about 8 p. m. that day after a march of 
30 miles and building three bridges on the way." 

1 Va. Camp., p. 385, and Mil. Hist., vol. iii., p. 567. 

2 Va. Camp., p. 389. » Mil. Hist, vol. iii., p. 584. 



100 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

until he " assumed " command over General 
Sheridan at Jetersville ; and that he could not 
but acknowledge him possessed of much of " the 
stuff of which commanders should be made." 
We find on p. 538 of the second volume of the 
Memoirs that, in his concluding estimate of the 
character of his subordinate, General Grant de- 
scribes him as an of&cer of great merit ; subor- 
dinate to an uncommon degree ; brave and con- 
scientious, and commanding the respect of all 
who knew him ; and, in spite of some drawbacks 
to his usefulness, arising from an unfortunate 
infirmity of temper and his training and experi- 
ence as an officer of the Engineer Corps before 
the war, "a most valuable officer and deserves a 
high place in the annals of his country." 

It is to be regretted that the leader of the vic- 
torious armies of our country could condescend 
to laborious effort to modify, almost to retrac- 
tion, his official commendations of the services 
of a magnanimous lieutenant Tvho, even General 
Badeau confesses, " never failed in soldierly 
loyalty." 

Before General Grant had been placed over 
him in command. General George G. Meade had 
achieved a separate renown ; and, even carping 
criticism bearing witness, he held it unsullied to 
the end. 



V 



lUEe'S STATIOM ' 



I UfASHINtTOM SCMaCMY 



^ 




TOTOPOTOMOY 

AND 

COLO HARBOR 



SCALE 

i r 1' t 



CHAPTER VI. 

GENERAL WARREN AT SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. 

On p. 107 of the second volume of the " Mil- 
itary History of U. S. Grant/' after relating the 
story of General Warren's assault upon General 
Ewell, in the Wilderness, May 5, 1864, General 
Badeau comments as follows : " This assault 
had been skilfully and gallantly made. Troops 
enough to ensure complete success had been or- 
dered to combine — all of the Fifth Corps and 
two divisions of Sedgwick's ; while, as has been 
seen, the ^^ro^/i/^^ness of the attack took the 
rebels by surprise ; but the labyrinth in which 
the movements were made rendered effectual 
co-operation impossible, even among the troops 
nearest each other, and Sedgwick's divisions 
were unable to attack at all. Only these circum- 
stances prevented the overthrow of Lee's entire 
left, for the rout at first was absolute." Gen- 
eral Grant condenses this into : " About this 
hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favor- 
able though not decisive results." ^ This con- 
ciseness is significant here only because of its 

1 Mem.f vol. ii., p. 193, 



102 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

being the first notice given by General Grant to 
General Warren's services in action under his 
supervision, and therefore introductory to the 
frequent and complex statements to which atten- 
tion must now be given. 

In his account of the movement from the 
"Wilderness to Spottsylvania Court House, on 
the night of May 7, General Grant makes more 
extended mention of the commander of the Fifth 
Army Corps. Commencing on p. 210 of the 
second volume of the Memoirs, he says : " Soon 
after dark Warren withdrew from the front of 
the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. 
Warren's march carried him immediately behind 
the works where Hancock's command lay on the 
Brock Eoad. With my staff and a small escort 
of cavalry I preceded the troops. Meade with his 
staff accompanied me. The greatest enthusiasm 
was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed 
by. No doubt it was inspired by the fact that the 
movement was south. It indicated to them that 
they had passed through the ' beginning of the 
end' in the battle just fought. The cheering 
was so lusty that the enemy must have taken 
it for a night attack. At all events it drew 
from him a furious fusillade of artillery and 
musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us." 
Then, following his speculations concerning the 
reasons for the failure to win success in the 
Wilderness engagement, and to reach Spottsyl- 
vania Court House in advance of General Lee's 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 103 

troops, on p. 213, he continues : " Anderson soon 
intrenched himself — if indeed the intrenchments 
were not abeady made — immediately across 
Warren's front. Warren was not aware of his 
presence, but probably supposed it was the cav- 
alry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the 
day. He assaulted at once, but was repidsed. 
He soon organized his men, as they were not 
pursued by the enemy, and made a second at- 
tack, this time with his whole corps. He now 
succeeded in gaining a position immediately in 
the enemy's front, where he intrenched. His 
riofht and left divisions — the former Crawford's, 
the latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cut- 
ler — drove the enemy back some distance. 

" At this time my headquarters had been ad- 
vanced to Piney Branch Church. I was anxious 
to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to 
his support. To this end Sedgwick, who was at 
Piney Branch Church, was ordered to Warren's 
support. . . . Sedgwick was slow in getting up 
for some reason — probably unavoidable, because 
he was never at fault when serious work was to 
be done — so that it was near night before the 
combined forces were ready to attack. Even then 
all of Sedgwick's command did not get into the 
engagement. Warren led the last assault, one 
division at a time, and of course it failed." 

Here follows the description of General War- 
ren's imputed twofold constitutional difficulty, 
which has already been quoted at length in our 



104 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

second chapter. Then, after an explanation of 
General Early's accidental detention of General 
Hancock at Todd's Tavern, near the foot of 
page 215, General Grant continues : — 

" Had I ordered the movement for the night 
of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put 
Hancock in the lead. It would also have given 
us an hour or more earlier start. It took all 
that time for Warren to get the head of his 
column to the left of Hancock after he had 
got his troops out of their line confronting 
the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity 
to use his whole force when necessary, would, no 
doubt, have enabled him to crush Anderson 
before he could be reinforced. But the move- 
ment made was tactical. . . . Then, too, I had 
not yet learned the special qualifications of the 
different corps commanders. At that time my 
judgment was that Warren was the man I would 
suggest to succeed Meade should anything hap- 
pen to that gallant soldier to take him from the 
field. As I have before said, Warren was a 
gallant soldier, an able man ; and he was besides 
thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and im- 
portance of the duty he had to perform." 

The first point to be noted in this account is, 
that, up to the evening of May 7, 1864, General 
Warren, as a gallant soldier and able man, actu- 
ated by a thorough comprehension of his duty, 
held a high place in the estimation of Lieutenant- 
General Grant. It is to the record of subse- 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 105 

quent events, therefore, one must look for an 
explanation of the evident change which so 
speedily occurred in the opinion of the com- 
mander-in-chief. Here, first in order of move- 
ments, is presented General Grant's insinuation 
that General Warren was so unnecessarily tardy 
in moving his troops from the Wilderness lines, 
that perhaps, after all, it would have been better 
had he (General Grant) risked the hazardous 
experiment of a movement by his left flank, so 
as to give General Hancock the lead on the road 
to Spottsylvania Court House. 

It is to be remarked, that while General 
Grant's memory is tenacious of some facts con- 
nected with the visit to General Hancock and 
the night ride to Todd's Tavern, it is noticeably 
oblivious as to others. General Badeau, whose 
account as a whole agrees substantially with 
General Grant's, makes no mention of dilatori- 
ness on General Warren's part. He says simply : 
" During the afternoon, Sheridan had a serious 
fight at Todd's Tavern, driving the rebel cavalry 
so as to make way for Warren ; and, as soon as the 
darkness was deep enough to conceal the move- 
ment, the Fifth Corps came out of its works, and 
fell into the road to Spottsylvania."^ There 
seems to be no question that the movement of 
the Fifth Corps commenced as ordered, at half 
past eight o'clock in the evening of the 7th, in 
accordance with the project of General Grant. 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 134. 



106 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

General Humphreys says, concerning this : 
" After overlooking, for a time, the commence- 
ment of the movement, General Meade, with 
General Grant, rode to General Hancock's head- 
quarters on the Brock Eoad, near the left of his 
line, to await there the arrival of the head of 
Warren's column, and about eleven o'clock set 
out for Todd's Tavern, in advance of the Fifth 
Corps, reaching there about midnight." ^ In a 
foot-note, on the same page, he adds : " While 
at General Hancock's headquarters it was learnt, 
about eleven o'clock, that the head of Warren's 
column was near by, halted and seriously delayed 
by the mounted troops of the Provost-Marshal- 
General, which, following the headquarters, had 
occupied the road instead of drawing out of it. 
General Warren had remained in the vicinity of 
the Lacy house to oversee the withdrawal of his 
troops, the most important part of his duty. 
Had he been at the head of his column the delay 
would not have occurred, since he would at once 
have notified General Meade of the obstruction, 
and it would have been removed immediately. 
The headquarters at once set out as the speediest 
way of removing the obstacle, and rode rapidly to 
Todd's Tavern, reaching there about midnight." 
It is not to be supposed that the necessity which 
shortened his visit to General Hancock that 
night, escaped the attention of General Grant. 

But had either General Warren or General 

1 Va. Camp., p. 58. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 107 

Hancock reached the point east of Todd's Tavern 
at any time that night before half -past three a. m., 
the time of General Warren's arrival, he would 
still have found General Fitz Lee's division, across 
the road to Spottsjlvania, confronting General 
Merritt ; for General Sheridan had not succeeded 
in " driving the rebel cavalry so as to make way 
for Warren." The road must still have been 
cleared, and there is no derogation in the belief 
that General Hancock could have reached the 
enemy in front of Spottsylvania Court House no 
sooner than did General Warren. The insinua- 
tion of reprehensible tardiness on General War- 
ren's part would seem here to be as unmerited as 
it is unnecessary. 

General Badeau's account of the debouchment 
of the Fifth Corps upon the field in front of 
Spottsylvania Court House, and the ensuing op- 
erations of the afternoon of May 8, differs from 
that of General Grant only in that General 
Badeau credits the troops with their march of the 
previous night and their engagement with the 
enemy since early that morning^ (which facts 
General Grant ignores), and in that he delegates 
to Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, the 
duty of embodying in a despatch to the War 
Department the reflections upon General War- 
ren's leadership. General Grant's most tangible 
accusation is when, concerning the closing opera- 
tions of the day, he says : " Warren led the last 

1 MU. Hist., vol. ii., p. 142. 



108 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

assault, one division at a time, and of course it 
failed." Mr. Dana's despatch, while equally in- 
accurate, is, at least, more specific. It is dated 
May 9, and relates to the operations of the after- 
noon of the 8th. As given by General Badeau 
in a foot note on page 144 of the second volume 
of the Military History, it is as follows : — 

" Prisoners were taken by Wilson, who reported 
that two divisions of Longstreet's " [Anderson's] 
"corps had just come up, they having marched 
all night. General Grant at once gave orders 
for attacking these troops with the whole of 
Warren's corps, to whose support Sedgwick was 
hurrying up, in order to destroy them before the 
rest of the rebel army could arrive. Warren, 
however, proceeded with exceeding caution, and 
when he finally did attack, sent a single division 
at a time, and ivas constantly repulsed. The 
general attack Generals Grant and Meade di- 
rected was never made, for reasons which I have 
not yet been able to learn, but successive assaults 
were made upon this and that point in the rebel 
positions, with no decisive results." 

The definite record, established on pages 59 to 
61 of " The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 
1865," contains the following facts : After re- 
lieving General Merritt's cavalry, about six o'clock 
in the morning of May 8, General Robinson's 
division, leading the Fifth Corps column and 
pushing before it the enemy's cavalry that had 
obstructed the road, reached the forks of the road 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, 109 

near Alsop's about half-past eight o'clock. The 
division, then moving down the left-hand road 
about a mile to where the forks reunite, reformed 
and moved across the open ground, which there 
occurred, till they were met by a sudden and 
heavy fire of musketry and artillery from the 
enemy holding the wood covering the junction 
of the old Court House Road with the Brock Road. 
General Robinson was severely wounded while 
leading his men and his division, its left having 
been turned, finally fell back, followed hij the 
enemy until they were checked by the Maryland 
Brigade, which formed in the woods from which 
the division had advanced. In the meantime 
General Griffin's division had moved down the 
right fork of the road, his leading brigade, under 
General Barfclett, in line of battle, and came un- 
der fire from the enemy very soon after General 
Robinson's division. General Bartlett's brigade 
was also somewhat disordered at first by the fire 
it encountered, but it quickly reformed under 
cover of its supports, and the division advanced 
to the line it held for several days. General Craw- 
ford coming up promptly with his division and 
driving the enemy from General Griffin's left. 
By this time. General Field's division of General 
Anderson's corps had come up and threatened 
General Griffin's right, but General Cutler's 
division of the Fifth Corps, arriving in its turn, 
pushed in to the attack, drove the enemy back 
and established a line connectino- with General 
Griffin. 



110 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

There was, in fact, but one attack upon the 
enemy's line before noon. The Fifth Corps, 
advancing with the head of its column deployed 
only enough to clear the road in front, coming 
suddenly upon the enemy in strong position, 
promptly moved forward to the attack, the leading 
divisions engaging practically together and the 
remainder of the corps participating immediately 
upon reaching the field. There does not appear 
to have been any delay or any repulse of a first 
attack followed by reorganization and advance by 
the whole corps. The divisions as they reached 
the ground fought their way, as they had done 
at Gettysburg, from column into line of battle, 
and the movement was continuous from com- 
mencement to ending, through more than two 
hours of what Confederate authority called 
"stubborn" fighting. 

Concerning the operations of the afternoon. 
General Humphreys says : " At one o'clock Gen- 
eral Meade ordered General Sedgwick to move 
to Spottsylvania Court House and unite with 
General Warren in an immediate and vigorous 
attack upon the enemy. . . . The arrangements 
for the attack of the Fifth and Sixth Corps were 
not completed until late in the afternoon, and it 
was then only partial, and not determined and 
vigorous. The ground was new to everyone, and 
the troops were tired. It was also made too late 
in the day to be followed up advantageously if 
successful. Some advance was made by a part of 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. Ill 

the Sixth Corps, and Penrose's New Jersey brigade 
of Wright's division, leading the advance in open 
ground, was repulsed by a sharp fire from the 
wood in their front. A little later, toward dusk, 
General Crawford passed over the open ground 
into the woods beyond — he had, it appears, passed 
the right of Longstreet's corps, and had come 
upon Rodes's division of Ewell's corps unexpect- 
edly to them, while they were moving by a flank, 
and forced them back three-quarters of a mile, 
it is stated, taking some prisoners. After night- 
fall Crawford fell back to the line of the corps." ^ 
One cannot discover here any warrant for 
General Grant's assertion that " Warren led the 
last assault, one division at a time, and of course 
it failed," or for Mr. Dana's statement that Gen- 
eral Warren was " constantly repulsed," and that 
"successive assaults were made upon this and 
that point in the rebel positions." At one 
o'clock General Sedgwick, who was at Piney 
Branch Church,^ was ordered to move to Spott- 
sylvania and unite with General Warren in an 
immediate attack upon the enemy. General 
Sedgioick therefore, by seniority of rank, com- 
manded the proposed combined attack ; and as no 
one will for a moment question General Grant's 
statement that " he was never at fault when se- 
rious work was to be done," it must be accepted 
that the failure to make the attack as ordered 
was "probably unavoidable," or at least had some 

^ Va. Camp., pp. 65, 66. ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 214. 



112 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

excuse, as General Humphreys has suggested, and 
was not to be charged to any inefficiency of the 
junior corps commander. General Humphreys 
assigns the credit for leading the only " assault " 
made that afternoon, by troops of the Fifth 
Corps, to General Crawford, whose movement 
was at least so far successful that he was not 
repulsed, but fell back unmolested after night to 
the line held by the corps. 

General Grant states that General Warren was 
not aware of General Anderson's presence at 
Spottsylvania, " but probably supposed it was the 
cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier in 
the day." The statement is not improbable. 
General Warren, though leading the advance of 
the Federal infantry, had at his command no 
means of learning the numbers and character of 
the troops opposing him, except through the 
developments of attack. 

The cavalry force he had engaged at six 
o'clock in the morning was still confronting him 
late in the afternoon ; for General Stuart, who 
reached the Court House with General Ander- 
son's column, extended the left of the Confeder- 
ate infantry line with General Fitz Lee's cavalry 
division, and occupied that position until the ar- 
rival of the main body of the army.^ With the 
Federal advance it was different. Thouo^h Gen- 
eral Merritt's cavalry division remained on and 

1 McClellan's Life and Campaigns of Maj .-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart^ 
pp. 408, 409. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 113 

near the Brock Road until near noon, after being 
relieved by the Fifth Corps in the early morning, 
and was engaged nowhere else that day, it was 
assigned no part whatever in the further advance 
of the infantry. General Wilson's cavalry di- 
vision, which had reached Spottsylvania Court 
House early in the morning, and was therefore 
in the rear of the enemy's right flank when 
General Warren attacked, was ordered to retire 
from the field and accordingly withdrew. Of this 
General Badeau (vol. ii., pp. MO, 141) says : — 

" Wilson moved promptly on the morning of 
the 8th, according to Sheridan's orders, which, 
in his case, had not been reversed by Meade ; 
and brushing away a mounted picket, crossed the 
Ny and pushed into Spottsylvania, where he en- 
countered and dispersed a body of rebel cavalry. 
He was about advancing upon Snell's bridge, to 
make the junction ddered with Merritt and 
Gregg, when he heard heavy firing from the 
north, on the roads from Todd's Tavern and 
Piney Branch Church, and moving towards the 
sound of battle, his advance soon found itself 
behind a line of rebel infantry — two divisions 
of Anderson's command. . . . But by this time 
Anderson . . . obliged Wilson to evacuate Spott- 
sylvania, etc. etc." In a foot-note he adds : 
"As soon as Sheridan learned the change which 
Meade had made in the orders to Merritt and 
Gregg, and the consequent isolation of Wilson, 
he sent orders to that of&cer to fall back from 
Spottsylvania." 



114 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

It is sufficient now to notice only that General 
Wilson started for Spottsylvania at ^ye o'clock 
in the morning;^ and that General Sheridan's 
order retiring him from the Court House must 
have been received about ten o'clock, and must 
have been issued after it was known to General 
Sheridan that General Warren was advancing 
toward the same objective with his progress im- 
peded by a force which might readily have been 
attacked successfully in flank and rear by Gen- 
eral Wilson had he been promptly advised. 

The report of Brigadier-General W. N. Pen- 
dleton, Chief of Artillery Army of Northern 
Virginia, touches upon this point and says : 
" About 9 A. M. of the 8th the head of the 
column came in sight of the court-house, and 
found the enemy just getting into view on the 
Fredericksburg road, driving back a small cavalry 
force which there opposed them. At the same 
time a strong infantry column assailed another 
cavalry force which disputed their entrance on 
the Todd's Tavern road. General Alexander, 
accompanying General Anderson with his ad- 
vanced column, immediately sent Major Haskell 
with two batteries to the assistance of our cav- 
alry. On the Todd's Tavern road two infantry 
brigades also went in support. These batteries 
were stubbornly engaged for two hours. Their 
ammunition being then exhausted and consider- 
able loss experienced, they were withdrawn. 

^ See Gen. Sheridan's Order, quoted in chapter iv. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 115 

During a part of the action they had suffered 
under a flank reverse fire from a battery he- 
longing to that force of the enemy which had 
reached the court-house by the other routed' 

The report of Brigadier-General John Bratton, 
C. S. Army, states : " We moved, in accordance 
with orders, across the raiboad by the Cathar- 
pin road to Spottsylvania Court-House, and ar- 
rived in the vicinity on the next morning (the 
8th) at about 10 o'clock to find the enemy's cav- 
alry in possession of and between us and the 
court-house. My brigade formed on the right 
of the road and moved down to the court-house, 
the enemy retiring before us and abandoning 
the place without a fight J^ 

It would seem that General Grant's order — 
" Push the enemy with all your might. That 's 
the way to connect." ^ — would have been in place 
with the commander of the cavalry corps at this 
earlier date. One finds grounds for more than 
mere idle speculation in the almost certainty of 
what might have been, had the hardy veterans 
of the First Cavalry Division been thrown in, as 
they could well have been, upon the left of Gen- 
eral Warren's line, and had General Wilson been 
pushed home upon the exposed Confederate 
right. 

General Grant expresses his regret that Gen- 
eral Meade's orders to his cavalry prevented 
General Warren from reinforcing General Wilson 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 177 (foot-uote). 



116 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

and holding the town/ but he omits all mention 
of General Sheridan's order, which called off 
General Wilson when he might have reinforced 
General Warren and have enabled him to gain 
the Court House. 

On May 10, Mr. Dana informed the authori- 
ties in Washington : " Further to the left, where 
Mott's division held ground between Wright and 
Burnside, we were disgraced hy the retreat of 
that dimsion without loss, and apparently with- 
out any considerable force to oppose them.'' ^ If 
he forwarded any comments on the withdrawal 
of General Wilson from Spottsylvania, General 
Badeau has failed to reproduce them. 

With regard to these despatches from Mr. 
Dana, it is well to note General Badeau's state- 
ment of their origin, character, and purpose. At 
the foot of page 144 of his second volume, that 
historian explains as follows : — 

" Grant was so averse to writing long despatches 
that the government sent the Honorable Charles 
A. Dana, at this time Assistant Secretary of War, 
to his head-quarters, to report more fully than 
the general-in-chief was in the habit of doing. 
Dana's despatches were not submitted to Grant, 
and furnish evidence which will not be suspected 
of partiality." 

In a note appended to his account of the Cold 
Harbor movements, on page 277 of the same 

1 Mem., vol. ii. p. 213. 2 j/j^. ^^^^^ y^i. ^i p. 157 (note). 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 117 

volume, he again remarks : " It must be remem- 
bered that Mr. Dana's criticisms were not invari- 
ably those of the general-in-chief , although they 
frequently, perhaps generally, concurred. Mr. 
Dana was naturally freer in his censures than the 
ofdcer whose responsibilities not only to those 
he commanded, but to the government and the 
country, were so great. Besides this, strictures 
often seemed warranted at the moment, which a 
fuller knowledge and later judgment quite re- 
versed. Probably, Dana himseK would not have 
hked to endorse all the despatches he sent from 
the turmoil of the camp and the battle-field. His 
opinions were his own ; but as a rule, the state- 
ments of fact that he made to the government 
were identical with what Grant believed at the 
tune." 

The concluding sentence demands notice of 
the despatches here. The impressions upon 
which they were based were unquestionably re- 
ceived in great part from General Grant, for 
whose rehef Mr. Dana was detailed, apparently 
in the especial character of censorial assistant, 
from the War Department. Doubtless also, 
willing aid was never lacking from Mr. Dana's 
companions on the lieutenant-general's staff — 
his despatches all evidencing the spirit declared 
by General Badeau to have prevailed at the 
headquarters of the armies of the United States. 
General Grant has entered no protest against 
their reproduction, although General Badeau, 



118 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

even while proffering them in evidence, acknowl- 
edges their possible injustice. Had they been 
revived simply as illustrations of what General 
Grant and those surrounding him " believed at 
the time/' there would be no occasion to remark 
upon them ; but when they are propounded as 
" evidence which will not be suspected of parti- 
ality," in support of statements opposed to facts 
established by a " fuller knowledge and later 
judgment," their character should be examined. 
In addition to what has been already quoted 
from them, one more example will suffice. 

On page 163 of his second volume. General 
Badeau adds a foot-note, saying : " Mr. Dana 
thus reports : ' The general assault took place 
about 6.30 p. m. I witnessed it on Warren's 
front, where it was executed with the caution 
and absence of comprehensive ensemble which 
seem to characterize that officer.' This criticism 
appears to me too severe." 

This report, formulated by a civilian bureau 
officer against the corps commander who but four 
days previously was regarded by General Grant 
as the possible successor to the command of the 
Army of the Potomac, is, singularly enough, 
appended by General Badeau to his account of 
General Warren's assault, which was made at 
about four o'clock in the afternoon of May 10, 
and which General Grant says was iwom'ptly 
made on a field which " was so densely covered 
with forest that but little could be seen, by any 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 119 

one person, as to the progress made." ^ In his 
account, General Badeau had said : " The point 
of attack was a densely wooded hill in front of 
Warren, its crest crowned with earthworks, and 
the entire front swept by cross and enfilading 
fires of musketry and artillery. . . . Grant and 
Meade took position on an elevated plateau op- 
posite the hill, to watch the battle ; but here, 
as in the Wilderness, the woods prevented them 
from observing in detail the progress of the fight. 
All they could discern was the wooded ridge in 
the background, the swamp at its base covered 
with underbrush, and nearer still, the lines of the 
troops about to enter the thicket. . . . Across 
the open plain, through reaches of wood, through 
depths of swamp, the lines of the battalions strug- 
gled forward under a fearful fire, until they were 
lost to view in the jungle and the smoke of bat- 
tle. . . . the troops pressed on and up within the 
woods, until at one or two points they mounted 
the enemy's breastworks. But their greeting was 
too terrible ; they stood for a moment on the 
crest, then wavered, and fell back, disordered by 
the enfilading fire on either side. ..." 

On the next page, he says of the assault Mr. 
Dana claims to have witnessed and which General 
Grant states was " gallantly made " : ^ — 

" Hancock had by this time arrived upon the 
field, with Birney's division. A furious cannon- 
ade was maintained while the troops that Warren 

1 Mem.f vol. ii., p. 223. 2 j^j,^ yoj jj^ p 224. 



120 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

had led were re-formed, anda< haJf-past six, the 
untired and undaunted Fifth corps, with two 
divisions of the Sixth, again advanced, this time 
under the immediate command of Hancock 
But the same obstacles were encountered which 
had forced the troops to retire two hours before 
and although they again reached, and again even 
overleapt the breastworks, they were unable to 
hold them, and fell back at dark, with serious 
loss. Price, a gaUant brigadier in the Fifth 
corps, was killed in the advance. That corps 
mdeed never bore less than its share of the hrunt 
of any battle, and none of its officers, of what- 
ever grade, failed to set a worthy example to 
their soldiers." 

Further comment on Mr. Dana's despatch 
would be superfluous. 

Of General Warren's part in the assault upon 
the salient. May 12, General Grant' states: 
_ . . Warren and Wright were ordered to hold 
themselves in readiness to join in the assault if 
circumstances made it advisable. . . About 
SIX o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the sup- 
port of Hancock. ... At eight o'clock Warren 
was ordered up again, but was so slow in makino- 
his dispositions that his orders were frequently 
repeated and with emphasis. At eleven o'clock 
1 gave Meade written orders to reheve Warren 
from his command if he failed to move promptly. 

' ■*/«»!., vol. ii., pp. 228 to 233. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 121 

... If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had 
been as prompt as Wright was with the 6th 
corps, better results might have been obtained. 

" Lee massed heavily /rom Ms left flank on the 
broken point of his line. . . . 

" Warren's corps was now temporarily broken 
up, Cutler's division sent to Wright, and Grifiin's 
to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff, 
General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and 
the remaining division, and authorized him to 
give it orders in his name." 

This was the occasion upon which General 
Grant's headquarters " were in a thickly wooded 
dell, from which it was impossible to distinguish 
any portion of the field, but the necessity of 
remaining at a point where he could be readily 
reached by every corps commander left him no 
option." 

Concerning General Warren, General Badeau 
amplifies substantially the same account as that 
outlined by General Grant, but states that Gen- 
eral Warren was ordered "to attack" instead of 
" to the support of Hancock." ^ On pages 182 
and 183, he remarks : "... No absolute tactical 
result was achieved by the exploit of the Second 
corps. 

" Hancock had indeed dealt the severest blow 
of the campaign, but, as happened in the Wilder- 
ness, under the same commander, after a brilliant 
and successful onset, his troops became disorgan- 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., pp. 177 to 185. 



122 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

ized by victory, and he seemed unable to follow 
up his advantage, or even to retain all that he had 
gained, until fresh supports arrived. He could 
inspire, but apparently not control his soldiers. 
In the Wilderness, all the splendid results of his 
success on the 6th of May, were lost by this 
same incapacity ; . . . But there are hundreds 
of men who can lead a charge, for one who can 
control his soldiers or his own faculties in the 
hurly-burly afterwards. One achievement re- 
quires physical courage and personal magnetism ; 
the other, mental and moral power. 

"It was, however, Warren's feebleness which 
especially prevented Grant from following up the 
advantage that Hancock had obtained ; and the 
trait which afterwards occasioned Warren's down- 
fall on the field of battle, was in this emergency 
at least equally conspicuous, and still more inop- 
portune. ..." 

The paragraph concerning General Hancock 
is here quoted as a specimen of the insatiable 
spirit of criticism, which is not only characteristic 
of General Badeau's writing, but, by his showing, 
was the unvarying sentiment of those surround- 
ing General Grant, who would seem to have felt 
called upon to neutralize as far as possible, all 
unavoidable acknowledgments of worth in his 
subordinates of the Army of the Potomac. The 
pages of the Memoirs indicate that General Grant 
himself sympathized with his historian. 

Referring to General Humphreys's account, on 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 123 

page 89, we find that, on the afternoon of the 
11th, General Meade received General Grant's 
order dated 3 P. M., instructing him " to move 
three divisions of the Second corps by the rear 
of the Fifth and Sixth corps under cover of 
night, so as to join the Ninth corps in a vigorous 
assault on the enemy at four o'clock a. m. to- 
morrow. . . . Warren and Wright should hold 
their corps as close to the enemy as possible to 
take advantage of any diversion caused by this 
attack and to break in if the opportunity presents 
itself. . . ." It is concerning the transmission 
of this order to the corps commanders that Gen- 
eral Badeau makes some characteristic remarks, 
to which attention was called in our last chapter, 
and referring to which General Humphreys, in a 
note on page 91, says : " From the hour of our 
arrival before Spottsylvania Court House, the 
greater part of my time was passed with the 
troops; the ground occupied by them, and be- 
tween them and the enemy, was therefore well 
known to me. 

" Badeau, not acquainted with it or the enemy's 
works, and because the direction of General Grant 
that Warren and Wright should hold their corps 
as close as possible to the enemy was not repeated 
by Meade in his order [their corps being already 
as dose to the enemy as was judicious), descants 
upon the loss of Grant's spirit and force by his 
orders percolating through three brains before 
they reached a corps commander. But he does 



124 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

not attempt to point out in what manner the dis- 
positions ordered by Meade were inapplicable, nor 
how, with any reference to the ground and the 
enemy's works, they could have been bettered, 
nor where, nor how they caused any failure in 
promptitude or efficiency to meet the necessities 
of the day. On the contrary, it is very evident 
from what took place that they met in the best 
possible manner the requirements of the day. 
Badeau does not seem to have known, evea when 
he wrote his account of the operations of the 12th 
of May, that Longstreet's troops remained that 
day in their intrenchments as strong as they were 
on the 10th of May, when the repeated assaults 
on their position proved it to be too strong to be 
carried by assault, if well manned} It was of 
the utmost importance to the enemy to maintain 
that part of their works, for if it had been 
carried the troops in the salient w^ould have been 
taken in rear and flank. It was their point of 
support and the hinge upon which Lee was to 
swing back from the salient, and its giving way 
would have j^roved disastr^ous to Aim." 

On page 91 we also learn that General Wright 
and General Warren "were directed to have 
their troops in readiness at the hour named for 
the combined attack of Burnside and Hancock, 
when, it was understood, they might be required, 
according to the developments of the day, either 
to attack in their front s, or move elsewhere and 

^ Italics in original. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 125 

attachr On page 100, continuing the narrative of 
the Fifth Corps, General Humphreys says : '^ Early 
in the morning of the 12th, General Warren 
opened with all his artillery, and pressed forward 
his skirmish line. The intrenchments of the 
enemy gave no sign of having been stripped of 
any of their troops to meet Hancock's and 
Wright's attacks on the salient, but the manner 
m which the contest there was carried on and the 
reinforcements the enemy received, together with 
the fact that Burnside was attacking on the east 
face of the sahent, led to the conclusion that the 
enemy could not be very strong in Warren's 
front, and at 9.15 a. m. he was ordered to attack 
at once at all hazards, with his whole force if 
necessary. He accordingly prepared to do so, 
and assaulted, but was repulsed, for Longstreet's 
corps was holding its intrenchments in force, the 
only change made in his line being the extension 
of his right to fill the place from which Ramseur's 
brigade had been taken. . . . Immediately upon 
the failure of Warren's attack he was directed to 
send General Cutler's division to General Wright 
and leiwejpared to follow with his whole corps, 
... It appearing probable that the enemy's in- 
trenchments in the vicinity of the west angle 
could be carried if assaulted by the whole Fifth 
Corps, General Warren was directed to withdraw 
from his front and move with his whole corj)s 
to the desig?iated point and attack. Grifan's 
division followed Cutler's closely. The other 



126 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

troops of the Fifth Corps were following, except 
Crawford's division, when the project of further 
assault was given up, as it did not appear to 
promise a complete success. ..." 

In his report of the battle in the salient, Gen- 
eral Ewell says : " General Kershaw ^ extended 
so as to allow Kamseur to be withdrawn, and as 
Daniel's right was unprotected, Ramseur was sent 
in there. ... But the salient was still held by 
the enemy, and a most deadly fire poured -on his 
right flank. Accordingly, Harris's Mississippi 
brigade, which came to my assistance about 9 
A. M., was sent to Ramseur's right ; but as it still 
failed to fill the trenches, McGowan's South 
Carolina brigade, which arrived an hour later, 
was ordered to the same point. . . . The en- 
gagement was spoken of in Northern papers as a 
general attack by their army. It was met only 
by my cor2os and three brigades sent to my aid, 
etc." 

It appears, then, that General Warren was not 
ordered to support General Hancock, but to 
attack the enemy in his own front, and that he 
wasted no time in dispositions, they having been 
already made according to order ; but, early in 
the morning, attacking by opening with his 
artillery and pressing forward his skirmish line, 
he demonstrated that Longstreet's corps still 
held their intrenchments in force. As the 

^ General Kershaw's division, on the east of the Brock Road, 
extended beyond the left of the Fifth Corps. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 127 

attacks of the lOtli had proven the enemy's 
lines to be impregnable when thus held. General 
Warren, reporting the situation, waited further 
orders instead of sacrificing his men uselessly. 
General Grant, however, could not bring himself 
to believe that General Lee was keeping well 
guarded the lines which protected the left flank 
and rear of the salient he held so stubbornly, 
and which formed his point cCappui if his right 
should be forced back ; and, refusing to under- 
stand otherwise than that General Warren must 
be at fault, he persisted in ordering the assault 
along his front. It is also evident that, imme- 
diately after General Warren's second attack 
failed and he reported at about 9.30 a. m. " I 
cannot advance my men farther at present," ^ 
General Meade and General Humphreys were 
personally present with the Fifth Corps and had 
examined into the condition of the field in its 
front ; for General Meade's order, of 10.33 a.m., 
to General Humphreys, reads : " Please remain 
here, and in my name attend to the shortening 
of the line and the sending reinforcements to 
Wright and Hancock."^ That their investiga- 
tions led in no way to General Warren's discredit 
is indicated by the fact that, despite the unjust 
censures and threatening order for removal by 
General Grant, there was no temporary breaking 
up of his command, as is alleged ; but that, as had 

1 Va. Camp., p. 101. 

2 Mil Hist., vol. ii., p. 181. 



128 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

from the beginning of the movement been antici- 
pated as possibly necessary, he was ordered to 
transfer his efforts from his own front to aid the 
Sixth Corps in the vicinity of the west angle, 
leaving General Crawford's division to hold his 
intrenchments. 

What General Badeau assumes to call General 
Warren's " feeble attempts to assault," the enemy 
described as "two violent assaults" on ^ General 
Field's lines, and upon General Bratton'ff line, a 
beautiful advance over open ground, in two lines 
of battle, pushed up to within fifty yards of 
their intrenchments, where it was broken by 
theh: fire; and the men of Longstreet's corps 
were veteran judges. General Humphreys says : 
" I was overlooking the right of the army, and 
gave the order for the assaults there to cease, as 
soon as I was satisfied they could not succeed ; 
and directed the transfer of the troops to the 
centre for attack there." ^ When General An- 
drew A. Humphreys decided that an assault by 
the Fifth Army Corps could not succeed, few ex- 
perienced military men would wish to disregard 
his judgment, and small room was left for criti- 
cism of defeated effort. 

Unquestionably, an "absence of comprehen- 
sive ensemble'' was noticeable in the conduct of 
the battle of May 12, but the record does not 
trace it home to General Warren. 

1 Va. Camp., p. 101. 



CHAPTER VII. 

GENERAL WARREN AT SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT 
HOUSE, MAY 19, AND AT COLD HARBOR, 
JUNE 1 AND 2. 

In the report of Lieutenant-General R. S. 
Ewell, C. S. Army, of operations May 4 to 29, 
we find : " On May 19tli General Lee directed me 
to demonstrate against the enemy in my front, 
as he believed they were moving to his right and 
wished to ascertain. As they were strongly in- 
trenched in front I obtained leave to move round 
their right. After a detour of several miles 
through roads impassable for my artillery I came 
on the enemy iwejyared to receive me. My force 
was about six thousand, his much larger. His 
position being developed and my object attained, 
I was about to retire when he attacked me. Part 
of my line was shaken, but Pegram's brigade, of 
Early's division, (Colonel Hoffman commanding,) 
and Ramseur's, of Rodes', held their ground so 
firmly that I maintained my position till night- 
fall, then withdrew unmolested." 

Concerning the operations of that day, Gen- 
eral Grant states : " Up to this time I had re- 



130 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

ceived no reinforcements, except six thousand 
raw troops under Brigadier-General Robert 0. 
Tyler, just arrived. They had not yet joined 
their command, Hancock's corps, but were on 
our right. This corps had been brought to the 
rear of the centre, ready to move in any du-ec- 
tion. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my 
part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, 
moved Ewell's corps, about five o'clock in the 
afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us 
in that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fred- 
ericksburg, and had been halted on the road to 
the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade of 
Warren's corps. Tyler received the attack with 
his raw troops, and they maintained their posi- 
tion, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of vet- 
erans. 

" Hancock was in a position to reinforce speed- 
ily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting 
to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to 
Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gib- 
bon as a reserve ; and Ewell was whirled back 
speedily and with heavy loss. 

" Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's 
flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his 
intrenchments. But his efforts were so feeble 
that under the cover of night Ewell got back 
with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, 
besides his killed and wounded. The army be- 
ing engaged until after dark, I rescinded the 
order for the march by our left flank that night. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 131 

" As soon as it was discovered that the enemy 
were coming out to attack, I naturally supposed 
they would detach a force to destroy our trains. 
The withdrawal of Hancock from the right un- 
covered one road from Spottsylvania to Freder- 
icksburg over which trains drew our suppHes. 
This was guarded by a division of colored troops, 
commanded by General Ferrero, belonging to 
Burnside's corps, Ferrero was therefore promptly 
notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pick- 
ets out to the south and be prepared to meet 
the enemy if he should come ; if he had to re- 
treat to do so towards Fredericksburg. The en- 
emy did detach as expected, and captured twen- 
ty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were 
soon retaken." ^ 

General Badeau's account (vol. li., pp. 206- 
208) in outline is identical with that of General 
Grant. He amplifies somewhat, however, say- 
ing : " The assault was sudden and vigorous, but 
Grant at once ordered up the Second and Fifth 
corps to the support of Tyler, who held his own 
splendidly. . . . Hancock himself soon came 
upon the field, and found Tyler in the midst of 
a hot engagement. Birney's division was hur- 
ried forward, and thrown in on the right, and 
Warren moved Crawford rapidly up on Tyler's 
left. The two other divisions of the Second 
corps were in reserve. 

" Ferrero with his colored division was on the 

1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 239, 240. 



132 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

road to Fredericksburg , in rear and on the right 
of Tyler, and near the point where Ewell struck 
the national line." Then, after repeating General 
Grant's cautionary directions to General Ferrero, 
including the " cavalry pickets well out on the 
plaiih road, and all other roads leading loest and 
south/' he continues : " The rebels- did indeed 
push on as far as the Fredericksburg road, but 
Ferrero and his colored division handled them 
severely. Twenty-seven wagons were captured 
in the first surprise, but all retaken ; and on the 
soil of Virginia, men who had once been slaves 
beat back the forces of those who had held them 
in slavery. . . . 

" By dark, the whole movement of Ewell was 
repulsed, and several hundred prisoners were left 
ih Tyler's hands. . . . Warren had participated 
in the battle, on the left of the Second corps, and 
when the rebels were seen to be repelled, he was 
ordered to fall upon their flank and rear with the 
view of cutting off and capturing Ewell's entire 
column ; but he failed to carry out his instruc- 
tions, and under cover of night the enemy re- 
tired." 

The Ferrero episode is pertinent to the present 
consideration as being another example of the 
imaginative inexactness of many of the results of 
General Badeau's historical investigations. Gen- 
eral Grant states that General Ferrero' s division 
was guarding a road from Spottsylvania to Fred- 
ericksburg over which trains were drawing sup- 



SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 133 

plies for the army, and which had been uncovered 
by the withdrawal of General Hancock from the 
right. General Badeau locates the colored di- 
vision " on the road to Fredericksburg, in rear 
and on the right of Tyler, and near the point 
where Ewell struck the national line," and adds 
that " The rebels did indeed push on as far as 
the Fredericksburg road." As neither General 
Ewell nor General Ramseur who commanded his 
leading brigade make any mention of having 
reached the Fredericksburg Road, although the 
latter claims to have driven " the enemy rapidly 
and with severe loss," the presumptive evidence 
from the Confederate side is opposed to General 
Badeau's statement on that point. In addition 
to this — the order sent by General Grant to 
General Ferrero to keep his " cavalry pickets well 
out on the plank roady and all other roads leading 
west and south/^ is inconsistent with the location 
assigned to the division by Generals Grant and 
Badeau. The roads west and south of that 
location were then occupied, in full force, by the 
Army of the Potomac, and General Ferrero, as 
located, would have been exposed only on the 
north. General Humphreys, in a note on page 
115, states facts more in accordance with the 
order. He says : — 

"Ferrero's division of colored troops was not 
in rear and on the right of Tyler, nor near the 
point where Ewell struck the National line, nor 
was he on the road forming Grant's direct com- 



134 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

munication with his base (the Fredericksburg and 
Spottsylvania Court House road) but on the plank 
road from Orange Court House to Fredericks- 
hurg, not far from Salem Church, and over five 
miles north of the Harris farm where Ewell was 
encountered as narrated by me. General Ferrero 
had with him besides his division, the Second Ohio 
and the Third New Jersey (both white veteran 
cavalry regiments) thrown out in advance of his 
infantry, and this cavalry had an outpost on the 
road from Alsop's to Silver's on the Orange 
plank road. This outpost was driven in about 
half-past five in the afternoon by some cavalry 
and artillery force of the enemy. This force the 
Second Ohio and the Third New Jersey engaged, 
and Ferrero formed his division in line to support 
them. The enemy fell back with slight loss, our 
two cavalry regiments losing two enlisted men 
killed, seven wounded, and two missing. The 
colored division had not a casualty of any kind 
whatever, handled nobody, severely or other- 
wise ; in fact, were not engaged, 

"The wagons captured were taken near the 
Harris farm, and were retaken by the troops 
there, not by Ferrero's troops." 

General Ewell states that his movement was 
made through roads impassable for his artillery. 
Brigadier-General A. L. Long, C. S. Army, Chief 
of Artillery of General Ewell's corps, says in his 
report: "In the afternoon, [the 19th,] General 
Ewell having determined to make a flank move- 



SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 135 

ment, Lieutenant-Colonel Braxton was directed to 
accompany him with six guns of select calibre. 
After proceeding two or three miles the roads 
were found to be impracticable for artillery, and 
Braxton was ordered to return to his former posi- 
tion." The attack upon General Ferrer o's cavalry 
outpost could not possibly have been made by a 
detachment from General Swell's command ; for 
General Ferrero was at least five miles from the 
point of General EwelFs attack, and his pickets 
were driven in by a cavalry force with artillery 
at the same hour that General Tyler was en- 
gaged. 

Referring now to pages 111 to 114 of the 
" Virginia Campaign/' we find that, on the night 
of the 18th, the divisions of the Second Corps 
commanded by Generals Barlow, Gibbon, and 
Birney were moved to the vicinity of Anderson's 
Mill on the east side of the Ny River and below 
the left of the Sixth Corps. This accords with 
General Grant's statement that the " corps had 
been brought to the rear of the centre." Gen- 
eral Tyler's division was posted on the road from 
Spottsylvania Court House to Fredericksburg near 
the Harris House, and Colonel Kitching's brigade 
of the Fifth Corps was stationed in the same 
vicinity and on the left of General Tyler. The 
Second Corps, therefore, was stationed between 
two and three miles south, and a little east, from 
General Tyler's command. It was held, under 
orders, ready to move southward the night of 



136 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

the 19tli. The Fifth Corps, however, held the 
right of the army, its intrenchments crossing the 
Ny River above the Fredericksburg road-crossing 
about one mile south and west from the Harris 
House. The commands of Colonel Kitching and 
General Tyler, therefore, extended the right of 
the Fifth Corps, and covered the road to Fred- 
ericksburg, and General Warren's reserve was 
available for support if needed. 

On the afternoon of the 19th, Colonel Kitching 
discovered indications of the enemy's movement, 
and preparations were made to meet it, as Gen- 
eral Ewell has reported. The firing began about 
half -past five o'clock, and as it became heavy. 
General Meade directed General Hancock to send 
one division in double quick to General Tyler's 
aid, and hold his corps ready to follow; and 
General Warren, being the nearest to the battle, 
was also ordered to support. He at once de- 
spatched the Maryland Brigade, which arrived in 
time to take an active part in the fight on the 
left, while the First Maryland Regiment, reaching 
the ground on a return march from Fredericks- 
burg, immediately joined in the encounter on 
General Tyler's right. General Grant ignores 
Colonel Kitching and the Maryland regiments. 

General Hancock, on receiving orders, directed 
General Birney to move at once to the support 
of the troops engaged, and Generals Barlow and 
Gibbon to be ready to follow, and went directly 
to the ground himself. General Birney arrived 



SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 137 

shortly before dark and was thrown in upon the 
right of General Tyler's troops, and General 
Crawfordj arriving soon after, supported the left 
of the Federal line. Though General Hancock 
says the fighting was obstinate till about nine 
o'clock, it seems that the severity of the action 
was over before the arrival of Generals Birney 
and Crawford. General Hancock was the corps 
commander present, and General Warren does not 
appear to have taken personally any part in the 
action. General Badeau, however, says that 
General Warren " participated in the battle, on 
the left of the Second corps, and when the rebels 
were seen to be repelled, he was ordered to fall 
upon their flank and rear." It is not at all prob- 
able that on such a field as that of May 19, after 
the enemy was seen to he repulsed, either General 
Meade or General Hancock would have ordered 
General Warren, or any other commander in the 
line of battle, to fall upon the flank and rear of 
the retreat ; and General Badeau here entirely 
ignores the fact that General Early was in posi- 
tion to threaten the right of General Cutler's 
division of the Fifth Corps and protect the right 
flank of General E well's command. General 
Grant is equally forgetful. But there is positive 
refutation of this item in the systematic detrac- 
tion, so apparent in the Military History and 
Memoirs, in what relates to General Warren. In 
a note on page 114 of the " Virginia Campaign," 
in answer to General Badeau's erroneous account, 
General Humphreys says : — 



138 GRANT VS, THE RECORD. 

" The troops from both corps engaged received 
the same orders from General Meade, and con- 
tinued the action together, both equally close to 
the enemy until its close. Nothing took place 
on the field nor is there anything on record to 
support the statement of Badeau. Ewell was 
close to the ford near Landron's when the fight- 
ing terminated, two miles from Warren, who 
was with Grifiin's and Catlin's divisions close up 
to the Spottsylvania intrenchments, under orders 
to attack them if there was promise of success." 
This correction General Grant entirely overlooks. 

It is not gratifying to be obliged to reconcile 
the sincerity one must accord to the views of 
General Grant, with this persistence in gratuitous 
aspersion of one confessed to be an able, dutiful, 
and gallant soldier. 

From May 19 to June 1, General "Warren is 
fortunate in that he at least escapes unfavorable 
mention. Recalling the exigencies of Cold Har- 
bor seems to have revived the flagging memory 
of his claims ; and, of the movements of the lat- 
ter date. General Badeau says : " Grant had ex- 
pected a serious battle before obtaining posses- 
sion of Cold Harbor, and the moment he heard 
of its capture, the Sixth corps was ordered from 
the right to the relief of Sheridan ; while Smith, 
now moving up from the Pamunkey, was directed 
to march upon the same point. . . . But Lee at 
once discovered the manoeuvre, and withdrew 



SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 139 

Anderson's corps from the rebel left, marching it 
towards Cold Harbor, — a movement exactly 
parallel to that of the Sixth corps. 

" Meanwhile, exactly as Lee had discovered 
the movement of Wright, so Grant detected the 
transfer of Anderson. At an early hour on the 
1st of June, a heavy column was observed passing 
in front of the Fifth corps, towards the right of 
Lee, and Warren was at once ordered to fall upon 
it in flank, while Wright was directed to attack 
the head of the column with his whole command, 
and crush the rebels on their arrival, before they 
could have time to entrench. If these orders 
had been carried out, the destruction of Lee's 
army might have been consummated at Cold Har- 
bor. But Warren opened with artillery instead 
of attacking in force, and at three p. m., he re- 
ported that the entrenchments of the rebels were 
exceedingly strong, and his own lines so long 
that he had no mass of troops to assault with. 
Wright also reconnoitred and skirmished, until at 
two p. M., he found no rebels in his front : the 
enemy had fallen back and fortified, as soon as 
it was certain that Old Cold Harbor was lost to 
Lee. The condition of the Sixth corps, after a 
long and fatiguing night march, and its new- 
ness on the ground, accounted, indeed, for its 
delay ; yet the enemy had the same difficulties 
to overcome ; Anderson marched nearly as far 
as Wright, and then began entrenching ; while 



140 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Warren's failure to assault was doubtless the 
result of those peculiarities already described, 
which made this officer hesitate so often and so 
long, before an action, although when once en- 
gaged, no soldier in the army excelled him." ^ 

General Grant repeats the story, as follows : 
" Finding at daylight that Wright had left his 
front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone 
to our left. At all events, soon after light on 
the 1st of June Anderson, who commanded the 
corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along War- 
ren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him 
vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed 
to move out and get on his front. Warren fired 
his artillery at the enemy ; but lost so much 
time in making ready that the enemy got by, and 
at three o'clock he reported the enemy was 
strongly intrenched in his front, and besides his 
lines were so long that he had no mass of troops 
to move with. He seemed to have forgotten 
that lines in rear of an army hold themselves 
while their defenders are fighting in their front. 
Wright reconnoitred some distance to his front : 
but the enemy finding Old Cold Harbor already 
taken had halted and fortified some distance 
west." 2 

For a correct understanding of these state- 
ments, a brief review of the relative positions of 
the opposing corps is necessary. Referring to 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., pp. 275-278. 

2 Mem.f vol. ii., pp. 265, 266. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 141 

pages 165 to 174 of the " Virginia Campaign " 
we find that, on the 28th of May, General EwelFs 
corps, under the command of General Early, was 
in position covering the road from Hanover 
Town to Richmond by way of Hawes's Shop, and 
the road from White House to Richmond by way 
of Old Church and Shady Grove Church. His 
right rested near Beaver Dam Creek and his left 
on the Totopotomoy, near Pole Green Church. 
General Anderson, with Longstreet's corps, was 
in position covering the road from White House 
to Richmond by Old Church, Bethesda Church, 
and Mechanicsville, and therefore on the right of 
General Early. From General Early's left the 
command of General Breckinridge, and General 
Hill's corps, extended the Confederate lines along 
the Totopotomoy to the vicinity of Atlee's Sta- 
tion, crossing the railroad a mile north of that 
point. This whole line was well intrenched. On 
the 30th General Hancock's corps was in position 
on the road from Hawes's Shop to Richmond, 
one division on the left and the remainder of the 
corps to the right of the road. The Sixth Corps 
came into position still farther on the right, in 
the afternoon. These two corps confronted Gen- 
eral Breckinridge's command and General Hill's 
corps, on the Confederate left, and General Han- 
cock's left also extended in front of General 
Early's extreme left. General Burnside's corps 
came into position on the left of General Han- 
cock, its right being near the Whitlock House, 



142 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

and its left near the Shady Grove Church Road. 
While General Warren was moving into position 
on the left of General Burnside, General Early 
moved out by his flank, on the Old Church Road, 
to attack him, and General Anderson moved up 
into the position thus vacated by General Early. 
At evening General Warren had driven General 
Early back till he formed the right of General 
Anderson's line, while the Fifth Corps took po- 
sition holding the left of the Federal infantry 
lines. General Sheridan, with two divisions of 
cavalry, covered the left of the army. 

On the 31st General Early extended to the left 
so as to place one division west of Beaver Dam 
Creek, and General Anderson's corps was moved 
to the right of General Early, General Kershaw's 
division being placed near Beulah Church, about 
a mile north of Cold Harbor, General Pickett's 
division on General Kershaw's left extending in 
the direction of the Walnut Grove Church Road, 
and General Field still farther to the left, his 
left flank resting on the Mechanicsville Pike. 
General Hoke, who had come up with his divi- 
sion during the night, was placed on the ex- 
treme right of the Confederate line, near Cold 
Harbor. This extension of the lines to General 
Lee's right was at once partially intrenched. 
General Sheridan was holding Cold Harbor with 
his two cavalry divisions, confronting General 
Fitz Lee's cavalry and one brigade of General 
Hoke's division of infantry. General Humphreys 



SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 143 

says : " The presence of General Hoke near Cold 
Harbor was known to General Meade from 
Sheridan's reports, but it was not known that 
Kershaw was near him, or that Anderson's 
(Longstreet's) corps was on the right of Early, 
between Bethesda Church and Cold Harbor." 

Of the situation on the 31st General Hum- 
phreys says: "The infantry corps were pressed 
up against the enemy as close as practicable 
without assaulting, but the position was so strong 
naturally, and so well intrenched, and the in- 
trenchments so strongly held that an assault was 
not attempted ; the skirmish lines, however, were 
kept up against the enemy's, and an attack 
threatened." 

On page 172, General Humphreys continues : 
" An attack on the enemy's position on the 
Totopotomoy, and covering the Shady Grove 
Church road and Mechanicsville pike, giving no 
promise of success, it was determined to send two 
infantry corps to maintain possession of Cold 
Harbor, and attack the enemy there before they 
and tho troops sent to their support could in- 
trench. General Wright was directed to move 
that night, and make every effort to get to Cold 
Harbor by daylight of the 1st of June, for it 
was believed that Sheridan would be attacked 
heavily at daybreak. But Wright's only practi- 
cable route was by Hawes's shop and across to 
the road from Old Church to Cold Harbor, a 
night march of more than fifteen miles, through 



144 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

a strange country covered with an intricate net- 
work of narrow, ill-defined roads." 

General W. F. Smith was also expected to be 
at Cold Harbor early in the morning of June 
1 with his troops, which had landed at White 
House on the afternoon of May 31. On the 
morning of the 1st, General Hoke did not be- 
come engaged, but established his position on 
the right. General Kershaw, however, made two 
attacks upon General Sheridan, both of which 
were repulsed ; and at nine o'clock General 
Wright arrived with the head of the Sixth Corps 
column and relieved the cavalry, which moved 
toward the Chickahominy, covering the left of 
the army. 

General Humphreys here continues : " The 
arrival of the Sixth corps was observed by the 
enemy, and Kershaw at once closed in to the 
right on Hoke, Pickett on Kershaw, and Field 
on Pickett. 

" This closing in to the right by Longstreet's 
corps, which occupied about an hour, and was 
made under cover of intrenchments in Warren's 
front and beyond his left, was observed by him at 
half-past ten, and under General Meade's order 
to attack, he deployed Lockwood's and Cutler's 
divisions, but these troops were embarrassed and 
delayed in forming by the wooded swamps of the 
Totopotomoy and Matadequin, and by the time 
they were in line in open ground the enemy's 
movement to the right had ceased. Their in- 
trenchments were too formidable to attack. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 145 

'' By two o'clock in the afternoon the Sixth 
Corps was all up, and covered the roads to Cold 
Harbor from Bethesda Church, New Bridge, and 
Despatch Station on the York River Railroad 
near the Chickahominy." 

Investigation, therefore, develops that Gen- 
eral Lee did not withdraw General Anderson 
" from the rebel left " and make with his corps 
"a movement exactly parallel to that of the 
Sixth Corps," for General Anderson's corps never 
occupied the Confederate left at any time from 
May 28 to June 1, but held the right centre, 
and right, of General Lee's line. For the same 
reason General Grant could not have " detected 
the transfer of Anderson," and the statement 
that " Anderson marched nearly as far as Wright 
and then began intrenching" is merely another 
of General Badeau's characteristic inaccuracies. 
The Confederate lines at Cold Harbor were at 
least partially intrenched on May 31. General 
Warren himself discovered the movement, which 
was not that of any corps moving in column 
from any part of the line, but the closing to- 
gether of the troops holding the intrenchments 
in his front and beyond his left, that they might 
connect firmly with General Hoke when General 
Wright had reached Cold Harbor. On report- 
ing the movement and receiving orders to attack. 
General Warren not only opened with his artil- 
lery, but immediately advanced two divisions of 
his corps. His troops, however, could not force 



146 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

their way across intervening swamps before the 
movement^ which occupied in all but about an 
hour, had ceased and the enemy were ready to 
receive them from behind intrenchments already 
decided, by his superiors in command, to be too 
formidable to be attacked with promise of suc- 
cess. In fact, when it is remembered that the 
movement to Cold Harbor was necessitated by 
the ascertained strength of the lines held by the 
enemy from General Warren's front to the Con- 
federate left, and that it was over three hours 
after all movement in General Lee's lines had 
ceased, when General Warren is said by General 
Grant to have reported himself unable to assault, 
the attempted slur written in the Memoirs be- 
comes as meaningless as it is unjust. 

We find, further, that the Sixth Corps was not 
all up at Cold Harbor until two o'clock in the 
afternoon, and that the fulfilment of the orders 
General Wright is said to have received, " to at- 
tack the head of the column" or^^ get on his 
front," would have necessitated the carrying of 
the lines in Ms front, for which purpose General 
Grant himself considered the cooperation of, at 
first, two, and, afterwards, three corps necessary. 

It is to be remembered that these events oc- 
curred upon the day when some one connected 
with the headquarters of the general-in-chief had 
ordered General W. F. Smith, with his com- 
mand, to New Castle Ferry instead of to Cold 
Harbor. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 147 

In his account of the operations of June 1 
and 2, General Grant has said : " Hancock was 
moved from his place in line during the night 
and ordered to the left of Wright. I expected 
to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, 
but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so 
excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to 
keep, that the head of column only reached Old 
Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position 
at 7.30 A. M. Preparations were made for an 
attack in the afternoon, but did not take place 
until the next morning. Warren's corps was 
moved to the left to connect with Smith : Han- 
cock's corps was got into position to the left of 
Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda 
Church in reserve. While Warren and Burn- 
side were making these changes the enemy came 
out several times and attacked them, capturing 
several hundred prisoners. The attacks were re- 
pulsed, but not followed up as they should have 
been. I was so annoyed at this that I directed 
Meade to instruct his corps commanders that 
they should seize all such opportunities when 
they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our 
manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of 
getting the enemy out of his cover." ^ 

On pages 177 to 180 of the " Virginia Cam- 
paign," a detailed account of the operations of 
June 2 is given. General Humphreys there 
states : " On the morning of the 2d, General 

1 Mem.^ vol. ii., p. 268. 



148 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Warren was directed to extend his left so as to 
unite with Smith at Woody's, and to contract 
his right to such extent as to make one-half 
his force available for attack. This, it was ex- 
pected, would bring his right to the vicinity of 
Bethesda Church. General Burnside was di- 
rected to withdraw his force and mass it in rear 
of Warren's right, to protect that flank and sup- 
port Warren. But this gave General Warren a 
line about three miles long, the left of which he 
held chiefly with artillery. It was interrupted 
here and there by the swamps of the Matade- 
quin, which virtually shortened his lines, as he 
could command the swamps without occupying 
them. General Wilson was directed to cover the 
right of the army from the vicinity of Bethesda 
Church to the Pamunkey. The main body of 
the Confederate cavalry was on Lee's left, Fitz 
Lee's division on his right. 

" Early on the night of the 1st, General Han- 
cock began to withdraw . . . 

"Perceiving the withdrawal from our right, 
General Lee, on the morning of the 2d, sent 
General Breckenridge and General Hill, with Wil- 
cox's and Mahone's divisions, to his right, . . . 
Early remained on the left with his own corps 
and Heth's division. Intrenching went on all 
day, with heavy skirmishing and artillery fire. 

" But General Lee directed General Early to 
get upon our right flank and drive down in front 



SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 149 

of the Confederate line. To carry out this order 
Rodes's division moved out the Shady Grove 
Church road in the afternoon, Gordon swung 
around to keep pace with Rodes, and Heth, fol- 
lowing Rodes, took position on his left. This 
movement brought on sharp fighting, which 
lasted until night, but did not accomplish what 
was designed. It found General Burnside's 
withdrawal unfinished, and his skirmish line, 
occupying the corps intrenchments, was driven 
from them by Rodes's division, and a large num- 
ber of prisoners taken from it. In this way 
Rodes's troops got in rear of the Fifth Corps 
skirmishers unperceived, and captured a number 
of them. 

" Cutler and Crawford held the long line from 
Bethesda Church to Smith's right. Griffin's 
division was massed at Bethesda Church, but as 
soon as Early's movement was discovered it was 
formed in line, Ayres on the left, Bartlett in the 
centre, Sweitzer on the right, and moved forward 
under musketry and artillery fire, to the attack 
of Rodes's division, which had advanced from 
the Shady Grove Church road. Rodes was 
forced back to the road, and in this encounter 
lost a gallant officer, Brigadier-General Doles, 
who was killed. 

" General Crittenden's division brought up 
the rear in the withdrawal of Burnside, and was 
attacked with some vigor in doing so, but held 
Heth in check until Willcox and Potter got into 
position and stopped his further advance, 



150 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

" Early's troops remained on the Shady Grove 
Church road, and intrenched during the night, 
while Ramseur's division held the intrenchments 
on the left of Anderson's (Longstreet's) corps.'* 

General Badeau's account, on pages 281 and 
282 of the second volume of his Military History, 
is essentially the same as that given by General 
Grant, except that he mentions only one attack 
by the enemy, and undoubtedly he is to that ex- 
tent less inaccurate. The spasmodic tactics im- 
puted to the Confederate troops by the author 
of the Memoirs is not consistent with the estab- 
lished character of those troops, or the posssibil- 
ities of the field. Had he been content to write, 
" several of the enemy came out and attacked 
them," his statement woidd have been equally 
euphonious and more in accordance with the 
probabilities in the case. It is evident, also, 
that the enemy did not come out so far from his 
cover, or in such a manner, as to endanger his 
return should he desire, or be obliged, to fall 
back. General Gordon on his right held fast to 
his lines and could only be attacked by General 
Warren at the expense of the already attenuated 
line of the Fifth Corps. General Griffin did not 
" repulse " any attack that day, but attached 
General Rodes's division and forced it back to 
the Shady Grove Church Road. 

How more than was done could have been 
done, neither General Grant nor General Badeau 
has indicated ; and it is believed that, as far as 



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SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR- 151 

the Fifth Corps is concerned, in default of any- 
thing more tangible than the indefinite complaint 
as made, the names of Warren, Griffin, Ayres, 
Bartlett, and Sweitzer will be a sufficient guaran- 
tee that all that the circumstances of the case 
permitted was accomplished. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

WHITE OAK ROAD AND DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE, 
MARCH 31, 1865. 

In a foot-note on page 449 of his third vol- 
ume, General Badeau remarks : " It is a common 
manoeuvre for some rebel advocate or apologist 
to assert that such and such was the intention or 
result of a certain operation, without giving the 
slightest proof of the correctness of the state- 
ment ; and then for all the rest to quote him as 
authority. . . . 

" No statement of national or rebel intentions, 
or strength, or losses, or of any material fact on 
either side, should he accepted without j^ositive 
proof of its correctness ; and it is not sufficient 
to mention an authority ; the absolute quotation 
should be verified." 

Nevertheless, thus far at least, the reflections 
upon General Warren have been of a very gen- 
eral and indefinite character, and have been pro- 
jected upon very vapory evidence, if even such 
it can be called. We come now to consider the 
close of his career as commander of the Fifth 
Army Corps. 

Early in the morning of March 29, 1865, 



WHITE OAK ROAD. 153 

General Warren moved with the Fifth Corps as 
ordered, crossing Hatcher's Run at Monk's Neck 
Bridge. He was to proceed no farther than the 
junction of the Yaughan and Quaker roads until 
the Second Corps was in position on his right, 
when he was to advance toward the enemy's 
lines by the Boydton Road. At mid-day, how- 
ever, liis orders were modified ; and, as then 
directed, he moved up the Quaker Road in the 
afternoon, and, about a mile from its junction 
with the Boydton Road, encountered two bri- 
gades of General Anderson's command which 
were forced to fall back into the intrenchments 
on the White Oak Road after a sharp engage- 
ment and severe loss. 

On the 30th, General Warren moved up the 
Quaker and Boydton roads as far as the Dabney 
Mill Road, and occupied a line covering the 
Boydton Road as far as Gravelly Run. General 
Ayres, with his division, made a reconnoissance 
northwestward to the vicinity of the point where 
the Confederate intrenchments turned north to 
cover the Claiborne Road, and established a 
picket Hne in that direction, supported by part 
of his division, the other part remaining on the 
left of General Grif&n in advance of the Boydton 
Road. Late in the afternoon, in reporting Gen- 
eral Ayres's reconnoissance, General Warren sug- 
gested that a division of the Second Corps 
should take the place of General Griffin's divi- 
sion during the night, and that the Fifth Corps 



154 GRANT VS, THE RECORD. 

should occupy the White Oak Road early the next 
morning. This suggestion was in part approved. 
General Humphreys was directed to, and did, 
relieve General Griffin's with General Miles's 
division before daylight of the 31st ; and General 
Warren was ordered to place General Crawford's 
and General Griffin's divisions within supporting 
distance of General Ay res. General Ay res was 
directed by General Warren to reinforce his 
advance, by daylight of the 31st, with his whole 
division ; General Crawford to hold his command 
ready to follow General Ayres ; and General 
Griffin to take up the position General Ayres 
had held at Mrs. Butler's, as soon as his division 
was relieved by General Miles. General Ayres's 
advanced position was in open ground south of 
the White Oak Road near W. Dabney's. 

At 7 A. M. of the 31st, General Crawford 
moved out, taking position at the Halliday 
House about five hundred yards in rear of Gen- 
eral Ayres. General Griffin was about one thou- 
sand yards in the rear of General Crawford and 
on the south-east side of a branch of Gravelly 
Run. These dispositions will be again noted 
further on. General Ayres, who was informed 
of the presence of General Pickett at Five Forks, 
about four miles from his left, prepared to meet 
attack from that quarter as well as in front. He 
formed his division with General Winthrop's 
brigade looking north, fronting the White Oak 
Road ; the Maryland Brigade along a ravine on 



WHITE OAK ROAD. 155 

General Winthrop's left, looking west ; his third 
brigade to General Winthrop's right, and one of 
General Crawford's brigades in rear of his centre. 

At half-past eight a. m., corps commanders 
were notified that there would be no movement 
that day ; but at 9.40 a. m., General Warren 
reporting that he had directed General Ayres to 
drive the enemy's pickets off the White Oak 
Road or ascertain with what force the road was 
held, he was instructed by General Meade that, 
if he found he could get possession of the road 
and hold it, he was to do so, notwithstanding 
the order suspending operations. 

At eleven o'clock, General Winthrop's brigade 
moved forward, supported by General Gwyn's 
brigade on the right. When within fifty yards 
of the White Oak Road, the enemy in line of 
battle, suddenly breaking cover, moved across 
the road and forward to meet them. General 
Ayres's advance had developed the fact that 
General Lee was, in person, directing a movement 
for the purpose of attacking the left of the Fifth 
Corps. He had sent General McGowan with two 
brigades to get across the flank of General 
Ayres's command, and had drawn up General 
Hunton's brigade in the woods along the north 
side of the White Oak Road, with General Wise's 
brigade formed on his left. General Hunton's 
formation was scarcely completed when General 
Winthrop advanced upon his position, and Gen- 
eral McGowan had not completed his movement 



156 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

across the flank when the firing in front began, 
and he at once ordered the charge. Despite 
General Ayres's efforts, his command was driven 
back to where General Griffin was in position, 
and General Crawford's division fell back in 
confusion. 

Warned by the heavy musketry firing and the 
drifting of stragglers to the rear, General Hum- 
phreys, divining that General Warren needed 
support, ordered General Miles to advance at once 
with two brigades and attack the left flank of 
the advancing enemy. General Miles's other two 
brigades followed soon after. General Himi- 
phreys also ordered General Mott and General 
Hayes to attack the lines in their front. These 
orders were similar to those afterwards received 
from General Meade. General Miles struck 
General Wise's brigade in front and flank, and 
drove him back, capturing the flag of an Ala- 
bama regiment and over three hundred prisoners. 
This forced General Hunton also to fall back, 
and General Warren having got a part of Gen- 
eral Griffin's division across the run and upon 
General McGowan's flank, the whole attacking 
force fell back to the position occupied by Gen- 
eral Ayres in the morning. 

By half-2oast two o'clock, General Warren had 
re-formed his corps on the north side of the branch 
of Gravelly Run, and moved forward, General 
Griffin's division in the centre, with General 
Ayres's division on the left and General Craw- 



WHITE OAK ROAD. 157 

ford's on the right, both in echelon. After a 
short but sharp encounter the brigades of Gen- 
erals Chamberlain and Gregory drove the enemy 
back within the White Oak Road intrenchments.^ 

On page 435 of the second volume of the 
Memoirs, General Grant, referring to these oper- 
ations, says simply : " There was considerable 
fighting in taking up these new positions for the 
2d and 5th corps, in w^hich the Army of the 
James had also to participate somewhat, and the 
losses were quite severe. 

"This was what was known as the battle of 
White Oak road." 

On page 445 of the same volume, he states 
that he was much dissatisfied with General War- 
ren's " dilatory movements " on that occasion. 
His historian, however, attempts a more extended 
account of the affair and of General Warren's 
alleged faults therein. (See Mil. Hist., vol iii., 
pp. 460-466.) He charges that, on the night of 
March 30, General Warren, " in direct violation 
of his orders, stretched out his three divisions in 
echelon ; placing Ayres on the left, then Craw- 
ford, and Grifiin in the rear," and produces as 
evidence a despatch from General Webb, chief 
of staff, to General Warren, dated 9.30 a. m. of 
March 30, saying : " He [General Meade] is very 
anxious to have you cover as much of the front 
line as possible, and his idea was that you would 
put both Griffin and Crawford in front, keeping 

1 Va. Camp., pp. 324-334. 



158 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

a portion of each as a reserve, and keeping Ayres 
to cover your left flank." He does not, how- 
ever, quote another despatch which will be noted 
a little further on. After relating the repulse of 
the morning of the 31st, he states : " There was 
a delay of several hours before the Fifth corps 
was ready, and Meade evidently shared the feel- 
ing in regard to Warren that was entertained by 
Sheridan and Grant." In support of this asser- 
tion he repeats his theories regarding General 
Warren's peculiarities, and appends in fancied 
substantiation a selection of despatches and ex- 
tracts which, if they prove anything further than 
the weakness of his own position, show merely 
that both General Meade and General Warren 
could be impatient on occasion ; that gallant 
General "Andy" Webb could sometimes irritate 
with pen as well as sword; and that General 
Badeau was incapable of comprehending soldiers 
of the grade of those whose words he strives to 
marshal to his aid. General Badeau apparently 
forgot his criticism of General Meade, on page 
370 of his second volume, and his softening ad- 
mission : " Unjust at times, as every intense soldier 
is apt to be, when his orders are not carried out 
— for reproof will come, even though the fault 
is not with him who is reproved — yet Meade 
did amjjle justice afterivardsJ' It is to be re- 
gretted that General Meade's example, in this 
last respect, was not more contagious. 

It is not easy to see just how the charge of 



WHITE OAK ROAD. 159 

" dilatory movements/' in this affair, can be main- 
tained against General Warren. The Fifth Corps 
was in position before the order suspending opera- 
tions for the day was received by the corps com- 
manders ; the advance of General Ayres's troops 
which precipitated General Lee's attack, was 
made at General Warren's own suggestion ; and 
as but three hours and a half intervened between 
the time of starting General Ayres's advance in 
the morning, and the final advance of the corps 
which drove the enemy within his works, it is 
manifest there could have been no " delay of 
several hours " in reforming the corps after the 
severe repulse at first encountered. 

In his official Report (see Mem., vol. ii., p. 622) 
General Grant had said : " On the morning 
of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably 
to getting possession of the White Oak road, and 
was directed to do so. To accompHsh this, he 
moved with one division, instead of his whole 
corps, which was attacked by the enemy in su- 
perior force and driven back on the 2d division 
before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced 
back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was 
checked. A division of the 2d corps was im- 
mediately sent to his support, the enemy driven 
back with heavy loss, and possession of the 
White Oak Road gained." 

At the request of General Warren, a court of 
inquiry was appointed by the President to inves- 
tigate this and other matters connected with the 



160 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

operations of March 30 to April 1. Concerning 
the imputation contained in this passage in Gen- 
eral Grant's report, that court rendered the 

following : — 

" Opinion. 

" There seems to be no evidence that General 
Warren, on the morning of March 31, or at any 
other time, reported favorably to getting posses- 
sion of the White Oak road except in his de- 
spatch (y.) of 4 p. M., March 30, already referred 
to, and the movement suggested in that was prac- 
tically set aside by General Grant's despatch (viii.) 
of March 30, heretofore quoted. General War- 
ren's report, in his despatch (lxxxiy.) of 9.40 A. 
M., March 31, quoted above, that he had given or- 
ders to drive the enemy's pickets off the White 
Oak road or develop what force of the enemy 
held it, could not be fairly construed as being 
able to take possession of it. 

" With regard to that portion of the imputation 
contained in the statement that General Warren 
was directed to take possession of the White Oak 
road, the following despatch from General Meade 
is the only one that can bear that construction : — 

LXXXV. 

"'U. S. M. T. 

« * Headquarters Armies U. S., 

10.30. A. M., March 31, 1865. 

" * To Major-General G. K. Warren. 

" ' Your despatch giving Ayres's position is re- 



WHITE OAK ROAD. 161 

ceived. General Meade directs that should you 
determine by your reconnoissance that you can 
get possession of and hold the White Oak road, 
you are to do so, notwithstanding the orders to 
suspend operations to-day. 

Alex. S. Webb, 

Bt. M. G. C. S.' 

" And the evidence before the court shows that 
the order was not received by General Warren 
till after the fighting that resulted from the 
attempted reconnoissance had begun. 

" It is in evidence by Ayres's and Crawford's 
testimony that General Warren had in his ad- 
vance two divisions, though the testimony does 
not clearly show how long before the attack of 
the enemy upon Ayres the division of Crawford 
reached him. 

" Griffin's division was held in reserve along 
the branch of Gravelly run nearest to and north- 
west from the Boydton plank road, and it may 
have been so held to carry out the intention of 
the following despatch from General Meade's 
Headquarters. 

LXXIX. 

"'8.32 a. m., U. S. M. T. 
" ' Headquarters A. of P. 8.25, March 31, '65. 
" * To Major-General Warren. 

" ^ There is firing along Humphreys's front. 
The Maj. Gen. Comandg. desires you to be ready 



162 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

to send your reserve if it should be called for, to 
support Humphreys. There will be no move- 
ment of troops to-day. 

A. S. Webb, 

B. M. G. 
'"Rec^ 8.40 A. M., G. K. W.' 

"The Court is further of the opinion that, 
considering the Fifth Corps constituted the ex- 
treme left wing of the armies operating against 
Richmond, and that the corps was in a delicate 
position and liable to be attacked at any moment, 
of which liability General Warren had been re- 
peatedly warned, he should have been with his 
advanced divisions, guiding and directing them, 
and that he should have started earlier to the 
front than he did and not have waited at the 
telegraph office to keep in communication with 
General Meade's Headquarters, unless he had di- 
rect orders that morning so to do, which however 
does not appear in the evidence." 

The despatches referred to, but not quoted, in 
this opinion, are as follows : — 

V. 

« 4 p. M., March 30. 
" General Webb, Chief of Staff. 

" General : General Ayres's advance now sees 
the White Oak road near W. Dabney's for | of 
a mile. There is a difficult swamp between the 
plank road and that place. I have now a con- 
tinuous intrenched line from my right across 



WHITE OAK ROAD. 163 

Griffin's front and along the plank road nearly 
down to Gravelly Run. If General Humphreys 
can take charge of Griffin's front, about 500 
yards west of plank road with the return down 
it I can take my corps and block the White Oak 
road. 

G. K. Warren, M. Gr 



VIII. 

" U. S. Mily. Telegraph. By telegraph from Gravelly Run. 

March 30, 1865. 
" To Major-General Meade. 

"Your orders to Warren are right. I do not 
expect to advance him in the morning. I sup- 
posed, however, that he was now up to the White 
Oak road. If he is not, I do not want him to 
move up without further orders. 

U. S. Grant, Lt-Genr 

The first part of this Opinion, deahng with 
matters of fact, speaks clearly for itself, and cer- 
tainly vindicates General Warren as far as Gen- 
eral Grant's official imputation is concerned. 

Of the second part it may be remarked, that 
it expresses an opinion upon a point of tactical 
detail which might possibly have been materially 
modified, if not entirely reversed, had the Court 
been in possession of evidence which would have 
been attainable during the lifetime of General 
Meade. That General Grant could not have 
considered such a difference of opinion as reflect- 



164 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

ing seriously upon General Warren, may confi- 
dently be inferred from his well-known approval 
of the location adopted by the commander of the 
Federal forces at Pittsburg Landing, April 5, 
1862 ; and from the approved movements of the 
commander of the cavalry corps Army of the 
Potomac, on March 30, 1865, when all the cir- 
cumstances noted in the Opinion applied with 
pecuHar force to that corps. It is to be remem- 
bered that General Warren remained constantly 
within the Hmits of his corps, and that he had 
intrusted his advance to a command and com- 
mander both acknowledged as preeminently re- 
liable. 

It is necessary now to review briefly the oper- 
ations on the extreme left of General Grant's 
lines. On the 28th, General Grant instructed 
General Sheridan : " The Fifth corps will move 
by the Yaughan road at three a. m. to-morrow 
morning. . . . Move your cavalry at as early 
an hour as you can, and without being confined 
to any particular road or roads. You may go 
out by the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth 
corps, pass by its left, and, passing near to or 
through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of 
the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the in- 
tention to attack the enemy in his entrenched 
position, but to force him out ifj^ossihle. Should 
he come out a7id attack us, or get himself where 
he can he attacked, move in with your entire 



DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 165 

force in your own way, and with the full reli- 
mice that the army will engage or follow, as 
circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the 
field, and will probably be able to communicate 
with you." ^ The italics are General Badeau s. 

At dark on the 29th, General Sheridan had 
reached Dinwiddle Court House, and General 
Grant sent him word there : "... In the 
morning, push around the enemy, if you can, 
and get on his right rear. The movements of 
the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your 
action. We will all act together as one army, 
until it is seen what can be done with the 



enemy " ^ 



\j±xxy » 

On the night of the 29th, General Grant s 
headquarters were on Gravelly Run, south of the 
crossing of the Yaughan Road. All through the 
night the rain fell in torrents, and before morn- 
ing it became impossible to move anything on 
wheels except as corduroy roads were laid. All 
was gloomy and uncomfortable at headquarters, 
" until, like a gleam of light, Sheridan, with his 
cheery manner and never - failing confidence, 
came riding up from Dinwiddie, to confer with 
Grant about 'ending the matter r' After a 
conference with the general-in-chief ," Sheridan 
went back to Dinwiddie with orders to gam pos- 
session of Five Forks," and then "Sheridan 
pushed out a division from Dinwiddie, but found 

1 Mil Hist., vol. iii., pp. 450, 451. 

2 Id., p. 453. 



166 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

the enemy in force at the junction, and the con- 
dition of the roads still prevented any serious 
attack by the cavalry." ^ 

Referring to the Thirteenth Chapter of " The 
Virginia Campaign/' we find that, on March 28, 
General R. E. Lee directed General Fitz Lee to 
move at once to Five Forks, assume command of 
all the cavalry, and, with the infantry supports 
he would send, attack General Sheridan in that 
vicinity. General Fitz Lee reached Sutherland 
Station with his division on the night of the 
29th, and early on the morning of the 30th, 
marched by the most direct route to Five Forks ; 
and, advancing from there toward Dinwiddie 
Court House, encountered General Sheridan's 
cavalry. At dark on the evening of the 30th, 
General W. H. F. Lee and General Rosser joined 
General Fitz Lee with their commands; and 
about the same time General Pickett arrived at 
Five Forks by way of the White Oak Road, 
from the intrenched lines at the Claiborne Road 
Forks, with three brigades of his own division 
and two from General Johnson's division. 

^ When, therefore. General Sheridan halted with 
his thirteen thousand troopers at and near Din- 
widdie Court House, on the evening of the 29th, 
there was no enemy before him excepting the 
small brigade of General Roberts picketing the 
White Oak Road -, while the division of General 
Fitz Lee, not two thousand strong, on his right 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., pp. 456, 457. 



DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 167 

front at Sutherland Station, was more than eight 
miles distant in a straight line. But while Gen- 
eral Sheridan rode on the morning of the 30th 
to General Grant's headquarters, about eight 
miles east of Dinwiddie Court House, for the 
purpose, apparently, of having his orders re- 
peated yet again, General Fltz Lee was moving 
his division from Sutherland Station to Five 
Forks. The importance of the possession of 
that point was thoroughly understood ; and, even 
admitting necessity for General Sheridan's morn- 
ing ride to General Grant's headquarters, one 
cannot understand why, with the force at his dis- 
posal, he could not occupy it before noon on the 
30th ; for it is evident that till the evening of 
that day it was defended only by General Fitz 
Lee's division and General Roberts's brigade. It 
was nearer to Dinwiddie Court House than to 
Sutherland Station by more than two miles. The 
roads were not impassable, for General Lee 
moved from Sutherland Station between early 
day and the time of his meeting General Merritt 
half-way between Dinwiddie and Five Forks. 
General Badeau is manifestly in error when he 
says, " the condition of the roads still prevented 
any serious attack by the cavalry ; " for, at J. 
Boisseau's, General Lee, with a command much 
less than half the size of that led by General 
Merritt, held two roads, after " sharp skirmish- 
ing." General Grant, however, gives no sign of 
finding dilatoriness here. He remembers, and 



168 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

recounts approvinglyj the visit of General Sher- 
idan to his headquarters, but fails to give the 
date or to recall to mind the orders issued to the 
cavalry on the days preceding. 

During the 30th, General Grant decided to re- 
inforce General Sheridan with an infantry corps, 
and, with his command thus strengthened, at- 
tempt to turn General Lee's right, and then as- 
sault along his whole line. He said to General 
Sheridan : " If your situation is such as to jus- 
tify the belief that you can turn the enemy's 
right with the assistance of a corps of infantry 
entirely detached from the balance of the army, 
I will so detach the Fifth corps, and place the 
whole under your command for the operation. 
Let me know, as early in the morning as you 
can, your judgment in the matter, and I will 
make the necessary orders." On the morning of 
the 31st, General Sheridan replied : "... If 
the ground would permit, I could, with the Sixth 
corps, turn the enemy's right, or break through 
his hues ; but I would not like the Fifth corps 
to make such an attempt." General Grant re- 
plied at once : " It will be impossible to give 
you the Sixth corps for the operations by our 
left. ... I could relieve the Second with the 
Fifth corps, and give you that." General Badeau 
here remarks : " Sheridan evidently did not want 
the Fifth corps, doubtless because he was aware 
of the idiosyncrasies of its commander ; and 



DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 169 

Grant desired to regard his preference. Events, 
however, settled the point for them all." ^ 

General Grant's official report (Mem., vol. ii., 
p. 622), referring to General Sheridan's advance 
towards Five Forks, and the engagement which 
resulted on the 31st, says : " Sheridan advanced, 
and with a portion of his cavalry got possession 
of the Five Forks ; but the enemy, after the af- 
fair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel 
cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and 
forced him back towards Dinwiddie Court House. 
Here General Sheridan displayed great general- 
ship. Instead of retreating with his whole com- 
mand on the main army, to tell the story of su- 
perior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry 
on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to 
take charge of the horses. This compelled the 
enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded 
and broken country, and made his progress slow. 
At this juncture he dispatched to me what had 
taken place, and that he was dropping back 
slowly on Dinwiddie Court House." 

In his account, on page 442 of the second 
volume, he says : " Sheridan moved back to 
Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th, 
and then took a road leading north-west to Five 
Forks. He had only his cavalry with him. Soon 
encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a 
very stout resistance. He gradually drove them 
back however until in the neighborhood of Five 

1 Mil. Hist, vol. iii., pp. 458-460. 



170 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Forks. Here he had to encounter other troops 
besides those he had been contending with, and 
was forced to give way. 

" In this condition of affairs he notified me of 
what had taken place and stated that he was 
falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and 
slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to 
his assistance. . . ." 

Before noting the peculiarities of these ac- 
counts given by General Grant, reference should 
again be made to the record as stated in the 
thirteenth chapter of " The Virginia Campaign," 
which in substance is as follows : — 

On the 30th, General Merritt, with General 
Devin's division and General Davies's brigade of 
General Crook's division, moving under orders 
from General Sheridan to gain possession of Five 
Forks, encountered, as we have before noted, 
General Fitz Lee's command, about two thousand 
strong, just beyond the point where the road 
from J. Boisseau's, leading past Dr. Boisseau's, 
to the White Oak Road, leaves the direct road 
from Dinwiddie Court House to Five Forks, and 
about midway between those points. Both roads 
were held by the enemy. General Devin halted 
for the nio-ht at the forks near J. Boisseau's. 

At dark. General W. H. F. Lee and General 
Rosser reinforced General Fitz Lee with their di- 
visions, giving him, in all, about eight thousand 
cavalry, and General Pickett reached Five Forks 
at about the same time, with six thousand six 



DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 171 

hundred infantry. General Pickett assumed 
command of the combined force. On the morn- 
ing of the 31st, General Fitz Lee, moving with 
his cavalry on the direct road to Dinwiddie Court 
House, met General Devin's division, advancing 
upon Five Forks, near the fork of the Gravelly 
Run Church Road. Leaving General Munford 
with one division confronting General Devin, 
General Lee moved with his other two divisions 
of cavalry by way of Little Five Forks, west of 
Chamberlain's Bed, or Run, to Fitzgerald's and 
Danse's crossings of that stream, General Pickett 
following with the infantry command. General 
Crook held Fitzgerald's crossing with General 
Smith's brigade, Danse's crossing, a mile above, 
with General Davies's brigade, and General Gregg 
was in reserve. 

Immediately on arriving. General W. H. F. 
Lee attempted to force the passage of Fitzgerald's 
crossing. He got over, but was driven back 
with heavy loss. The enemy's cavalry failed also 
to effect a crossing at Danse's ; but the infantry 
coming up, General Corse's brigade leading, suc- 
ceeded after sharp fighting and severe loss. Gen- 
eral Gregg holding them for a time. Meanwhile, 
General Munford was forcing General Devin 
back, and General Pickett's infantry now pushing 
General Davies upon General Devin's left, forced 
their way in between General Devin and General 
Crook. General Gibbs, however, withdrew his 
brigade of General Devin's division, in time to 



172 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

join General Crook. This closed the direct road 
to Dinwiddie Court House to Generals Devins 
and Davies, and they were ordered to fall back 
fighting towards the Boydton Road and by that 
road reach the Court House. 

General W. H. F. Lee had now forced his way 
at Fitzgerald^s crossing ; had obHged General 
Smith's and General Gregg's brigades to fall 
back ; and, moving over by the road through 
the Adams farms, had taken position on the 
right of General Pickett's line, General Mun- 
f ord forming the left. Under General Sheridan's 
order General Gibbs and General Gregg attacked 
the rear of General Pickett's line, which was ex- 
posed as it advanced on General Devin, and 
General Custer joined them in the attack with 
two of his brigades. This freed Generals Devin 
and Davies, by forcing General Pickett to face 
about and confront General Sheridan's line in 
front of the Court House. A severe contest now 
ensued, lasting until night. General Devin and 
General Davies reached the Court House by way 
of the Boydton Road, but not in time to take 
part in the action. 

That night General Pickett's infantry lay 
across the road from Dinwiddie Court House to 
Five Forks, with cavalry on either flank extending 
with pickets to Fitzgerald's crossing of Cham- 
berlain's Run on the right, and nearly to the 
Boydton Road in the vicinity of G. U. Brooks's 
on the left. General Custer held the Federal 



DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 173 

front supported by General Devin. The ground 
fought over during the day was generally very 
heavy and in large part densely wooded. 

General Grant states in his report : " Sheridan 
advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got 
possession of the Five Forks/' and in the Me- 
moirs he expresses it : " Sheridan moved back to 
Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th, 
and then took a road leading north west to Five 
Forks. He had only his cavalry with him. 
Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with 
a very stout resistance. He gradually drove 
them back however until in the neighborhood 
of Five Forks." 

The record, reads that on the night of March 
30, General Devin, with General Sheridan's ad- 
vance, halted for the night at the forks of the 
road near J. Boisseau's, having encountered Gen- 
eral Fitz Lee's division near that point ; and that 
on the morning of the 31st, General Devin, 
again advancing, reached the fork of the Grav- 
elly Run Church Road, where he again met Gen- 
eral Fitz Lee. This point is about a mile and a 
half south east of Five Forks, and no part of 
General Sheridan's command advanced beyond 
it on the 31st; but, on the contrary. General 
Devin was driven backward from it, and at even- 
ing had returned to Dinwiddie Court House. 

General Grant's report continues : " but the 
enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, rein- 
forced the rebel cavalry, defending that point 



174 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

with infantry, and forced him back toward Din- 
widdie Court House." The Memoirs state it ; 
" Here he had to encounter other troops besides 
those he had been contending with, and was 
forced to give way." 

When considering the battle of White Oak 
Road, we have seen that, at eight 6* clock in the 
morning of the 31st, General Ayres was notified 
of General Pickett's presence at Five Forks and 
cautioned to be prepared for an attack on his 
left flank, and also that at eleven o'clock Gen- 
eral Ayres advanced to the White Oak Road 
and thereby brought on " the affair with the 
5th corps," wdiich was not concluded until about 
tliree o^clock in the afternoon. General Grant 
says on page 440 of the second volume of the 
Memoirs, that General Lee, on the SOth, sent 
" Pickett with five brigades at reinforce Five 
Forks." General Badeau, on page 468 of his 
third volume, states that General Pickett's attack 
on Fitzgerald's crossing of Chamberlain's Bed 
was made at ten o'clock. It is manifest that 
General Pickett received no aid from the main 
lines " after the affair with the 5th corps." 

General Grant's report states that " Here 
General Sheridan displayed great generalship/' 
As proof of this he states that General Sheri- 
dan " deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only 
mounted men enough to take charge of the 
horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy 
over a vast extent of wooded and broken coun- 



DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 175 

try, and made his progress slow." Coming 
from any other source than the lieutenant-gen- 
eral in command of the armies of the United 
States, such proof would need no notice. Prof- 
fered as it is, it needs but to be noted — it 
speaks for itself. General Grant says that Gen- 
eral Sheridan's tactics were adopted " instead of 
retreating with his whole command on the main 
army to tell the story of superior forces encoun- 
tered." General Sheridan certainly retreated 
with his whole force to within reach of the 
main army, and General Grant states that he at 
once asked to be reinforced with the Sixth 
Corps. Somebody told the story of superior 
numbers, and has continued to tell it to this day. 
The morning report of March 31, 1865, gives 
the strength of General Sheridan's cavalry com- 
mand at thirteen thousand enlisted men present 
for duty. General Badeau states that the com- 
bined force under General Pickett, confronting 
General Sheridan at Dinwiddle Court House, 
was nearly eighteen thousand strong. Fourteen 
thousand was much more nearly correct, and 
still in excess ; but, allowing General Badeau's 
estimate, the odds, even then, against General 
Sheridan were no greater than those that many 
of the veterans of the unappreciated Fifth Corps 
had stood steadily against under General Fitz 
John Porter at Gaines's Mills, and on more than 
one field thereafter ; and were as nothing com- 
pared with what the First Cavalry Division, 



176 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

under General John Buford, had held its own 
against at Gettysburg. It is also proper to note 
that the superior numbers claimed by General 
Badeau to have here opposed General Sheridan's 
command, give not quite the odds against him 
that undoubtedly existed in his favor on the 
afternoon of May 7, 1864, when the Brock Road 
was not opened for the movement of the Fifth 
Corps to Spottsylvania Court House. 



CHAPTER IX. 

GENERAL WARREN FROM AFTERNOON OF MARCH 
31 TO MORNING OF APRIL 1, 1865. 

Continuing his report from where it speaks 
of General Sheridan " dropping back slowly on 
Dinwiddie Court House/' Lieutenant-General 
Grant says : " General Mackenzie's cavalry and 
one division of the 5th corps were immediately 
ordered to his assistance. Soon after receiving 
a report from General Meade that Humphreys 
could hold our position on the Boydton Road, 
and that the other two divisions of the 5th 
corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered 
at once. Thus the operations of the day neces- 
sitated the sending of Warren, because of his 
accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was in- 
tended, and precipitated intended movements. 
On the morning of the 1st of April, General 
Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove 
the enemy back on Five Forks, where, late in 
the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly 
fortified position, capturing all his artillery and 
between five and six thousand prisoners. 

" About the close of this battle. Brevet Major- 
General Charles Griffin relieved Major-Gen eral 



178 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Warren in command of the Sth corps. The 
report of this reached me after nightfall." 

Eesuming General Grant's narrative at the 
same point, we find in the Memoirs : " In this 
condition of affairs he [Sheridan] notified me 
of what had taken place and stated that he was 
falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and 
slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to 
his assistance. I replied to him that it was im- 
possible to send Wright's corps because that 
corps was already in line close up to the enemy, 
where we should want to assault when the 
proper time came, and was besides a long dis- 
tance from him ; but the 2d (Humphreys's) and 
5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left 
and a little to the rear of it in a position to 
threaten the left flank of the enemy at Five 
Forks, and that I would send Warren. 

" Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to 
move at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie 
Court House and put himself in communication 
with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to 
him. He was very slow in moving, some of his 
troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next 
morning. When he did move it was done very 
deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run he 
found the stream swollen from the recent rains so 
that he regarded it as not fordable. Sheridan of 
course knew of his coming, and being impatient to 
get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to 
him to hasten. He was also hastened or at least 



GENERAL WARREN. 179 

ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade. 
He now felt that he could not cross that creek 
without bridges, and his orders were changed to 
move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank 
or get in their rear ; but he was so late in getting 
up that Sheridan determined to move forward 
without him. However, Ayres's division of 
Warren's corps reached him in time to be in the 
fight all day, most of the time separated from the 
remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly 
under Sheridan. 

" Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock 
on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not 
up so as to be much engaged until late in the 
afternoon. Griffin's division in backing to get 
out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy 
was found marching away from the fighting. 
This did not continue long, however ; the division 
was brought back and with Ayres's division did 
most excellent service during the day. Craw- 
ford's division of the same corps had backed still 
farther off, and although orders were sent re- 
peatedly to bring it up, it was late before it 
finally got to where it could be of material as- 
sistance. Once there it did very excellent ser- 
vice. 

" Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the af- 
ternoon or a little later, in advancing up to the 
point from which to make his designed assault 
upon Five Forks itself. He was very impatient 
to make the assault and have it all over before 



180 GRANT VS. THE RECORD, 

night, because the ground he occupied would be 
untenable for him in bivouac during the night. 
Unless the assault was made and was successful, 
he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddle 
Court-House or even further than that for the 
night. 

'^ It was at this junction of affairs that Sheri- 
dan wanted to get Crawford's division in hand, 
and he also wanted Warren. He sent staff 
officer after staff officer in search of Warren, di- 
recting that general to report to him, but they 
were unable to find him. At all events Sheridan 
was unable to get that officer to him. Finally he 
went himself. He issued an order relieving 
Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of 
the 5th corps. The troops were then brought 
up and the assault successfully made. 

"I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's 
dilatory movements in the battle of White Oak 
Eoad and in his failure to reach Sheridan in 
time, that I was very much afraid that at the 
last moment he would fail Sheridan. He was a 
man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick 
perception, and could make his dispositions as 
quickly as any officer, under difficulties when he 
was forced to act. But I had before discovered 
a defect which was beyond his control, that was 
very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies 
like the one just before us. He could see every 
danger at a glance before he had encountered it. 
He would not only make preparations to meet 



GENERAL WARREN. 181 

the danger which might occur, but he would in- 
form his commanding officer what others should 
do while he was executing his move. 

" I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan 
to call his attention to these defects, and to say 
that as much as I hked General Warren, now 
was not a time when we could let our personal 
feelings for any one stand in the way of success ; 
and if his removal was necessary to success, not 
to hesitate. It was upon that authorization that 
Sheridan removed Warren. I was very sorry 
that it had been done, and regretted stiU more 
that I had not long before taken occasion to 
assign him to another field of duty." 

General Grant here expresses regret that Gen- 
eral Sheridan had acted on his plain suggestion, 
and yet, — while, as will be seen hereafter. Gen- 
eral Sheridan extended the authority given him 
by General Grant, and removed General War- 
ren from his corps command after he had with 
that corps secured success for General Sheridan, 
— through all the years in which he had the 
power, General Grant denied to General War- 
ren the meagre justice of official inquiry and 
statement of the facts pertaining to the case. 

General Warren,^ while at W. Dabney's on 
the White Oak Road, about five o'clock in the 
afternoon of March 31, heard the sound of Gen- 
eral Sheridan's engagement coming from the 
south-west, and, as it appeared to him to be re- 

1 Reference resumed to 13th chap. Va. Camp. 



182 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

ceding, he at once and without waiting for 
orders sent General Bartlett with his brigade 
of General Griffin's division toward the firing, 
with directions to attack the enemy in flank. 
This prompt and, as will be seen, efficient aid 
from what General Badeau calls " Warren's dis- 
organized flank," is not alluded to in General 
Grant's Report or Memoirs, or in General Ba- 
deau's History. 

Soon after five o'clock. General Warren re- 
ceived orders from General Meade to push a bri- 
gade down the White Oak Road, so as to open 
it for General Sheridan. He was directed to 
support this brigade if necessary. At half-past 
six this order was recalled, and he was directed 
to send the brigade down the Boydton Plank 
Road as promptly as possible, as it was reported 
to General Meade, by an officer of General Mer- 
ritt's staff, that the enemy had penetrated be- 
tween General Sheridan's main command and 
General Warren's position. As General Bart- 
lett had by this time advanced too far to be 
promptly recalled. General Warren directed Gen- 
eral Pearson, who with three regiments was on 
the Boydton Road, to move at once toward Din- 
widdie Court House. The order was promptly 
obeyed ; but the bridge at the Boydton Road 
crossing of Gravelly Run had been destroyed 
by the enemy on the 29th, and, the stream be- 
ing swollen from the rain and unfordable for 
infantry. General Pearson was compelled to halt 



GENERAL WARREN. 183 

at that point. Why this bridge had not been 
examined and repaired on the 30th, and held 
ready for just such an emergency as this, does 
not appear. Both General Grant and General 
Meade seem to have been ignorant of this se- 
rious break in the lines of communication with 
the cavalry corps until informed by General 
Warren. 

At eight o'clock, General Warren was in- 
formed that, as General Sheridan had been 
forced back to Dinwiddie Court House and the 
rear of the Fifth and Second Corps was thus 
left exposed on the Boydton Road, the brigade 
sent down that road should not go farther than 
Gravelly Run. About half-past nine, however, 
he was ordered to withdraw the Fifth Corps 
from the White Oak Road to the Boydton Road, 
and send General Griffin^s division at once to 
General Sheridan by the Boydton Road. He 
immediately sent a staff offi.cer, and then Cap- 
tain Benyaurd of the Engineer Corps, to repair 
or rebuild the bridge ; and, advising General 
Meade of the situation and condition of his 
command, prepared to withdraw from the White 
Oak Road to the Boydton Road, and to send 
General Grif&n, as ordered, to General Sheri- 
dan. He was soon after notified that the divi- 
sion ordered to General Sheridan '}nust start at 
07icej and in reply stated the condition of the 
bridge, and that he was making every effort to 
have it passable by the time General Grif&n 



184 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

reached it. General Warren's headquarters were 
on the Boydton Road; General Meade's were 
at the Vaughan Road crossing of Hatcher's 
Run, about five miles from General Warren, 
and about two miles from General Grant's head- 
quarters, which were near Dabney's Mill, a 
point west from General Meade and about eight 
miles from Dinwiddle Court House. The tele- 
graph lines between these headquarters were 
working badly. 

At 8.40 p. M. General Warren had telegraphed 
General Meade, suggesting that, if the enemy 
did not threaten south of Gravelly Run and 
east of the Boydton Plank Road, he could move 
with his corps and attack the enemy near Din- 
widdle Court House on one side, while General 
Sheridan attacked on the other. In a note on 
page 477 of his third volume, General Badeau 
gives General Warren's despatch as follows : 
" The fine along the plank road is very strong. 
One division, with my artillery, I think, can 
hold it, if we are not threatened south of Gra- 
velly run. East of the plank road. General 
Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could 
hold this securely, and let me move down and 
attack the enemy at Dinwiddle court-house on 
one side, and Sheridan on the other. On ac- 
count of Bartlett's position, they [the enemy] 
will have to make a considerable detour to rein- 
force their troops at that point from the north. 
Unless General Sheridan has been too badly 



GENERAL WARREN. 185 

handled, I think we should have a chance for an 
open-field fight that should be made use of." At 
9.45 p. M. this proposition was submitted to Gen- 
eral Grant by General Meade, who at the same 
time stated the position of General Bartlett's 
brigade near Gravelly Run, on the road from 
Dinwiddie Court House, past J. Boisseau's, to 
the White Oak Road. General Meade also stated 
that in this way General Warren could move at 
once and take the enemy in rear, or he could 
send one division to General Sheridan near Din- 
widdie Court House, and move on the enemy's 
rear with the other two divisions of his corps. 
General Grant replied, " Let Warren move in 
the way you propose, and urge him not to stop 
for anything. Let Griffin go on as he was first 
directed," 

At 10.50 p. M. General Warren received Gen- 
eral Meade's reply to his suggestion made at 
8.40 p. M. He was now directed to send General 
Griffin's division promptly, as ordered, by the 
Boydton Road; and with the rest of his corps 
to move, very promptly and without encumber- 
ing himself with anything that would prevent 
his moving in any direction or impede him in 
any way, by the road General Bartlett was on, 
so as to strike the enemy in rear, and get the 
forks of the Brooks Cross-Roads so as to open 
communication with the Boydton Road. Both 
General Grant and General Meade informed 
General Sheridan of the steps taken to reinforce 



186 GRANT VS. THE RECORD, 

him. General Warren answered General Meade's 
despatch, received at 10.50, saying that, as in 
withdrawing his corps to the Boydton Koad, as 
previously ordered. General Ayres's division was 
necessarily the first to reach the road, he would 
send him, instead of General Griffin, to General 
Sheridan by the Boydton Road, and move with 
General Crawford and General Griffin to strike 
the rear of the enemy as just directed. He at 
the same time gave the preliminary orders for 
the movements of these divisions. 

Not till one o'clock in the morning of April 1, 
did General Warren receive a reply from Gen- 
eral Meade to his despatch concerning the de- 
struction of the bridge over Gravelly Run. It 
was then suggested that the troops for General 
Sheridan should be sent over the Quaker Road, 
or hy both roads if necessary, and the rear 
attack he given up, as time was of the utmost 
importance ; for General Sheridan could not 
maintain himself at Dinwiddle Court House 
without reinforcements, and General Warren 
must use every exertion to get troops to him as 
soon as possible. It was also stated that if 
General Sheridan was not reinforced and must 
fall back, he would retire by the Vaughan Road. 
It was nine or ten miles from General Warren's 
position to Dinwiddle Court House by way of 
the Quaker Road, and by that route reinforce- 
ments could scarcely reach General Sheridan 
before eight o'clock in the morning. While 



GENERAL WARREN. 187 

advising General Meade of this. General Warren 
assured him that if he failed to get his troops 
through by the road they were on, he would do 
so by the Quaker Road. 

As the tenor of the despatch appeared to Gen- 
eral Warren to leave to his discretion the deci- 
sion of how he could best reinforce General 
Sheridan, he decided to persevere in the move- 
ment in progress, as in his opinion he could best 
reach the rear of the enemy by the Boydton 
Road, should General Sheridan, through failure 
of reinforcements to reach him in time, be forced 
to fall back by the Vaughan Road. At two 
o'clock in the morning General Ayres was cross- 
ing the repaired bridge over Gravelly Run and 
advancing with his division toward Dinwiddie 
Court House. General Meade was informed of 
this fact. An hour before daybreak of April 1, 
an officer of General Sheridan's staff met Gen- 
eral Ayres about two miles from Dinwiddie 
Court House, and led him back about a mile to 
the Brooks Cross-Road, and along that road to 
its intersection with the direct road from the 
Court House to Five Forks. In this vicinity 
General Ayres's division was massed to await 
further orders. Soon after the division entered 
the Brooks Road, about the dawn of day, one of 
General Munford's videttes was seen retiring. 

At half-past four a. m. General Warren learned 
that General Ayres had communicated with 
General Sheridan. The tenor of all General 



188 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Meade's instructions to him had been that the 
most important duty assigned him was to make 
sure that a division reached General Sheridan 
in time to go into action at daylight. Hamng 
fulfilled that duty, he was about joining the 
remaining divisions of his corps to move them, as 
he had also been directed, when he received Gen- 
eral Sheridan's despatch sent at three a. m. This 
despatch said : " I am holding in front of Din- 
widdie Court House, on the road leading to Five 
Forks, for three-quarters of a mile, with General 
Custer's division. The enemy are in his imme- 
diate front, lying so as to cover the road just 
this side of the Adams' House, which leads out 
across Chamberlain's Bed or Run. I understand 
you have a division at J. Boisseau's ; if so, you 
are in rear of the enemy's line, and almost on 
his flank. I will hold on here. Possibly they 
may attack Custer at daylight ; if so, have this 
division attack instantly and in full force. At- 
tack at daylight anyway, and I will make an 
eif ort to get the road this side of Adams' House, 
and if I do, you can capture the whole of them. 
Any force moving down the road I am hold- 
ing, or on the White Oak road, will be in the 
enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force 
that may escape you by a flank attack. Do not 
fear my leaving here. If the enemy remain I 
shall fight at dayhght." 

At five o'clock in the morning of April 1, 
General Grifi&n's division moved from the White 



GENERAL WARREN. 189 

Oak Road, followed by General Crawford's divi- 
sion, to Crump's, and thence to the forks of the 
road near J. Boisseau's. Here General Devin's 
cavalry division was met about seven o'clock, and 
General Sheridan directed General Warren to 
remain at J. Boisseau's to rest his men, holding 
them ready to move to the front when required. 

General Bartlett, when ordered by General 
Warren, at five o'clock on the afternoon of the 
31st, to proceed from near W. Dabney's house 
on the White Oak Road toward the sound of 
firing in the direction of Dinwiddie Court House, 
had moved by a wood road, which led him to 
Dr. Boisseau's house on the direct road from the 
White Oak Road to the Court House. Here his 
skirmishers met those of the enemy and drove 
them across Gravelly Run on the road at Crump's. 
At dark General Bartlett established his picket 
line along the run. 

About ten o'clock at night (March 31) General 
Pickett was informed of the presence of General 
Bartlett on the road near Crump's, and thinking 
it to be the advance of the Fifth Corps he decided 
to fall back to Five Forks during the night. 
His ambulances and ammunition trains and the 
artillery began to move back at about midnight, 
and were followed by the infantry on the most 
direct road to Five Forks ; General Corse's bri- 
gade bringing up the rear of the infantry and 
getting off just before daylight. General Mun- 
ford's division of cavalry followed the infantry 



190 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

about daylight ; and about the same time Gen- 
eral W. H. F. Lee and General Rosser, with 
their cavalry divisions, recrossed Chamberlain's 
Bed and moved back through Little Five Forks. 
The Opinion of the Warren Court of Inquiry 
upon the second imputation or accusation laid 
before it was as follows : — 

"Second Imputation. 

" The second imputation is found in the fol- 
lowing extract from General Sheridan's report of 
May 15, 1865 (see Record, pp. 21 and 48), as 
follows : — 

" ' . . . had General Warren moved accord- 
ing to the expectations of the Lieutenant Gen- 
eral, there would appear to have been but little 
chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in 
front of Dinwiddle Court House.' 

" Opinion. 

" It is supposed that the expectations of the 
Lieutenant General, referred to in the imputation, 
are those expressed in his despatch to General 
Sheridan of 10.45 p. m. of March 31, 1865, as 
follows : — 

CLXXIX. 

" ' Dabney's Mills, 

Alarch 31, 18C5, 10.45 p. m. 
" * Major-General Sheridan, 

" ' The Fifth corps has been ordered to your 
support. Two divisions will go by J. Boisseau's 



GENERAL WARREN. 191 

and one down the Boydton road. In addition to 
this I have sent Mackenzie's cavalry, which will 
reach you by the Vaughan road. All these 
forces, except the cavalry, should reach you by 
12 M. to-night. You will assume command of 
the whole force sent to operate with you and use 
it to the best of your ability to destroy the force 
which your command has fought so gallantly to- 
day. U. S. Grant, Lieut, Gen J 

In which he says, ^all these forces except the 
cavalry, should reach you by 12 to-night.' 

" If this supposition be correct, the Court is 
of the opinion, considering the condition of the 
roads and surrounding country over part of which 
the troops had to march, the darkness of the 
night, the distance to be travelled, and the hour 
at which the order for the march reached General 
Warren, 10.50 P. M., that it was not practicable 
for the Fifth corps to have reached General Sher- 
idan at 12 o'clock on the night of March 31. 

"Notwithstanding that dispositions suitable 
for the contingency of Sheridan's falling back 
from Dinwiddle might well have occupied and 
perplexed General Warren's mind during the 
night, the Court is of the opinion that he should 
have moved the two divisions by the Crump 
road in obedience to the orders and expectations 
of his commander, upon whom alone rested the 
responsibility of the consequences. 



192 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

" It appears from the despatches and General 
Warren's testimony, that neither Generals Meade, 
Sheridan, nor Warren expressed an intention of 
having this column attack before daylight. 

" The Court is further of the opinion that 
General Warren should have started with two 
divisions, as directed by General Meade's de- 
spatch (civ., heretofore quoted), as early after 
its receipt at 10.50 p. m., as he could be assured 
of the prospect of Ayres's departure down the 
Boydton plank-road, and should have advanced 
on the Crump road as far as directed in that de- 
spatch, or as far as might be practicable or 
necessary to fulfil General Meade's intentions ; 
whereas the evidence shows that he did not start 
until between five and six o'clock on the morning 
of the 1st of April, and did not reach J. Bois- 
seau's with the head of the column till about 
seven o'clock in the morning. 

" The despatches show that Generals Meade 
and Warren anticipated a withdrawal during the 
night of the enemy's forces fronting General 
Sheridan, which was rendered highly probable 
from the known position in their rear of a por- 
tion of the Fifth corps (Bartlett's brigade) at G. 
Boisseau's, and the event justified the anticipa- 
tion." 

General Grant's official report states only the 
fact that, on the night of the 31st, the Fifth Corps 
was ordered to move to the support of General 
Sheridan. The narrative of the Memoirs, how- 



GENERAL WARREN. 193 

ever, charges that, being ordered on that night 
to report to General Sheridan, General Warren 
was very slow in moving ; — that when he did 
move it was very deliberately done ; and that, in 
spite of hastening orders from Generals Meade 
and Sheridan, he allowed his command to be un- 
necessarily delayed by the broken bridge over 
Gravelly Run, and thereby failed to reinforce 
General Sheridan as promptly as he should have 
done. 

We find from the Record, however, that Gen- 
eral Warren was the first to move in sending 
aid to General Sheridan ; for, acting on the au- 
thority of his soldierly intelligence alone, before 
General Grant was aware of General Sheridan^ s 
discomfiture, he had sent General Bartlett with 
his brigade toward the sound of General Sher- 
idan's battle as soon as it reached his ears, and 
by this timely aid effectually reinforced General 
Sheridan against General Pickett's " superior 
forces," which dare not remain confronting him 
with this threatening force upon the rear of 
their left flank. 

We find also that it was General Warren 
who proposed the movement of the Fifth Corps 
upon the rear of the enemy at Dinwiddie Court 
House ; and that when his suggestion was sent 
back to him approved, it was too late to make 
the movement he had proposed successfully, for 
General Pickett had been warned nearly an hour 
before General Warren received permission to 



194 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

move against him, and was, of course, prepared 
to meet him. In addition, General Warren's or- 
dered movement was hampered with the repeated 
and positive injunction to make sure that one 
division of his corps reached General Sheridan 
before daylight by the Boydton Road; and by 
his anxiety faithfully to fulfil this additional 
obligation laid upon him, he incurred the only 
censure put upon his actions in this movement 
by the Court. 

It is to be remembered that it was not till one 
o'clock in the morning of April 1, that General 
Meade became aware of the destruction of the 
bridge over Gravelly Run ; that his orders to 
General Warren subordinated everything to the 
necessity of reinforcing General Sheridan by the 
Boydton Road ; that he even proposed to aban- 
don the movement by Boisseau's to insure the 
arrival of a division at Dinwiddle Court House ; 
and that his death, here also, deprived the Court 
of evidence very material to the question as to 
which of the orders he received demanded the 
first and greatest care from General Warren. 
No word in the Opinion of the Court implies 
that anything of negligence or want of energy 
was shown by General Warren ; and when we 
consider the expressed opinion that it was imprac- 
ticable for the Fifth Corps to have reached Gen- 
eral Sheridan as soon as General Grant expected, 
and the further statements of the Court as to the 
expectations of attacking the enemy, and the 



GENERAL WARREN. 195 

evidence with regard to the removal of General 
Pickett's forces, — it may be safely said that 
the fault of which General Warren was in the 
opinion of the Court guilty, was at the most 
technical, rather than culpable, in character. 



CHAPTER X. 

FIVE FORKS. 

Being directed by General R. E. Lee to main- 
tain the position at Five Forks, General Pickett 
at once intrenched himself along the White 
Oak Road, his line extending from Five Forks 
to the west about a mile, and to the east about 
three quarters of a mile, with a short return 
about a hundred yards long at his left. Gen- 
eral W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division was on his 
right along the west line of the Gilliam Field. 
General Corse's infantry brigade, next on the 
left, lay along the north side of the same field ; 
and then in order came Colonel Mayo's, General 
Steuart's, General Ransom's, and Colonel Wal- 
lace's brigades of infantry, with General Mun- 
ford's cavalry division, dismounted, on the ex- 
treme left, covering between Colonel Wallace's 
left and Hatcher's Run. Three guns of Colonel 
Pegram's battalion of artillery were posted on 
General Corse's right, and three at the Five 
Forks. McGregor's battery of four guns was 
on the left. General Roberts's cavalry brigade 
picketed from General Munford's left towards 



FIVE FORKS. 197 

the right of the main line of works covering 
the Claiborne Koad ; and General Rosser guarded 
the trains on the north side of Hatcher's Run, 
near the Ford Road. 

At daylight of April 1, General Merritt 
moved forward toward Five Forks with General 
Sheridan's cavalry, pressing the rear of the 
enemy. General Custer's division, dismounted, 
moved along Chamberlain's Bed or Run ; Gen- 
eral Devin's division advanced on the right ; and 
General Crook's division was held in reserve. 
General Merritt pressed close up to General 
Pickett's intrenchments. 

General Sheridan's plan of attack was to 
manoeuvre as if to turn the enemy's right flank 
with his cavalry, and assault their left with the 
Fifth Corps ; General Merritt to attack the in- 
trenchments in his front as soon as the infan- 
try became engaged. At one o'clock he directed 
General V/arren to bring up the Fifth Corps 
and form it on the right of General Devin, 
six or eight hundred yards south of the White 
Oak Road. Captain Gillespie, engineer officer 
on General Sheridan's staff, had examined the 
ground where the Fifth Corps was formed. 
General Mackenzie had been sent from Din- 
widdle Court House to get possession of the 
White Oak Road at a point about three miles 
east of Five Forks. He succeeded after a brisk 
skirmish with some of the enemy's cavalry, and 
moved down to the right of the Fifth Corps, 



198 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

being ordered to move in conjunction with that 
corps, on its right, and gain the flank and rear 
of the enemy, and hold the Ford Road crossing 
of Gravelly Run to cut off their retreat. 

General Sheridan, besides informing General 
Warren as to the general plan of the battle, in- 
structed him that the enemy was in line of bat- 
tle along the White Oak Road, their left resting 
not far from the crossing of the Gravelly Run 
Church Road ; that he was to form his line so 
that he could strike with his right centre on the 
angle of the works and let his left engage the 
front ; that he was to place one division behind 
his right to support the attack on the angle, 
and to give his line such a direction that its 
obliquity to the road would correspond with the 
supposed position of the works of the enemy. 
The matter was talked over at length, and Gen- 
eral Warren drew a diagram of the proposed 
plan and wrote upon it the instructions he had 
received for the assault. 

General Crawford with his division arrived 
first upon the ground, and was followed by Gen- 
eral Griffin, General Ayres arriving last. Gen- 
eral Crawford's division was placed upon the 
right of the Gravelly Run Church Road ob- 
liquely to that road, so that his centre would 
strike where it was supposed the angle was 
located, and be the first to reach the works. 
General Griffin's division was placed in rear of 
General Crawford. General Ayres's division, 



FIVE FORKS. 199 

the smallest, was placed on the left of the road, 
and was to engage the enemy's front and pre- 
vent support being sent to the angle when Gen- 
eral Crawford should become engaged at that 
point. A copy of General Warren's diagram, 
with the instructions noted upon it, was given 
to each division commander and the plan ex- 
plained to them verbally in addition. The line 
was to move forward as formed till it reached 
the White Oak Road, when it was to swing 
around to the left until perpendicular to that 
road. 

About four o'clock in the afternoon, as soon 
as General Ayres's division was formed, the 
Fifth Corps was ordered to attack. Advancing, 
and receiving only a skirmish fire as he crossed 
the White Oak Road with his right. General 
Warren, thinking the enemy's line of battle was 
probably in the edge of the woods about three 
hundred yards north of the road, continued to 
advance in the direction in which he had started 
until the left of General Ayres's division had 
crossed. General Ayres then received a mus- 
ketry and artillery fire on his left, which evidently 
came from the enemy's intrenchments at the re- 
turn, which was, in fact, seven or eight hundred 
yards west of the Gravelly Run Church Road, 
instead of in the near vicinity of that road as 
General Sheridan had supposed it to be. On re- 
ceiving this fire General Ayres at once changed 
front and faced the return. General Winthrop's 



200 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

brigade, which was in reserve, was brought in 
double quick to the left of the line, which then 
advanced and finally carried the works, captur- 
ing a large number of prisoners and many battle 
flags. 

When the fire opened on General Ayres's left. 
General Warren, seeing that the fight at the 
angle would fall on General Ayres and not on 
General Crawford as had been planned, at once 
ordered General Winthrop to General Ayres's 
left to connect w4th General Devin, and sent 
word to General Griffin to support General 
Ayres's right as quickly as he could, and to Gen- 
eral Crawford to change direction to the left at 
right angles to the line he was following. Gen- 
eral Sheridan, who was with General Ayres's 
division through the greater part of the battle, 
also sent orders to General Griffin and General 
Crawford to come in on General Ayres's right. 
But a large part of both General Crawford's 
and General Griffin's divisions had entered the 
woods north of the White Oak Road. 

General Warren also directed Colonel Kellogg, 
commanding General Crawford's left, to form his 
brigade at right angles to its first direction and 
to hold it there for the division to align upon ; 
and he then directed Colonel Coulter, who was 
following in reserve, to form on Colonel Kellogg. 
Searching through the dense woods for General 
Crawford, and sending repeated orders for him 
to change direction to the left and keep closed 



FIVE FORKS. 201 

on Colonel Kellogg, so as to advance against the 
rear of the enemy, General Warren returning to 
Colonel Kellogg's position found that officer had 
been removed by one of General Sheridan's aides. 
All of General Warren's staff had now been sent 
to bring General Griffin and General Crawford 
to attack the enemy in rear, and many of General 
Sheridan's staff had been dispatched for the same 
purpose ; and in spite of the dense woods the di- 
rection of both divisions had soon been changed, 
and they came into the open ground of the Syd- 
nor Farm about eight hundred yards from the 
enemy's intrenchments near the return. 

General Warren found General Griffin, and 
directed him to attack General Ransom's bri- 
gade, which, with part of Colonel Wallace's 
brigade, had formed a new line, slightly in- 
trenched, connected with and at right angles 
to their main line. He then rode to General 
Ayres ; and finding that he had carried the 
return and was re-forming his troops to face 
the new line taken up by the enemy, he started 
to find General Crawford, who had passed 
through the Sydnor field driving General Mun- 
ford's dismounted cavalry westward before him. 
Following in his track, General Warren found 
General Crawford in the Young-Boisseau Farm, 
with his command facing west and in good 
order, Colonel Kellogg's brigade having rejoined 
the division. First sending Colonel Spear to 
hold the Ford Road crossing of Hatcher's Run, 



202 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

General Warren changed the direction of the 
division to the south, and led it along the Ford 
Road toward the rear of the enemy's lines, 
meeting, however, at the edge of the woods on 
the south side of the farm, a sharp fire from a 
line which General Pickett, having reached the 
field, had formed across the Ford Road with 
Colonel Majo's brigade, some of General Ran- 
som's troops just driven from the south-west 
corner of the Sydnor field by General Grif&n, 
and McGregor's four guns which had drawn 
back from the return on the left. The resistance 
here was brief, and General Crawford captured 
the four guns. Part of General Bartlett's bri- 
gade joined General Crawford in this field ; but 
neither General Griffin nor General Ayres had 
yet reached this point, the resistance of General 
Ransom's and Colonel Wallace's men having 
been stubborn and protracted for about half an 
hour. 

General Pickett, seeing that the line upon the 
Ford Road could not be maintained, gave direc- 
tion to General Corse to form a line along the 
west side of the Gilliam field, at right angles to 
the main intrenchments and extending into the 
woods to the north, to cover as far as possible 
the retreat of the infantry. General Warren, 
with General Crawford's division, pursuing the 
enemy as they fell back to the westward, came 
upon the Gilliam field. Here General Craw- 
ford's fine was formed in the edge of the woods 



FIVE FORKS. 203 

on the east of the field, the right being north of 
the White Oak Road. A sharp fire was being 
kept up from the enemy's quickly occupied and 
partially intrenched new line, and there was some 
little hesitation in General Crawford's tired com- 
mand about advancing to the attack ; but Gen- 
eral Warren, riding forward with the corps flag 
in his hand, led them across the field. General 
Custer advanced from the south at the same 
time, having sent word by a staff officer that he 
would do so. The fire was severe. Close up to 
the enemy's lines General Warren's horse fell 
dead under him, his orderly was killed at his 
side, and Colonel Richardson, of the Seventh 
Wisconsin, springing between his chief and the 
enemy, fell severely wounded ; but in a fcAv 
moments the intrenchments were carried and 
many prisoners taken. It was now dusk, and 
General Warren, after continuing the pursuit 
westward for half a mile, General Custer having 
passed on his left with his cavalry division, and 
there being no enemy in sight, halted his com- 
mand and reported for further orders. This is 
not what General Grant has written, hut it is 
the Record. 

General Custer's division, on the left in the 
assault, had but one brigade dismounted. With 
that he had kept up a constant fire upon the 
enemy's lines. With his two other brigades 
mounted, he charged General W. H. F. Lee's 
right, and a spirited encounter took place ; but 
General Lee held his position. 



204 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

General Devin's division advanced upon the 
enemy's front dismounted, when the Fifth Corps 
moved to attack, and kept up a constant fire. 
When the enemy were falling back from the 
Young-Boisseau field, Colonel Fitzhugh's bri- 
gade charged and carried the Hues in its front, 
capturing three guns, two battle flags, and over 
a thousand prisoners. 

General Mackenzie, moving on General Craw- 
ford's right, had once crossed Hatcher's Run, 
against which he was crowded by the infantry ; 
but he recrossed to the south side, along which 
he advanced westward to the Ford Road crossing, 
which he had been directed to hold. 

We are told by General Badeau that General 
Crook's division " was south of Dinwiddle on the 
1st of April, and as far from the battle field as 
the left of the Army of the Potomac." ^ 

General Pickett was routed with a loss of not 
less than four thousand five hundred prisoners, 
thirteen colors, and seven guns. Of these the 
Fifth Corps captured over three thousand two 
hundred prisoners, eleven colors, and four guns, 
the larger part of the prisoners being taken by 
General Ayres's and General Griffin's divisions. 
The Fifth Corps lost — in killed, wounded, and 
missing — in General Crawford's division three 
hundred, in General Ayres's division two hun- 
dred and five, and in General Griffin's division 
one hundred and twenty-five. Total, six hun- 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., p. 495, note. 



FIVE FORKS. 205 

dred and thirty-four. Among tlie killed was 
General Fred. Winthrop. The proportion of 
cavalry officers killed and wounded was large, 
but the total casualties in that corps was not 
large. 

The success of General Sheridan's command 
was complete, and after the last of the enemy 
had been driven from or captured at Five Forks, 
at seven o'clock in the evening, he sent an order 
to General Warren relieving him from duty with 
the Fifth Corps, and directing him to report for 
orders to Lieutenant-General Grant. 

On the morning of April 1, General Hunt, 
chief of artillery, had sent Captain E. E. War- 
ner, Third U. S. Artillery, to the old headquar- 
ter's camp of the Fifth Corps on some artillery 
duty. General Warren had insisted upon his 
staff getting some sleep during the night of the 
31st, and when he moved with his command 
on the morning of the 1st, had left some of 
them still sleeping, among them Colonel Locke, 
assistant adjutant-general. Captain Warner was 
directed by General Eawlins to ascertain where 
the Fifth Corps was ; and m.eeting Colonel Locke 
about nine o'clock, asked him for the informa- 
tion. Colonel Locke replied that when he last 
heard from them a portion of the corps had 
halted to bridge a stream, meaning that he had 
gone to sleep before the bridge was built and 
had received no further information since. Upon 
returning to headquarters about ten o'clock, 



206 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Captain Warner stated to General Rawlins that 
the Fifth Corps, or a portion of it, when last 
heard from, was delayed building a bridge, and 
that they were there still delayed. 

We have referred already to the correspond- 
ence between General Grant and General Sheri- 
dan, on March 30, with regard to reinforcing 
the latter with a corps of infantry, and Gen- 
eral Sheridan's unwillingness to have the Fifth 
Corps sent to him. In addition we are told by 
General Badeau (vol. iii., pp. 497-499), with 
reference to the operations of April 1 : " The 
general -in -chief had three aides-de-camp with 
Sheridan this day, sending them in succession to 
communicate his views. Colonel Porter was in- 
structed first to say that the movements of the 
main army would very much depend upon the 
result of Sheridan's operations ; that Grant 
would have preferred to send him the Sixth 
corps, but it was at too great distance to reach 
him in time ; and that the Fifth corps, being 
the nearest, had been dispatched instead. A 
little before noon Colonel Babcock arrived with 
a verbal messasre from Grant to the eifect that 
Sheridan was to have complete control of his 
own movement ; that the responsibility would 
rest entirely with him ; and that, if in his judg- 
ment, Warren should not 'pvone equal to the 
task assigned him, Sheridan must not hesitate 
to relieve him and put another in command of 
the Fifth corps." 



FIVE FORKS. 207 

And he adds further : " He hesitated some 
hours before sending this permission, which was, 
indeed, almost an invitation, to Sheridan." 

He concludes his chapter with the inspired re- 
mark, '- The success of the one is the explana- 
tion of the failure of the other," which may well 
bear a more candid construction than that its 
author evidently intended. 

General Humphreys has frankly stated that 
" At times, during the campaign beginning in 
May, there had been misunderstandings between 
General Meade and General Warren, the latter 
sometimes modifying the plan of operations pre- 
scribed by the orders of the day for the Fifth 
corps, so as to make them accord with his own 
judgment, as the day went on, modifications 
which General Meade sometimes did not approve, 
and hence something like controversy grevr up 
occasionally in the despatches that passed be- 
tween them. It appears to be probable that 
General Grant apprehended that something of 
this kind might occur between General Sheri- 
dan and General Warren, and considering the 
time to be a critical one, sent the message 
mentioned to General Sheridan." It is to be 
remembered, however, that though the pages 
of both the Military History and the Memoirs 
of U. S. Grant teem with evidence of the im- 
placable spirit in which every act of General 
Warren, from the passage of the Rapidan to the 
final shout of victory at Five Forks, has been 



208 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

assailed by his ruthless critics, not one specific 
instance of culpable neglect of duty or tran- 
scending of authority has been confirmed against 
him. Intangible general assertions are freely 
made, hut not one honest charge sustained. 

General Sheridan's imputations against General 
Warren, as embodied in his report of the battle 
of Five Forks, dated May 16, 1865, are of this 
same general and intangible character. He says : 
" General Warren did not exert himself to get 
up his corps as rapidly as he might have done, 
and his manner gave me the impression that he 
wished the sun to go down before dispositions for 
the attack could be comj^leted." And again : 
" During this attack [upon General Pickett's 
position] I again became dissatisfied with Gen- 
eral Warren. During the engagement portions 
of his lines gave way when not exposed to a 
heavy fire, and simply for want of confidence on 
the part of the troops, which General Warren 
did not exert himself to inspire. I therefore re- 
lieved him from the command of the Fifth corps, 
authority for the action having been sent to me, 
before the battle, unsolicited." 

General Humphreys well says : " These are 
very grave accusations or imputations, and of 
such serious character that no officer could rest 
under them. Any officer against whom they 
were made would be entitled, whatever his rank 
might be, to an investigation of them before a 
proper court." 



FIVE FORKS. 209 

For nearly fifteen years this right of investi- 
gation was denied to General Warren. While 
General Grant remained in power as General 
of the Army and President of the United 
States, even this scant justice was withheld. 
Finally, after repeated requests from General 
Warren, and seven years after the death of Gen- 
eral Meade had removed one of his most material 
witnesses, in December 1879, by order of Presi- 
dent Hayes, a Court of Inquiry was convened, to 
which were submitted all the circumstances at- 
tending the battle of Five Forks for its consid- 
eration and statement of opinion. Many Confed- 
erate as well as United States officers who had 
been engaged in the battle appeared and testified. 

General Sheridan explained to the Court that, 
though his troops were victorious at Five Forks, 
they were isolated from the Army of the Poto- 
mac ; and that the extreme left of that army had 
been thrown back to the Boydton Road, while the 
enemy held strongly at the intersection of the 
White Oak and Claiborne roads directly in his 
rear, which they, being only about three and a 
half miles distant, might attack early the next 
morning. He does not appear, however, to have 
stated that he had from the commencement of 
the movement been instructed by General Grant, 
in the event of the enemy offering him an op- 
portunity for attack, to move in with his entire 
force in his own way, and with the full reliance 
that the army would engage or follow, as cir- 



210 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

cumstances might dictate ; and that he had rea- 
son to believe that General Grant, in fulfilment of 
that assurance, would, as he did before the dose 
of the battle of Five Forks, cause the White Oak 
Road to be held by advancing the refused left 
wing of his army. 

Colonel Gillespie, engineer officer on General 
Sheridan's staif, April 1, 1865, testified that he 
made no reconnoissance of the enemy's works 
before the attack ; that the cavalry had moved 
directly up the road and gradually pressed the 
enemy behind his works ; that he did not know 
there was a return, nor did he know its direction 
from the position where the Fifth Corps was 
formed ; that he was instructed by General Sher- 
idan to select ground which would hold General 
Warren's corps close under the right flank of 
General Devin's command and beyond the obser- 
vation of the enemy, as he wanted to put Gen- 
eral Warren hi as a turning column. 

As to the giving way of portions of General 
Warren's troops, it was in evidence that the 
skirmish line of General Ayres's division, on en- 
tering the woods north of the open ground on 
the north side of the White Oak Road, fell back, 
lay down, and began to fire in the air ; and that 
they were made to go forward again by General 
Sheridan, General Ayres, and their stafP; and 
further, that when General Ayres changed front. 
General Gwyn's brigade, on his right, fell into 
some confusion, which was also remedied by Gen- 



FIVE FORKS. 211 

eral Sheridan, General Ayres, and their staff. 
General Ayres, however, does not appear to have 
regarded the disorder as serious. General War- 
ren, it was also in evidence, was at that time en- 
gaged in rectifying the position and direction of 
movement of General Griffin's and General Craw- 
ford's divisions. 

The following are the reports and opinions of 
the Court upon the imputations or accusations 
quoted from General Sheridan's report : — 

"Third Imputation. 

" The third imputation is found in an extract 
from General Sheridan's report of May 16, 1865 
(see Record, pp. 21 and 48), as follows : — 

" ^ . . . General Warren did not exert himself 
to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have 
done, and his manner gave me the impression 
that he wished the sun to go down before dispo- 
sitions for the attack could be completed.' 

" On the afternoon of April 1st, the Fifth 
Corps was massed as follows : Crawford's and 
Griffin's divisions at the forks of the Crump 
road and the main road from Dinwiddie Court 
House to Five Forks, and Ayres' s division on 
the Brooke's road, about one-fourth of a mile 
east from the forks of that road and the road to 
Five Forks. 

" The distance from the position of Griffin and 
Crawford to the place of formation of the Fifth 
Corps, near Gravelly Run Church, was about two 



212 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

and a half miles, and the length of the corps, 
when spread out in column of route, would be 
about two and three-eighths miles. The last file 
of the column required as much time to reach 
the place of formation as it would have taken to 
march about five miles. 

" General Warren received his orders near 
Gravelly Run Church to move up his corps at 
1 p. M., and it took some time to communicate 
those orders to the divisions and for the move- 
ment to begin. 

" The route to the place of formation was 
along a narrow road, very muddy and slippery, 
somewhat encumbered v/ith wagons and led 
horses of the Cavalry Corps, and the men were 
fatigued. The testimony of the brigade and di- 
vision commanders is to the efPect that the corps 
in line of march was well closed up, and that no 
unnecessary delay was incurred. 

" The corps reached its destination, and was 
formed ready to advance against the enemy at 
4 p. M. 

" It is in evidence that General Warren re- 
mained near Gravelly Run Church, directing the 
formation, explaining the mode of attack to the 
division and brigade commanders, with sketches 
prepared for the purpose. 

" General Warren also repeatedly sent out 
staff officers to the division commanders in order 
to expedite the march. 



FIVE FORKS. 213 

" Opinion. 

" The Court is of the opinion that there was 
no unnecessary delay in this march of the Fifth 
Corps, and that General Warren took the usual 
methods of a corps commander to prevent delay. 

" The question regarding General Warren's 
manner appears to be too intangible and the 
evidence on it too contradictory for the Court to 
decide, separate from the context, that he ap- 
peared to wish ' the sun to go down before dis- 
positions for the attack could be completed ; ' 
but his actions, as shown by the evidence, do 
not appear to have corresponded with such wish, 
if ever he entertained it. 

"Fourth Imputation. 
" The fourth imputation is found in an ex- 
tract from General Sheridan's report of May 16, 
1865 (see Eecord, pp. 22 and 48), as follows : — 

" ' During this attack I again became dissatis- 
fied with General Warren. During the engage- 
ment portions of his line gave way when not 
exposed to a heavy fire, and simply from want 
of confidence on the part of the troops, which 
General Warren did not exert himself to inspire.' 

" When the Fifth Corps moved up to the at- 
tack. General Sheridan said to General Ayres, ' 1 
will ride with you.' General Warren was on the 



214 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

left of Crawford's division, between Crawford 
and Ay res. 

" When General Ayres's command struck the 
White Oak road it received a fire in flank from 
the enemy's ' return ' nearly at right angles to 
the road. He changed front immediately at 
right angles and faced the ' return/ his right 
receiving a fire from Munford's Confederate di- 
vision of dismounted cavalry distributed along 
the edge of the woods to the north of the White 
Oak road. There was some confusion, which 
was immediately checked by the exertions of 
General Sheridan, General Ayres, and other 
officers. 

" The evidence shows that General Warren 
was observant of Ayres, because he sent orders 
to Winthrop's reserve brigade to form on the 
left of Ayres's new line. 

" This necessary change of front of Ayres 
increased the interval between him and Craw- 
ford on his right ; the latter was marching with- 
out change of direction until, as he expressed it, 
he would clear the right of Ayres, when he was 
also to change front to the left. 

" At this moment Warren, who saw that Craw- 
ford, with Griffin following, was disappearing in 
the woods to the north of the White Oak road, 
sent a staff-officer to Griffin to come as quickly 
as he could to sustain Ayres; went himself to 
the left brigade of Crawford and caused a line 
to be marked out, facing to the west, directing 



FIVE FORKS. 215 

the brigade commander to form on it; then 
went into the woods and gave orders to the 
right brigade of Crawford to form on the same 
line. When he returned to the open ground 
the brigade he had directed to change front had 
disappeared, as appears by the evidence, in con- 
sequence of orders given by an of&cer of Gen- 
eral Sheridan's staff. General Warren sent re- 
peated orders by staff-officers to both Griffin and 
Crawford to change direction, and went himself 
to both ; and finally by these means corrected, 
as far as was possible under the circumstances, 
the divergence of these two divisions. 

" It appears from evidence that these two di- 
visions were operating in the woods and over a 
difficult countrv, and received a fire in their front 
from the dismounted cavalry of Munford posted 
in the woods to the north of the White Oak 
road, which led to the belief, for some time, that 
the enemy had a line of battle in front ; and this 
may furnish one reason why it was so difficult at 
first to change their direction to the proper one. 

" Opinion. 
" General Warren's attention appears to have 
been drawn, almost immediately after Ayres re- 
ceived the flank fire from the 'return' and his 
consequent change of front, to the probability 
of Crawford with Griffin diverging too much 
from and being separated from Ayres, and by 
continuous exertions of himself and staff sub- 



216 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

stantially remedied matters; and the Court 
thinks that this was for him the essential point 
to be attended to, which also exacted his whole 
efforts to accomplish." 

These are the reports and opinions of officers 
of high rank and large experience, given under 
the sanctity of an oath to examine into the mat- 
ter submitted to them, and to decide and report 
thereon according to the evidence, without par- 
tiality, favor, affection, prejudice, or hope of 
reward. 

The established Record shows that there was 
no noticeable fighting by General Sheridan's 
command upon April 1, until after four o'clock 
p. M., but that his cavalry simply followed closely 
after the enemy as they retired upon Five Forks ; 
that General Warren was not relieved before the 
assault upon the enemy's intrenchments, as Gen- 
eral Grant states in his Memoirs, but after the 
enofasfement was ended, as General Grant's re- 
port more correctly says ; that General Warren 
promptly responded to the orders of General 
Sheridan ; that the disorder incident upon the 
opening of the assault was in no way attribut- 
able to him, but was due to the erroneous infor- 
mation concerning the enemy's works given him 
by General Sheridan ; that he did what man could 
do to remedy the matter ; and that, while he prob- 
ably did not expend his energies in the role of 
incarnate blasphemy and malediction, he directed 



FIVE FORKS. 217 

and led his troops in a victorious sweep along 
and beyond the length of the enemy's whole 
line, himself carrying his corps flag in triumph 
over their last intrenchment ; and therefore he 
could not he found by General Sheridan. 

One can readily imagine how, in the heat and 
turmoil of active warfare, injustice may very 
naturally result from laudable impetuosity and 
earnestness. There has been no war but has its 
record of wrong honestly inflicted ; there has 
been no honorable peace succeeding, without its 
recompense of manly acknowledgment and atone- 
ment : but, in General Warren's case, the pages 
of the Memoirs prove that prejudice again would 
raise its unrelenting cry to drown, if possible, be- 
neath assertion the muffled voice of tardy justice. 

It is not difficult to understand how General 
Badeau, in his effort to laud his chief, could fail 
to see aright truth clear as light to others ; but 
it is impossible to comprehend, with pleasure, 
the motive which produced the alleged record 
of events proffered by General Grant, and which 
we have been considering. General Grant, as 
to his statements of facts, has challenged refer- 
ence to the Record. His work submitted to that 
test, — we cannot but perceive that, as authority 
upon historic facts, or as delineator of character 
other than his own, the kindliest critic must 
acknowledge " drawbacks to his usefulness, con- 
stitutional and beyond his control." " How I 
saw the matters treated of" may make clear the 



218 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

influence causing the exaggerated repetition of 
disproved detraction ; but by no construction can 
it defend or excuse it. 

There had been no limit to the ready ofPering 
of blood, limb, life, homes, happiness, or hope, 
that at the bidding of General Grant had been 
made for the safety of the land ; and there was 
no limit to the recompense that land laid gladly 
at the feet of the Chieftain of our victorious 
hosts : as General, adding to the largess of the 
present the stored memories of the past that 
clung about the title ; as President, twice seated 
in regal opulence, ruling the loyal confidence 
and gratitude of his countrymen ; as Citizen, the 
world receiving with glad hearts and generous 
hands, and friends barring from him and his the 
possibilities of toil or care ; not one leaf, or bud, 
or flower that gratitude could gather was want- 
ing to the garland placed upon his brow, — and 
not least frequent or least fragrant of them all 
was Charity. Death came : the world looked on 
with bated breath at the stern struggle between 
the Chief, crowned Victor, and the Destroyer; 
and when the inevitable surrender came, — with 
pageant seldom seen before on earth, midst re- 
gathered ranks of war-worn comrades and clus- 
tering groups of one-time foes now grown to 
friends, and the bowed heads of a nation, — the 
honored form was laid to rest. 

Only the j^en of General Grant himself could 
blot the name that had been so glorified. 



FIVE FORKS. 219 

There was no waiting world without the door 
— only a weeping family gathered round — when 
Warren, the savior of Gettysburg, the hero of 
Mine Kun, the victor of Five Forks, lay down 
to die, slain in the house of his friends 1 But 
as the wasted failing arms reached up to clasp 
in last embrace a brother's neck, unconsciously 
they appealed, with deathless power, to many a 
heart bound by ties forged in battle fire and 
shock, to the gallant comrade, noble chief, of the 
Fifth Army Corps ! 

The gratitude of patriotism has no authority 
to hold the loyalty of friendship forever silent 
under repeated wrong. 



CHAPTER XI. 

GENERAL SHERIDAN's RICHMOND RAID, MAY, 1864. 

MENTION OF GENERAL A. A. HUMPHREYS IN 

THE MEMOIRS. BATTLE OF SUTHERLAND STA- 
TION, APRIL 2, 18(55. 

It was impossible that General Grant could, 
in the compass of his Avork, accord mention to 
all of those who under his command earned rec- 
ojrnition of their services. There are instances, 
however, when silence practically takes the place 
of positive misstatement. Intentional omission, 
intrenched in silence, is often more unjust than 
active criticism that may be met with protest; 
and undue commendation lavished upon one, 
makes noticeable the unwarrantable silence or 
shghting notice assigned to others. 

General Grant devotes nearly four pages of 
the Memoirs (vol. ii., pp. 153 to 157) to a de- 
scription of General Sheridan's raid to Richmond 
in May, 1864, which, he states, " attained in its 
brilliant execution and results all the proportions 
of an independent campaign." He says : — 

" On the 8th of May, just after the battle of 
the Wilderness and when we were moving on 



SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. 221 

Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to 
cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass 
around the left of Lee's army and attack his 
cavalry : to cut the two roads — one running 
west through Gordonsville, Charlottesville and 
Lynchburg, the other to Kichmond, and, when 
compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, 
to move on to the James River and draw these 
from Butler's supplies. This move took him 
past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders 
were also given in writing through Meade. 

" The object of this move was three-fold. 
First, if successfully executed, and it was, he 
would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of 
supplies and telegraphic communications, and 
destroy or get for his own use supplies in store 
in the rear and coming up. Second, he would 
draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus 
better protect our flanks, rear and trains than 
by remaining with the army. Third, his absence 
would save the trains drawing his forage and 
other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had 
now become our base. He started at daylight 
the next morning, and accomplished more than 
was expected. It was sixteen days before he 
got back to the Army of the Potomac. 

"The course Sheridan took was directly to 
Richmond. Before night Stuart, commanding 
the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of 
his command. But the advance kept on, crossed 
the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station 



222 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four 
hundred Union prisoners on their way to Rich- 
mond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed 
a larp'e amount of subsistence and medical stores. 

" Stuart, ... by a detour and an exhausting 
march, interposed between Sheridan and Rich- 
mond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles 
north of the city. ... A severe engagement 
ensued in which the losses were heavy on both 
sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader 
mortally wounded, and some guns and many 
prisoners were captured. 

" Sheridan passed through the outer defences 
of Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed 
through the inner ones. . . . After caring for 
his wounded, he struck for the James River below 
the city, . . . 

" He moved first between the Chickahominy 
and the James, but in the morning (the 12th) he 
was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. . . . 

" He was now in a perilous position, one from 
which but few generals could have extricated 
themselves. The defences of Richmond, manned, 
were to the right, the Chickahominy was to the 
left with no bridge remaining and the opposite 
bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Rich- 
mond. This force was attacked and beaten by 
"Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while Sheridan 
turned to the left with the remaining division 
and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahominy 
under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing 



SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. 223 

and soon dispersed the Confederates he found 
there. The enemy was held back from the 
stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in 
bridge building. 

"Sheridan in this memorable raid passed 
entirely around Lee's army : encountered his 
cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them 
in all ; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners 
and killed and captured many of the enemy; 
destroyed and used many supphes and munitions 
of war ; destroyed miles of railroad and tele- 
graph, and freed us from annoyance by the 
cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks." 

It is not intended now to criticise either the 
conduct or value of this " memorable raid," but 
simply to note a few established facts in contrast 
with General Grant's enthusiastic statements. 

A glance at the map of Virginia will demon- 
strate that Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia 
Central Railroad, the most westerly point touched 
by General Sheridan's command during this 
movement, is about seventeen miles directly south 
of the left of the lines held by General R. E. 
Lee at Spottsylvania Court House. From there 
the command moved by Yellow Tavern, Meadow 
Bridge, Gaines's Mills, and Bottom Bridge to 
Haxall's Landing. General Sheridan rejoined 
General Grant, by way of V/hite House on the 
Pamunkey, passing through Aylett's on the 
Matapony to the vicinity of Chesterfield Station 



224 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

on the Fredericksburg Railroad. General Grant, 
therefore, is in error when he states that " Sheri- 
dan in this memorable raid passed entirely around 
Lee's army." 

Official reports state that on May 1, 1864, 
General Sheridan's available cavalry force num- 
bered about twelve thousand men. It is within 
safe limits therefore to estimate that he set out 
upon this raid with at least ten thousand cavalry 
and a proper proportion of artillery. South of 
the Ta River the rear of the command was at- 
tacked by a brigade of General Stuart's cavalry, 
and from that point, until the column had crossed 
the North Anna and entered the Negro Foot 
Road, about five miles from Ground Squirrel 
Bridge, General Gordon's brigade of North Car- 
olina cavalry clung to the rear. Early in the 
morning of May 11, General Davies had a slight 
skirmisli at Ashland, on the Fredericksburg 
Railroad, and rejoined the command at Allen's 
Station. General Sheridan then encountered 
General Stuart, who, with General Fitz Lee's 
command consistino^ of General Wickham's and 
General Lomax's brigades, had made a circuit 
and interposed between him and Richmond at 
the Yellow Tavern on the Brook Pike, about six 
miles from Richmond, while General Gordon's 
brigade still followed the Federal rear. The 
three Confederate brigades, constituting less than 
half of the cavalry corps of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia, according to official reports num- 



SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. 225 

bered only about four thousand men. Here 
followed the engagement which ended in the 
defeat of the Confederate force and the mortal 
wounding of General J. E. B. Stuart and Gen- 
eral Jas. B. Gordon. The casualties on both 
sides were severe. 

On pages 135 and 136, General Humphreys 
says : " Following up the part of Stuart's force 
that fell back towards Richmond^^ General Sheri- 
dan crossed Brook Run and entered the most 
advanced line of intrenchments. Intending to 
keep south of the Chickahominy, and passing by 
Fair Oaks, to make a demonstration in favor of 
General Butler, who, he was informed, was on the 
south side of the James four miles from Rich- 
mond, he massed his force at daylight of the 
12th on the plateau at Meadow bridge. Some 
force of the enemy's cavalry held the north bank 
at the bridge, which had been so injured as to 
be im^passable. Merritt's division repaired it, 
crossed and followed up the other side to Gaines's 
Mill. 

^ On page 412 of McClellan's Life and Campaigns of Major' 
General J. E. B. Stuart, it appears that by two o'clock in the 
afternoon General Sheridan held the Brook Pike between Yellow 
Tavern and Richmond. Major McClellan recently states to the 
writer: " General Humphreys is in error here. No part of Stuart's 
force fell back towards Richmond. He had nothing on the Brook 
Turnpike, although it was in sight of his position. Both Lomax 
and Wickham were on the Telegraph Road ; and the Brook Pike 
was left open as if to tempt Sheridan to move on it and expose 
his flank to attack.'* The same authority also says : *' General 
Gordon's arm wa^s broken by a shot, and was subsequently ampu- 
tated. He died in hospital in Richmond several days after he 
received the wound." 



226 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

" On the Mechanicsville road the defensive 
works of Richmond extended out close to the 
Chickahominy, and Wilson found that he could 
not pass them. Two brigades of infantry, Bar- 
ton's and Gracie's, with some dismounted cavalry, 
advanced from these works, and in conjunction 
with their artillery attacked Wilson and Gregg, 
and at first with success, but finally they were 
forced to withdraw within their Hues, and Wilson 
and Gregg crossed the Chickahominy above the 
Mechanicsville brido:e. . . . 

" The casualties on our part in this operation 
[the entire raid] were four hundred and twenty- 
five killed, wounded, and missing. . . ." 

The Record speaks of hut one engagement of 
any importance, — Stuart's desperate stand at 
the Yellow Tavern, — and considering the force 
at General Sheridan's disposal, the circumstances, 
numbers, and positions of those opposed to him 
in front of Richmond, the remark, " He was now 
in a perilous position, one from which hut few 
generals could have extricated themselves,'^ ap- 
pears, as a matter of fact, to be a feebly sup- 
ported reflection upon the disparaged many. 

General Grant states positively that General 
Sheridan was directed to " pass around the left 
of Lee's army and attack his cavalry. '' General 
Humphreys expresses it : " In compliance with 
his instructions of the 8th of May to concentrate 
his available mounted force and j^^'oceed against 
the enemy's cavalry, . . ." The only portions 



SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. 227 

of the enemy's cavalry encountered in any force 
were the brigade which clu7ig to the rear of 
General Sheridan's column after it had crossed 
the Ta River, and the two brigades which inter- 
posed between the head of the column and Rich- 
mond. These three brigades comprised less 
than half of the enemy's cavalry force, and 
numbered much less than half of the force un- 
der General Sheridan's command. The enemy's 
cavalry was at no time "attacked" or "pro- 
ceeded against/' in force, except when it opposed 
the march of the Federal column aivay from 
the Confederate forces. If an attack upon the 
enemy's cavalry was, as the reported orders in- 
dicate, a material point in the projected raid, 
it is impossible to see how the Federal cavalry 
" accomplished more than was expected." Gen- 
eral Grant does not so interpret slighter devi- 
ations from the letter of his orders when im- 
puted to others of his subordinates. 

On the morning of June 22, 1864, General 
J. H. Wilson, with a cavalry force consisting of 
his own and General Kautz's divisions, and num- 
bering in all about five thousand five hundred 
men, set out upon the expedition against the 
Petersburg and Lynchburg, and Richmond and 
Danville railroads, to which he had been ordered. 
He was instructed that the destruction of these 
roads, to such an extent that they could not be 
useful to the enemy in Richmond during the 
future operations, was an important part of the 



228 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

plan of the campaign, and he was therefore to 
continue their destruction till driven from his 
work by such forces as he could no longer 
resist. He was informed that General Sheridan 
was at White House confronted by General 
Hampton ; that General Hunter was supposed 
to be near Lynchburg ; that the Weldon Rail- 
road would be held by the Army of the Potomac 
on the day of his departure ; and that it vvas 
expected the Petersburg and Lynchburg road 
would be taken possession of soon after. In a 
note to General Humphreys, chief of staff Army 
of the Potomac, written on the evening of the 
21st, General Wilson said : " If Sheridan will 
look after Hampton, I apprehend no difficulty 
and hope to be able to do the enemy great 
damage." General Meade, in his correspondence 
with General Grant, had expressed the hope and 
expectation that General Sheridan would keep 
General Hampton occupied on the north side 
of the James River during General Wilson's 
raid ; and in reply to General Wilson General 
Humphreys referred him, as an assurance, to the 
close contact that had been maintained between 
General Sheridan and General Hampton since 
early in June. 

General Wilson crossed the Weldon Railroad 
at Reams's Station, which he destroyed ; and, 
striking the Lynchburg Railroad about fourteen 
miles west of Petersburg, destroyed it for about 
thirty miles to the crossing of the Danville 



WILSON'S RAID. 229 

Railroad at Burkesville. At Nottoway Court 
House there was a sharp engagement with Gen- 
eral W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division. Burkes- 
ville Junction was destroyed, and also the 
Danville Railroad to Staunton River, about 
thirty miles southward. At Staunton River 
General Wilson's advance was checked by a 
large force of militia intrenched with artillery ; 
at the same time General W. H. F. Lee attacked 
his rear. Being now nearly one hundred miles 
from Petersburg, General Wilson determined to 
return. 

But General Sheridan had left White House 
on the 22d, the day that General Wilson had 
started on his raid, and was crossing to the 
south of the James River on the 26th. Conse- 
quently, on arriving between Stony Creek Depot 
and Reams's Station on the Weldon Railroad, 
General Wilson found himself, on the 29th, 
confronted and flanked by the cavalry divisions 
of Generals Hampton, W. H. F. and Fitz Lee, 
and two brigades of infantry, with artillery, 
under General Mali one ; the Weldon Road not 
having been occupied by Federal troops, as he 
had expected. He was therefore forced back- 
ward to the south of the Nottoway River. Then 
moving eastward, he arrived at Light House 
Point on the afternoon of July 2, having been 
gone ten and a half days, during which he had 
marched over three hundred miles and destroyed 
sixty miles of railroad. At no place had he 



230 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

halted more than six hours, and for the last four 
days at no time longer than four hours. His 
casualties were two hundred and forty killed 
and wounded, and one thousand two hundred 
and sixty - one missing, — a total of one thou- 
sand five hundred and one. Twelve guns were 
abandoned and his wagons burned or captured. 
General Sheridan, attempting to relieve General 
Wilson, reached Reams' s Station after the enemy 
had returned to their own lines on July 1.^ 

Of this raid. General Grant (vol. ii., p. 303) 
says : "In the meantime Meade had sent Wil- 
son's division on a raid to destroy the Weidon 
and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan 
was safe and Hampton free to return to Rich- 
mond with his cavalry, Wilson's position became 
precarious. Meade therefore, on the 27th, or- 
dered Sheridan over the river to make a demon- 
stration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back, 
though not without severe loss, having struck 
botli roads, but the damage done was soon re- 
paired." 

On page 172 of his second volume, describing 
another raid. General Grant says : " Kilpatrick 
started on the night of the 18th of August to 
reach the Macon road about Jonesboro. He 
succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around 
the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back 
again in his former position on our left by the 
22d. These little affairs, however, contributed 

1 Va. Camp., pp. 236-241. 



GRIFFIN, HUMPHREYS, AND MACKENZIE. 231 

hut very little to the grand result. They 
annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done 
to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon 
repaired." 

General Grant does not thus dismiss General 
Sheridan's raids. 

In the Memoirs, on page 541 of volume ii., 
we find: "Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie 
were good corps commanders, but came into that 
position so near to the close of the war as not 
to attract public attention. All three served as 
such, in the last campaign of the armies of the 
Potomac and the James, which culminated at 
Appomattox Court House, on the 9th of April, 
1865. The sudden collapse of the rebellion 
monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost 
everything else. I regarded Mackenzie as the 
most promising young officer in the army. Grad- 
uating at West Point, as he did, during the 
second year of the war, he had won his way up 
to the command of a corps before its close. This 
he did upon his own merit and without influ- 
ence." 

This, too-ether with the bare mention that on 
May 13, 1864, he had asked the confirmation of 
General Humphreys's appointment to the rank 
of Major-General, comprises all of commendation 
General Grant can find to say of one who, from 
July 8, 1863, to November 26, 1864, had filled 
the exacting position of chief of staff of the 
Army of the Potomac ; and who after the latter 



232 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

date succeeded General Hancock in command of 
the Second Army Corps : exhibiting in both po- 
sitions, energy, devotion, and ability undeniably 
preeminent. 

When on the morning of March 25, 1865, 
General Gordon attempted his sortie aimed at 
the Federal supplies and material at City Point, 
and pierced the right of the lines investing 
Petersburg, General Humphreys, who was on 
the left, received a telegram from General Hunt, 
chief of artillery, a little before six o'clock a. m., 
informing him of the situation. He immediately 
got his corps under arms and advanced, capturing 
the enemy's intrenched picket line in his front, 
and, pressing toward their main works, developed 
the fact that they had not been depleted to aid 
in the attack upon the right and were still too 
strong for successful assault. The intrenched 
picket lines were held by him against repeated 
attempts at recapture ; and thus the successful 
assault on the Confederate lines, on April 2, was 
made practicable. His action was duly reported 
to and was approved by General Meade. 

General Grant says of this : " After the re- 
capture of the batteries taken by the Confed- 
erates, our troops made a charge and carried 
the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they 
strengthened and held. This, in turn, gave us 
but a short distance to charge over when our 
attack came to be made a few days later." ^ 

1 Mem.f vol. ii., p. 434. 



GENERAL HUMPHREYS. 233 

Possibly the subject was exhausted by General 
Badeau, who says: "When Meade arrived on 
the field; he promptly ordered Wright and Hum- 
phreys to advance and feel the enemy in their 
respective fronts, west of Parke, but Humphreys 
had already advanced without orders. . . ." ^ 

It has been already shown that, on March 31, 
General Humphreys becoming aware of the re- 
pulse encountered by General Warren, on his 
left, without waiting for orders promptly threw 
General Miles with his division upon the left 
flank of the enemy pressing upon the Fifth 
Corps, and with General Mott and General Hays 
attacked the intrenchments in his own front, 
thus securing the repulse of the enemy and the 
ultimate advance to, and occupation of, the 
White Oak Koad. No mention of this circum- 
stance can be discovered in the Memoirs, though 
General Badeau afBrms that when the next day 
General Sheridan with General Gibbs and Gen- 
eral Gregg attacked the rear of General Pickett's 
troops, when it was exposed in their pursuit of 
General Merritt, and obliged them " to change 
the direction of their march and the whole char- 
acter of the battle," it " constituted one of the 
most hrilliant strokes of military genius dis- 
played during the war.'' 

This silence on the part of General Grant 
would be inoffensive, though ungracious, but 
that in connection with other parts of the nar- 
rative in the Memoirs it becomes noticeable. 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 447. 



234 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Continuing his account of the assault upon 
and capture of the Confederate lines in front of 
Petersburg, April 2, 1865, General Grant says : — 

" Sheridan, after he had returned to Five 
Forks, swept down to Petersburg, coming in on 
our left. This gave us a continuous line from 
the Appomattox River below the city to the same 
river above. . . . 

" I had ordered Miles in the morning to report 
to Sheridan. In moving to execute this order 
he came upon the enemy at the intersection of 
the White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road. 
The enemy fell back to Sutherland Station on 
the South Side Road and were followed by Miles. 
This position, naturally a strong and defensible 
one, was also strongly intrenched. Sheridan 
now came up and Miles asked permission from 
him to make the assault, which Sheridan gave. 
By this time Humphreys had got through the 
outer works in his front, and came up also and 
assumed command over Miles, who commanded 
a division in his corps. I had sent an order to 
Humphreys to turn to his right and move to- 
wards Petersburg. This order he now got, and 
started off, thus leaving Miles alone. The latter 
made two assaults, both of which failed, and he 
had to fall back a few hundred yards. 

^^ Hearing that Miles had been left in this 
position, I directed Humphreys to send a division 
back to his relief. He went himself. 

" Sheridan before starting to sweep down to 



SUTHERLAND STATION. 235 

Petersburg had sent Merritt with his cavalry to 
the west to attack some Confederate cavaby 
that had assembled there. Merritt drove them 
north to the Appomattox River. Sheridan then 
took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the 
reverse side from where Miles was, and the two 
together captured the place, with a large number 
of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put 
the remainder, portions of three Confederate 
corps, to flight. Sheridan followed, and drove 
them until night, when further pursuit was 
stopped. Miles bivouacked for the night on 
the o^round which he with Sheridan had carried 
so handsomely by assault. . . ." ^ 

In the official report of Lieutenant-General 
Grant, an account materially different in some 
points is found. It says : " The report of this 
[the battle at Five Forks] reached me after 
nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind 
lest the enemy might desert his lines during the 
night and by falling upon General Sheridan 
before assistance could reach him, drive him 
from his position and open the way for retreat. 
To guard against this, General Miles' s division 
of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, 
and a bombardment was commenced and kept 
up until four o'clock in the morning (April 2) 
when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. 

. . . General Sheridan being advised of the 

1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 450- 452. 



236 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

condition of affairs, [the success of the assault], 
returned General Miles to his proper command. 

The enemy south of Hatcher's run retreated 
westward to Sutherland's Station, where they 
were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe 
engagement ensued, and lasted until both his 
right and left flanks were threatened by the 
approach of General Sheridan, who was moving 
from Ford's Station towards Petersburg, and a 
division sent by General Meade from the front 
of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost 
confusion leaving in our hands his guns and 
many prisoners." ^ 

General Badeau appears again as a connecting 
link between the Report and the Memoirs. In 
his third volume, pages 522 to 525, we find : — 

'^ Meanwhile Sheridan had been busy on a 
more distant portion of the field. Miles reported 
to him at daybreak, and was ordered to move 
back towards Petersburg, and attack the enemy 
at the intersection of the White Oak and Clai- 
borne roads. The rebels were found at this 
point, in force and in position, and Sheridan 
followed Miles immediately with two divisions of 
the Fifth corps. The enemy, however, withdrew 
from the junction, and Miles pursued with great 
zeal, pushing the fugitives across Hatcher's 
run, and following them up towards Sutherland 
station, on the Southside railroad. North of 
1 Mem.f vol. ii., pp. 623, 624. 



SUTHERLAND STATION. 237 

Hatcher's run, Sheridan came up with Miles, 
who had a fine and spirited division, and was 
anxious to attack, and Sheridan gave him leave. 
About this time Humphreys also arrived with 
the remainder of his corps, having made his 
breach in the lines, and moved up from the 
Boydton road. He now re-assumed command 
of Miles, and Sheridan faced the Fifth corps by 
the rear, and returning to Five Forks, marched 
out by the Ford road to Hatcher's run. 

" Grant, hoivever, had intended to have Sheri- 
dan in command of Miles, and indeed in full 
control of all the ojjerations in this quarter of 
the field; and supposing his views to have been 
carried out, it was at this juncture that he 
ordered Humphreys to be faced to the right and 
moved towards Petersburg. This left Miles un- 
supported by either Humphreys or Sheridan. 
Nevertheless, that gallant commander made his 
assault. But the rebel position was naturally 
strong as well as defended by breastworks and 
artillery, and Miles was compelled to retire. A 
second attack at half-past twelve met with no 
better fortune, although supported by a vigorous 
shelling from the artillery of the division. The 
position was important, for it covered the right 
of Lee's army ; the rebels resisted vigorously, 
and Miles fell back to a crest about eight hun- 
dred yards from the enemy's line. 

" News of the repulse was carried to Grant, 
now nearly five miles away, and for a while the 



238 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

general-in-chie£ was anxious about the fate of 
Miles. . . . Humphreys was accordingly ordered 
to send another division to the support of Miles. 
He went himself with Hays's division. . . . 

"Sheridan meantime had sent Merritt west- 
ward to cross Hatcher's run, and break up the 
rebel cavalry, which had assembled in consider- 
able force north of the stream; . . . Sheridan 
himself with the Fifth corps crossed Hatcher's 
run, and struck the Southside railroad, north of 
Five Forks; then meeting with no opposition, 
he marched rapidly towards Sutherland, and 
came up in flank and rear of the enemy oppos- 
ing Miles, just as Humphreys was returning on 
the right from Petersburg. 

" Miles, in the interval, had devised a plan not 
unlike the strategy of Sheridan at Five Forks, 
though on a smaller scale. He made a feint 
against the rebel right, pushing a strong skir- 
mish line around that flank until he overlapped 
it and reached to the railroad; and while the 
enemy's attention was thus diverted, at 2.45 
P. M. he assaulted the opposite flank, sweeping 
rapidly down inside the breastworks, capturing 
nearly a thousand prisoners and two pieces of 
artillery, and putting the remainder of the force 
to precipitate flight. 

"Sheridan overtook the rebels in their rout 
on the main road along the Appomattox river, 
and the cavalry and Crawford's division attacked 
them at nightfall ; . . . 



SUTHERLAND STATION. 239 

" When Grant heard of the action at Suther- 
land, he declared to Meade : ' Miles has made a 
big thing of it, and deserves the highest praise 
for the pertinacity with which he stuck to the 
enemy and wrung from him victory.' " 

General Sheridan, after his return to Five 
Forks, could not have swept down to Petersburg 
and come in on the left of a line from the Appo- 
mattox River below the city to the same river 
above, as General Grant states ; for the further 
narratives of both General Grant and General 
Badeau do not locate that officer, or his com- 
mand, east of the Claiborne Road, at any time 
during April 2, and General Badeau (vol. iii., p. 
520) states: ''At noon, the left whig under 
Sheridan was still unheard from? ^ 

General Grant states that he ordered General 
Miles to report to General Sheridan in the morn- 
ing ; and that, in attempting to execute the 
order. General Miles came upon the enemy at 
the intersection of the White Oak and Claiborne 
roads; and that, the enemy falling back. Gen- 
eral Miles followed to Sutherland Station, where 
General Sheridan overtook him, and gave per- 
mission for him to attack; and that General 
Humphreys then arrived and assumed command 
of General Miles. 

General Badeau's statement is, that General 
Miles reported to General Sheridan at daybreak 
and was ordered to move hack and attack the 
enemy at the intersection of the roads ; and that 



240 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

General Sheridan followed General Miles imme- 
diately with two divisions of the Fifth Corps, 
and north of Hatcher's Run overtook him and 
gave permission for the attack on Sutherland 
Station ; and that, General Humphreys then ar- 
riving and reassuming command of General 
Miles, General Sheridan faced the Fifth Corps 
by the rear and returned to Five Forks, and 
moved again on Sutherland Station by way of 
the Ford and Cox roads. 

Without pausing to defend General Sheridan 
from the suggestion that, having arrived with 
the Fifth Corps at a point within two miles, at 
farthest, of an anticipated battle field, he counter- 
marched his command and made an unnecessary 
detour of from twelve to fifteen miles to threaten 
the flank of the enemy's position, because Gen- 
eral Humphreys had resumed command of his 
own troops ; it is to be observed that neither of 
these statements by Generals Grant and Badeau, 
accords with General Grant's official report that 
when General Sheridan, after being reinforced 
by General Miles during the night previous, 
learned the condition of affairs on the morning 
of April 2, he " returned General Miles to his 
2)roper command.'^ 

Both General Grant and General Badeau locate 
General Sheridan with the Fifth Corps during the 
2d : the first stating, in addition to what has just 
been noted, that after sending his cavalry to the 
west General Sheridan "then took the enemy 



SUTHERLAND STATION. 241 

at Sutherland Station on the reverse side from 
where Miles was ;" and the latter saying, "Sheri- 
dan himself with the Fifth corps crossed Hatch- 
er's run and struck the Southside railroad north 
of Five Forks, etc." 

On page 446 of volume ii., General Grant 
states that, on the evening of April 1, General 
Sheridan sent the Fifth Corps " across Hatcher's 
Run to just south-west of Petersburg, and facing 
them toward it ; " but this is manifestly an un- 
intentional inaccuracy, since it would have bivou- 
acked the corps within the Confederate lines. 
After the victory at Five Forks, two divisions 
of the Fifth Corps were posted for the night 
across the White Oak Road near Gravelly Run 
Church facing Petersburg, and one on the Ford 
Road. General Mackenzie's cavalry division 
guarded the Ford Road crossing of Hatcher's 
Run, and General Merritt's cavalry were at or 
near Five Forks.^ On the morning of April 2, 
General Merritt was sent across Hatcher's Run, 
and north-westerly across the Southside Railroad 
to engage the enemy's cavalry in that direction. 
On page 370 of " The Virginia Campaign," Gen- 
eral Humphreys outlines the movements of the 
Fifth Corps on the same day, as follows : " Gen- 
eral Sheridan moved the Fifth corps up the 
White Oak road two miles toward the Claiborne 
road, when it returned to Five Forks and moved 
across Hatcher's Run on the Ford road, and 

1 MU. Hht, pp. 494, 495 ; and Va. Camp., p. 354. 



242 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

across the South Side Kailroad to the Cox road, 
driving out of the way some dismounted cavalry, 
then moved eastward along the Cox road to- 
ward Sutherland Station, but turned off on the 
Namozine road, and halted for the night near 
Williamson's, at the intersection of the Namozine 
by the River road. General Crawford's division 
was sent forward to General Merritt at the cross- 
ing of Namozine Creek." This is sustained by 
the diary of General Fred. T. Locke, assistant 
adjutant-general Fifth Army Corps, for April 
2, 1865, from which we are permitted to quote, 
as follows : " Marched at 6 a. m. toward the 
Claiborne road. Received orders to cross Hatch- 
er's Run to Cox's Station. Arrived at South 
Side R. R. at 2 p. m. Captured one engine and 
three cars, and tore up the rails. Moved up 
to Sutherland's Station, thence to Williamson's 
house, and went into camp about 6.30 p. M. 
Crawford with 3rd Division moved out on the 
Namozine road and had a skirmish about 8 P. m. 
developing the enemy's force of two divisions of 
infantry and one of cavalry." It is not possible 
that the Fifth Corps could have marched from 
the Gravelly Run Church Road on the White 
Oak Road to the Claiborne Road, and thence 
northward across, or to the vicinity of Hatcher's 
Run, to within two or three miles of Sutherland 
Station where General Miles was preparing to 
attack the enemy, and then counter-marched to 
its place of starting and again moved north to 



SUTHERLAND STATION, 243 

Cox's Station, and the movement not have been 
more fully noted by General Locke, if indeed it 
could have been accomplished between the hours 
of six A. M. and two p. m. on roads, partially 
at least, occupied by the Second Corps moving 
northward. 

The consistent and authoritative narrative of 
General Humphreys records that, at half -past five 
in the afternoon of April 1, General Grant di- 
rected the left of the Second Corps to be thrown 
forw^ard so as to hold the White Oak Road and 
prevent any force of the enemy being sent by 
that road against General Sheridan at Five Forks. 
General Miles's division was promptly advanced 
and occupied the road in force. At nine o'clock 
on the night of the 1st, General Grant, learning 
of the defeat of General Pickett, and being 
anxious lest General Lee should abandon his 
lines and drive General Sheridan from his posi- 
tion, ordered that General Humphreys should 
feel for a vulnerable point in the enemy's in- 
trenchments, and if such should be found, that 
he should attack at once, and if successful 
push after the enemy. General Humphreys 
was further directed, if an attack should prove 
impracticable, to send General Miles to reinforce 
General Sheridan. A heavy fire was at once 
opened from the corps artillery, and General 
Miles's and General Mott's divisions attacked 
with vigor ; but, though they forced their way 
close to the slashings of the intrenchments, they 



244 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

could not carry them; and General Miles was 
sent to General Sheridan shortly after midnight, 
communication with his cavalry along the White 
Oak Road having been previously opened. Gen- 
eral Mott's left was then thrown back ; but both 
he and General Hays held close up to, and con- 
stantly felt, the enemy through the night, with 
their divisions ready for immediate assault should 
opportunity offer. 

This occupation of the \Yhite Oak Road, and 
subsequent laborious precautions for General 
Sheridan's safety, are entirely ignored by Gen- 
erals Grant and Badeau, except in that they 
state that General Miles was directed by General 
Grant to reinforce General Sheridan. 

General Humphreys states that, his command 
having been weakened by detaching General 
Miles, he was directed not to attack the Crow 
House redoubts during the night of the 1st and 
2d. But about six a. m., on the 2d, learning 
from General Meade of the success of the assault 
on the right, and his preparations having been 
made during the night, he directed General Hays 
to assault ; which he did successfully, capturing 
redoubts, artillery, and the greater portion of the 
garrison. About half-past seven General Mott 
captured the intrenched picket line in his front, 
and about half-past eight the enemy were moving 
out of their intrenchments by their right flank, 
sharply atacked by General Mott. At nine 
o'clock General Miles, on the White Oak Eoad 



SUTHERLAND STATION. 245 

about two miles west of the Claiborne Road 
Junction, reported his command as on its re- 
turn, and General Humphreys directed General 
Miles, General Molt, and General Hays to 
pursue the enemy by the Claiborne Road to- 
ward Sutherland Station. By this movement, 
which was in strict compliance with general in- 
structions repeatedly given by General Grant, 
General Humphreys expected to close in upon 
the rear of all of the enemy's forces which were 
cut off from Petersburg, while General Sheridan 
with his command would probably strike them 
in front and flank. This force of the enemy 
consisted of four brigades of General Hill's 
corps, under General Heth ; General Johnson's 
and General Pickett's divisions under General 
Anderson; and General Fitz Lee's cavalry 
division. 

General Humphreys reported his intentions 
immediately to General Meade, and his orders 
were countermanded — General Badeau and the 
Memoirs state — by direction of General Grant. 
General Mott and General Hays were now or- 
dered to move eastward by the Boydton Road 
and connect on the right with the Sixth Corps, 
and did so. General Miles was to move in the 
same direction by the first road found after 
crossing Hatcher's Run ; but when General Hum- 
phreys overtook him near Sutherland Station, he 
found that General Miles had there brought 
to bay the four brigades under General Heth. 



246 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

General Miles was satisfied he could defeat the 
force before him ; and being thus assured, 
General Humphreys left the matter in his hands 
and rejoined the remainder of his command then 
moving toward Petersburg. 

General Miles assaulted first with the brigades 
of Colonels Nugent and Madill, but was repulsed. 
A second attack was made at about half-past 
twelve by Colonel Madill's brigade under Gen- 
eral McDougall ; but this was also repulsed. 
About three o'clock, General Miles, having en- 
veloped the enemy's right with a heavy skirmish 
line, successfully assaulted his left with Colonel 
Ramsey's brigade, sweeping behind the breast- 
works and capturing six hundred prisoners, one 
battle flag, and two guns. 

General Humphreys says : " About half -past 
two General Meade, having learned that General 
Miles needed support, directed General Hum- 
phreys to take one of his divisions toward 
Sutherland Station for that purpose. Arriving 
there by the Cox road, General Humphreys 
found that General Miles's last attack had been 
completely successful. Probably the whole force 
would have been captured in the morning had 
the Second Corps continued its march toward 
Sutherland Station." ^ 

General Grant's remark, " By this time [Gen- 
eral Miles having come up with the enemy at 
Sutherland Station] Humphreys having got 
1 Va. Camp., pp. 368, 369. 



SUTHERLAND STATION. 247 

through the outer works in his front, came up 
also and assumed command over Miles, who 
commanded a division in his corps," is unjust; 
inasmuch as General Humphreys had carried the 
intrenchments in his front while General Miles 
was yet on the White Oak Road two miles west 
of the Claiborne Road Junction ; and further, in 
that General Humphreys " assumed " no author- 
ity, but simply resumed command of his sub- 
ordinate who reported back to him with his com- 
mand after the enemy's lines had been carried, 
as General Grant has stated in his official re- 
port. General Grant is unjust also when he 
says : "I had sent an order to Humphreys to 
turn to his right and move toward Petersburg. 
This order he now [when finding General Miles 
confronting the enemy at Sutherland Station] 
got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone^ 
Had this been the actual state of the case, Gen- 
eral Humphreys would only have done in obe- 
dience to orders what General Badeau states, 
vv^ith evident satisfaction, was done by General 
Sheridan in consequence of General Humphreys's 
resumption of his legitimate authority. But 
General Badeau has located General Sheridan 
as crossing Hatcher's Run with the Fifth Corps, 
and he must therefore have been at least five 
miles distant from General Miles and General 
Humphreys ; while the order taking the Second 
Corps towards Petersburg was received by Gen- 
eral Humphreys in time for him to direct the 



248 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

divisions of Generals Mott and Hays to move 
by the Boydton Road. He had overtaken Gen- 
eral Miles for the purpose of turning him also 
toward Petersburg, but finding him confronting 
the enemy, and being very willing his subordi- 
nate should " achieve a separate renown," when 
he was assured of General Miles' s confidence in 
his ability to cojye with the force in his front, 
he left him, in order that he might reap the 
benefit of the opportunity he had gained. This 
would appear to relieve both General Sheridan 
and General Humphreys of the imputation of 
having left General Miles in the lurch. 

General Grant also reflects unnecessarily upon 
General Humphreys in the petulant brevity of 
his " He went himself," with which he closes his 
statement that he directed him to send a division 
back to General Miles's relief. General Badeau's 
statement that General Grant had intended to 
leave General Sheridan in full command of that 
part of the field explains the irritability of the 
notation ; but General Humphreys states that 
General Meade directed him " to take one of his 
divisions toward Sutherland Station," on learning 
that General Miles might need support. Gen- 
eral Meade was evidently unaware of any valid 
reason for depriving General Humphreys of the 
command of the Second Army Corps. 

Both General Grant and General Badeau per- 
sist in connecting General Sheridan with General 
Miles's victory. General Humphreys frankly 



SUTHERLAND STATION. 249 

credits the whole achievement to General Miles. 
General Badeau claims that, after crossing Hatch- 
er's Run with the Fifth Corps, General Sheridan 
" marched rapidly towards Sutherland, and ccmie 
iqj in jiank and rear of the enemy opi:>osmg 
Miles, just as Humphreys was returning on the 
right from Petersburg." General Grant is more 
explicit, saying that "Sheridan then took the 
enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse side 
from where Miles was, and the two together 
captured the place," and further, that " Miles 
bivouacked for the night on the ground which 
he with Sheridan had carried so handsomely by 
assault." 

The plan adopted by General Miles in his 
last and successful assault is stated by General 
Badeau, as follows : " He made a feint against 
the rebel right, pushing a strong skirmish line 
around that flank until he overlapped it and 
reached to the railroad ; and while the enemy's 
attention was thus diverted, at 2.45 p. m. he 
assaulted the opposite flank '^ In order, there- 
fore, to come up " in flank and rear of the enemy 
opposing Miles," General Sheridan, coming from 
the west, would have been obliged to cross the 
South Side Railroad to the River Road ; but, 
according to General Badeau, it was nightfall 
when General Sheridan overtook the routed 
enemy on that road. It is difficult, also, to 
understand how General Sheridan, as stated by 
General Grant, took the enemy " on the reverse 
side from where Miles was." 



260 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

General Badeau states that General Sheridan 
" came up . . . just as Humphreys was return- 
ing on the right from Petersburg.'' General 
Humphreys states that ahout half-past two 
General Meade directed him to return with one 
division toward Sutherland Station. As he was 
ahout five miles from that point when receiving 
the order, it can hardly be doubted that it was 
at least ybt«r o'clock before he reached the battle 
field. General Badeau states that General Miles's 
assault was made at 2.45 p. m. General Hum- 
phreys says " about three o'clock/' and he states 
unreservedly that on his return he " found that 
General Miles's last attack had been completely 
successful." The diary of the adjutant-general 
of the Fifth Corps locates that command arriv- 
ing at Cox's Station, at least three miles west 
of Sutherland Station, at 2 p. m., tearing up the 
railroad. That work could not have been com- 
pleted even by the Fifth Corps, in time to take 
any part in the assault made by General Miles 
at 24o P- At- 

The paragraph, on page 525, with which Gen- 
eral Badeau closes his account of General Miles's 
movements on April 2, illustrates the thorough 
inconsistency of the attempts to share General 
Miles's triumph with another. He says : " Miles 
had been ordered to pursue the enemy towards 
Petersburg, and advanced in that direction about 
two miles, when he met Humphreys with Hays's 
division coming up to his relief. He thereupon 
returned to Sutherland and went into bivouac." 



SUTHERLAND STATION, 251 

Only half a page back, he had described Gen- 
eral Miles's assault upon the left flank of the 
enemy which effectually cut them off from Peters- 
burg, and but a few lines still further back he 
had recorded General Sheridan as arriving " in 
flank and rear of the enemy opposing Miles, just 
as Humphreys was returning on the right from 
Petersburg." 

It would seem in fact that it would have been 
wiser in General Grant had he adhered to the 
statement credited to him by General Badeau, 
on this same page 525, viz. : " Miles has made a 
big thing of it, and deserves the highest praise 
for the pertinacity with which he stuck to the 
enemy and wrung from him victory, ^^ 



CHAPTER XII. 

FROM JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX COURT 
HOUSE. 

On the morning of April 6, 1865, General 
Sheridan with his cavalry was dispatched from 
Jetersville in the direction of Deatonville, and 
General Meade, with the Second, Fifth, and 
Sixth corps, moved toward Amelia Court House. 
At half -past eight a. m., when about four miles 
out from Jetersville, General Humphreys discov- 
ered a strong column of the enemy moving west- 
ward on the north bank of Flat Creek. He 
immediately ordered General Mott to send a 
brigade to attack and develop the force, and 
halted the rest of his command ; sending the 
information to General Meade and preparing to 
cross the creek. General Miles opened fire upon 
the column with artillery, and thus announced 
that the rear of General Lee's army was over- 
taken. General Meade directed the Second 
Corps to move on Deatonville ; the Fifth Corps 
through Painesville, on the right of the Second, 
to Ligontown Ferry ; and the Sixth, through 
Jetersville to the left of the Second.^ 

1 Va. Camp., pp. 378, 379. 



JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 253 

Of this, General Badeau says : " As soon as 
the retreat of Lee from Amelia became a matter 
of certainty, the direction of the Army of the 
Potomac was changed, and the whole command 
faced west instead of north. The Sixth corps, 
which had been on the right, was moved across 
the rear of the army to the left ; the Fifth 
corps marched to the extreme right, and the 
Second became the centre. This disposition af- 
forded an admirable opportunity to attack the 
rebels in flank, and was made under the imme- 
diate direction of Grant." ^ 

General Grant is here more candid than Gen- 
eral Badeau. He says : " When the move to- 
wards Amelia Court House had commenced that 
morning, I ordered Wright's corps, which was 
on the extreme right, to be moved to the left 
past the whole army, to take the place of Grif- 
fin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to 
move by and place itself on the right. The ob- 
ject of this movement was to get the 6th corps, 
Wright's, next to the cavalry, with which they 
had formerly served so harmoniously and so effi- 
ciently in the valley of Virginia. 

'' The 6th corps now remained with the 
cavalry and under Sheridan's direct command 
until after the surrender." ^ 

General Grant is clearly in error in this last 
statement. The Sixth Corps, changing position, 
formed the left of General Meade's line, as 

1 Mil. Hist, vol. iii., pp. 568, 569. « Mem., vol. ii., p. 473. 



254 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

stated. As such it took part in the engagement 
at Sailor's Creek on the afternoon of the 6th. On 
the 7th it moved to Farmville, and crossing the 
Appomattox at that place, on the evening of the 
same day, remained with the Second Corps under 
General Meade's immediate orders until the end. 
On the 6th, after changing position, the Fifth 
Corps became the right of General Meade's line 
and marched through Paineville to Ligontown 
Ferry, a distance of thirty-two miles. On the 
7th it was ordered by General Meade to Prince 
Edward Court House. Early in the morning of 
the 8th it moved toward Appomattox Court 
House, joined the Twenty-second Corps at Pros- 
pect Station, and, under General Ord's command, 
the two corps reached Appomattox Court House 
about ten a. m. on the 9th, as General Ord 
states, barely in time, " for in spite of General 
Sheridan's attempts the cavalry was falling back 
in confusion before Lee's infantry ; . . ." 

We return now to the morning of April 6. 
General Meade's orders being received, the 
Second Corps crossed Flat Creek, part of the 
troops wading in water up to their armpits, and 
part on bridges hastily constructed by them- 
selves. General Gordon's corps was at once en- 
gaged and a sharp running fight ensued which 
continued uninterruptedly over a distance of 
fourteen miles. The country was broken and 
difficult in places, but artillery moved with the 
skirmish line, and the lines of battle followed 



JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 255 

closely " with a rapidity and good order that is 
believed to be unexampled." ^ General Badeau 
says : " the lines of battle followed the skirmish- 
ers so closely and rapidly as to astonish veteran 
soldiers." ^ Arriving at the forks near J. Hott's 
house, where the road running north to Perkin- 
son's Mills on Sailor's Creek leaves the road 
from Deatonville to Rice's Station, General 
Humphreys — leaving the commands of General 
Anderson and General Ewell, together number- 
ing about ten thousand men, but without any ar- 
tillery, to be engaged on the Rice's Station Road 
by the cavalry and Sixth Corps — pressed on 
after General Gordon's corps, which turned down 
the road to Perkinson's Mills, and continued his 
running fight. Just before dark General Gordon 
made his last determined stand at the mills, and 
after a sharp engagement was again defeated. 
In this fight, made by General Humphreys with 
hut two divisions of his corps over fourteen 
miles of country, several partially intrenched po- 
sitions defended by artillery were carried, and 
thirteen flags, four guns, seventeen hundred 
prisoners, and a large part of the main trains of 
General Lee's army were captured. One division 
(General Barlow's) of the Second Corps was 
not engaged on the 6th, having been detached 
to the extreme right on erroneous information of 
a column of the enemy being on the Paineville 
Road. According to the Records of the War 

1 Va. Camp., p. 379. 2 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., p. 578. 



256 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Department, an aggregate of seven thousand 
two hundred officers and men of General Gor- 
don's corps were paroled, April 9, 1865. The 
force encountered on the Rice's Station Road, 
April 6, by the Sixth Corps and the cavalry 
corps {two corps), under General Sheridan, 
numbered but ten thousand men and was with- 
out artillery. 

In his official report of the movements of the 
6th, General Grant says : " The movements of 
the 2d corps and General Ord's command con- 
tributed greatly to the day's success." -^ In the 
Memoirs he is silent concerning the Second Corps 
but, after relating the desperate combat and 
gallant death of General Read, Colonel Wash- 
burn, and their comrades (the only portion of 
General Ord's command engaged that day) near 
Farmville, about noon of the 6th, he conjectures 
that " the Confederates took this to be only the 
advance of a larg^er column which had headed 
them ofP, and so stopped to intrench ; so that 
this gallant band of six hundred had checked 
the progress of a strong detachment of the Con- 
federate army. 

" This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt 
saved to us the trains following." ^ 

The Record fails to establish even this com- 
pensation for the sacrifice of that little band of 
heroes. General Ord, with the Twenty-fourth 
Corps, arrived at Burkesville late at night on April 
1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 625. 2 i^^ pp. 474^ 475. 



JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 257 

5, under orders from General Grant to intrench 
for the night, " and in the morning to move west 
to cut off all the roads between there and JFarm- 
ville." ^ On page 567 of his third volumej Gen- 
eral Badeau adds the following information : 
" Grant had already directed Ord to cut the 
bridofe at Farmville. . . . The Southside rail- 
road crosses the Appomattox twice in this imme- 
diate neighborhood, first at High bridge, five 
miles east of the town, and again directly in 
Farmville. The wagon road to Lynchburg also 
crosses the Appomattox in the town. The river 
was too deep to ford, and Farmville therefore 
became the point aimed at hy both armies,'' 
Nevertheless, though the reconnoissance of Gen- 
eral Davies on the 5th had ascertained the move- 
ment of the Confederate trains westward upon the 
roads leading to the crossings of the Appomattox 
at and below Farmville, the cavalry corps under 
General Sheridan remained near Jetersville, and, 
daring the night of the 5th, General Ord was 
further instructed by General Grant to " move 
west at eight a. m. tomorrow,^' and cautioned, 
both then and upon the morning of the 6th, 
that General Lee was apparently moving direct 
for Burkesville? In obedience to his instruc- 
tions, before daylight of the 6th, General Ord 
sent two small regiments of infantry, together 
numbering but five hundred men, and his head- 

1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 468. 

2 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., pp. 663, 567. 



268 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

quarter escort of eighty cavalry, under Colonel 
Washburn, of the Fifth Massachusetts Regiment, 
to burn the bridges at Farmville and High 
Bridge, if not too strongly guarded, and then 
fall back upon the main command. General 
Theodore Read, of General Ord's staff, conducted 
the party. General Ord, moving westward later 
with his command, came upon General Long- 
street's corps intrenched at Rice's Station; but 
it was night before the Twenty-fourth Corps was 
in position to attack. General Ord had endeav- 
ored to communicate with General Read and 
Colonel Washburn, to warn them of the Confeder- 
ate movements, but was unsuccessful. The little 
command passed through Farmville, and about 
mid-day, when within about two miles of High 
Bridge, encountered two divisions of Confeder- 
ate cavalry under General Rosser. As a result. 
General Read, Colonel Washburn, and all the 
Federal cavalry officers were killed, and after a 
magnificent fight the entire command was cap- 
tured or destroyed. 

General Longstreet with his corps left Amelia 
Springs on the evening of April 5 ; and march- 
ing during the night reached Rice's Station, on 
the Lynchburg Railroad, about sunrise of the 
6th, and there halted to wait till the troops m 
his rear guarding the trains shoidd come iqj. 
General Lee joined him here during the course 
of the morning. General Fitz Lee's cavalry halted 
for the night at Amelia Springs, but marched at 



JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 259 

daylight, and reached the vicinity of Rice's Sta- 
tion just before noon of the 6th. General 
Anderson, with his command, followed General 
Lono-street, halting: durino; the mornino^ at J. 
Hott's house to protect the trains passing west 
on the Jamestown Road. General Ewell, with 
the remainder of the Confederate forces, left 
Amelia Springs soon after eight o'clock in the 
morning, General Gordon's corps being his rear- 
guard.^ General Crook and General Merritt, 
endeavoring on the morning of the 6th to push 
through to Deatonville, found the moving trains 
under a guard too strong to be forced until the 
Second and Sixth corps had closed down upon 
the retreating column ; and history says that 
these trains were saved to the Federal troops 
by the tireless energy and ability of General 
Humphreys, seconded by the gallantry of his 
command, rather than by any other agency. 

The Second Corps resumed the pursuit at 
half-past five in the morning of the 7th, and 
came upon High Bridge just as the enemy had 
set fire to the railroad bridge and were attempt- 
ing cO burn the wagon road bridge. General 
Barlow, being in the lead, sent his advance for- 
ward at double-quick and secured the wagon 
bridge ; and Colonel Livermore, of General Hum- 
phreys's staff, with a party, extinguished the fire 
on the railroad bridge while the enemy's skir- 
mishers were fighting under their feet. 
1 Va. Camp., pp. 377-379. 



260 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

Crossing the Appomattox at High Bridge, 
General Humphreys pushed rapidly after the re- 
treating enemy. General Gordon's corps retired 
up the river, along the railroad bed ; and Gen- 
eral Humphreys having been informed in the 
morning, from headquarters, that General Lee 
was probably moving toward Danville, directed 
General Barlow to follow General Gordon. Be- 
lieving that General Lee was moving toward 
Lynchburg, he himself moved with the divisions 
of Generals Miles and De Trobriand, on a road 
intersecting the stage road to that place north of 
the Appomattox Kiver ; and about one o'clock 
came upon General Lee's whole army in position, 
covering the plank and stage roads to Lynchburg, 
at Cumberland Church. General Barlow had 
overtaken and attacked part of General Gor- 
don's corps and cut off and burned a large num- 
ber of wagons. Farmville he found to be still 
in possession of the enemy, who had set the 
bridges on fire and were crossing a wagon train 
to the north bank. 

On coming in contact with the enemy General 
Humphreys immediately made dispositions for 
attack, and pressed a heavy skirmish line close 
up to develop his position. He found General 
Lee's whole army on the crest of a long slope of 
ground, intrenched sufficiently for cover, and 
Tvdth artillery in place. General Fitz Lee's cav- 
alry command covered the rear toward Farmville, 
supported by General Heth's infantry. General 



JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 261 

Humphreys ordered General Barlow up from 
his position opposite Farmville, and informed 
General Meade of the fact that he had come up 
with and was confronting General Lee's whole 
remaining force ; and suggested that a corps 
should attack from the direction of Farmville at 
the same time that he attacked from the oppo- 
site direction. General Meade sent directions 
to General Gibbon with the Twenty - fourth 
Corps, and General Wright with the Sixth Corps/ 
both of which were at or near Farmville, to 
cross the river there and attack jointly with 
the Second Corps. Neither General Meade nor 
General Humphreys were aware that the river 
at Farmville was impassable. 

General Badeau places General Grant in per- 
sonal command at Farmville at this juncture, 
and says : " He at once ordered Crook to ford 
the river and proceed to the support of Hum- 
phreys, and the cavalry waded belly-deep across 
the Appomattox. Next a re-assuring message was 
sent to Humphreys : ' Your note of 1.20 p. M. 
to Major General Meade is just seen. Mott's 
[Barlow's] division of your corps and Crook's 
cavalry are both across the river at this point. 
The Sixth and Twenty-fourth corps are here. 
The enemy cannot cross at Farmville.' ^ The 
Army of the James teas then ordered out of the 

1 It is to be remembered that General Lee had but barely- 
crossed from Farmville to the north side of the Appomattox 
River burning the bridges behind him, when General Humphreys 
closed in upon him with the Second Corps. 



262 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

way, to follow Sheridan on the road to Prince 
Edward, and Wright was directed to build a 
foot bridge for his infantry, and to bring up 
pontoons for the artillery and the trains. These 
orders were all obeyed, and before dark Wright's 
column was filing across the Appomattox, Crook 
was fighting on the northern bank, and Ord ivas 
far on the road to Prince Edward'' 

He continues : " The army of the Potomac 
had pursued with tremendous vigor, the infantry 
crossing at one bridge which had already been 
fired, and building another, and the cavalry wad- 
ing; the vanguard of both Humphreys and 
Crook had come up with the enemy north of 
the river, while on the southern side Sheridan, 
followed by Griffin and Ord was stretching out 
rapidly, once more to head the flying column of 
Lee and cut off his hoped-for supplies." ^ 

In his official report. General Grant says : 
" It was soon found that the enemy had crossed 
to the north side of the Appomattox; but so 
close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got pos- 
session of the common brido^e at Hio^h Brido-e 
before the enemy could destroy it, and immedi- 
ately crossed over. The 6th corps and a division 
of cavalry crossed at Farmville to its support." ^ 
In the Memoirs he amplifies somewhat, saying : 
" Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon 
road bridge near the High Bridge, and at- 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., pp. 584-596. 

2 Mem., vol. ii., p. 626. 



JETERSVILLE TO APPOTTOMAX, 263 

tempted to destroy it. He did set fire to it, but 
the flames had made but little headway when 
Humphreys came up with his corps and drove 
away the rear-guard which had been left to pro- 
tect it while it was burned up. Humphreys 
forced his way across with some loss, and fol- 
lowed Lee to the intersection of the road cross- 
ing at Farmville with the one from Petersburg. 
Here Lee held a position which was very strong, 
naturally, besides being intrenched. Humphreys 
was alone, confronting him all through the day, 
and in a very hazardous position. He put on a 
bold face, however, and assaulted with some 
loss, but was not assaulted in return." ^ In ad- 
dition he repeats, in substance, what General 
Badeau has said about the Sixth Corps and Gen- 
eral Crook's cavalry division crossing to the 
support of the Second Corps. 

General Crook crossed the Appomattox about 
four o'clock in the afternoon. General Gregg's 
brigade was in advance, and, moving out the 
Plank Road, encountered General Fitz Lee's cav- 
alry, supported by General Heth's infantry. 
General Lee attacked, General Gregg was cap- 
tured, and his brigade driven back. General 
Crook was then recalled to Farmville^ and 
moved to Prospect Station, about twelve miles 
west, reaching there about midnight. 

When General Humphreys — waiting the 
arrival of General Barlow and fully expecting 

1 Mem.y vol. ii., p. 476. 



264 GRANT VS, THE RECORD. 

that an attack would be made from the direction 
of Farmville (General Grant's "reassuring de- 
spatch " not being received) — heard the sound 
of the firing in General Gregg's affair, noticing 
at the same time that the enemy was shortening 
his right flank, he contracted his left, and ex- 
tended his right to envelop the enemy's left. 
While this movement was being made, General 
Miles thought he saw an opportunity to attack, 
and attempted it with a part of his First bri- 
gade, but was repulsed with considerable loss. 
General Barlow's division arrived about sunset 
but could not get into position before dark. 
General Lee, as was of course anticipated, moved 
off in the night. General Fitz Lee with the 
cavalry rear-guard left the ground about mid- 
night. 

As an example of what he calls " pressing up 
against an enemy without serious fighting," 
General Humphreys appends an extract from 
" McGowan's South Carolina Brigade," upon the 
situation when the tioo divisions of the Second 
Corps overtook General Lee's forces at Cumber- 
land Church. It is as follows : — 

"The enemy seemed ubiquitous. We were 
instructed to be prepared to fight on either 
flank. On our right flank firing was pretty 
steadily kept up ; in our front a regular battle 
was going on. Mahone's division was engaged, 
and a portion of Field's. . . . The firing in- 
creased in rapidity and extent until three sides 



JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX, 265 

were at once set upon by the enemy. ... I never 
was so bewildered as on this occasion. ..." 
General Badeau condenses this into "... the 
vanguard of . . . Humphreys . . . had come 
up with the enemy north of the river." 

The loss of the Second Corps on the 7th was 
five hundred and seventy-one officers and men 
killed, wounded, and missing. 

General Grant reached Farmville about four 
o'clock in the afternoon. The "' reassuring mes- 
sage" sent by him to General Humphreys is 
worthy of attention. Except the item in regard 
to General Crook's cavalry division, it imparts no 
information not already had by General Hum- 
phreys, and one seeks in vain for word of com- 
mendation, encouragement, or promise of support. 
It is to be remembered too that this despatch was 
written, and the subsequent orders for the cross- 
ing of the Sixth Corps to the north bank given, by 
the same general-in-chief who just one week be- 
fore had been so embarrassed and perturbed when 
General Warren found it necessary to bridge 
Gravelly Run before sending General Ayres's 
division to aid General Sheridan at Dinwiddle 
Court House. Of that Gravelly Run crossing, 
General Badeau writes : " The infantry would 
doubtless have had some difficulty in crossing, 
but war is full of difficulties as well as dangers, 
and the officer who allows them to deter and 
overcome him is apt to terminate his career in 
failure, and never pleases such superiors as 



266 GRANT VS. THE RECORD, 

Slieridan and Grant." ^ Nevertheless, we read 
that, with daylight in his favor and the enemy 
almost in sight where they had been brought to 
a stand by the Second Corps, General Grant 
here ordered General Wright " to build a foot 
bridge for his infantry, and to bring up pontoons 
for the artillery and the trams.'' 

General Badeau fixes the depth of the ford at 
which General Crook crossed the Appomattox 
at " belly-deep " — that is about three feet. 
General Humphreys, on the 6th, had waded 
Flat Creek armjnt or over four feet deejo, 
with a portion of the Second Corps, to reach 
the enemy he now held at hay. 

In the " Magazine of American History " of 
October, 1886, Major-General J. W. DePeyster, 
commenting on the position, and the probable 
results which would have obtained had the Sixth 
and Twenty-fourth corps promptly crossed to 
the north of the Appomattox, remarks: "Why 
did not this occur? The problem is insoluble. 
Troops have forded and bridged broader, more 
boisterous and deeper rivers successfully, under 
similar and more difficult circumstances, and 
under fire, crossing victoriously in the teeth of 
opposition through water arm-pit, even cravat 
deep, on very many occasions. There was no 

1 Mil. Hist, vol. iii., p. 481. It was in evidence before the 
Warren Court of Inquiry that, at the Boydton Road crossing of 
Gravelly Run, the banks were low and marshy, and the stream 
about four and a half feet deep. The crossing of General War- 
ren's troops was effected in the darkness of night. 



JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX, 267 

lack of material of every kind — buildings and 
large trees in abundance near at hand. . . . 
Meanwhile, if the cavalry and infantry got 
through, artillery could have been hauled across 
by hand if the teams could not perform their 
duty. . . . but nothing was done until too late, 
and Meade telegraphed toward night -fall to 
Humphreys : ' You must look out for yourself.' 
He had done so, and he continued to do so." 
This quotation suggests views held by able and 
well-informed judges, of the position maintained 
by General Humphreys on April 7, 1865. If, 
as General Grant informed General Meade on 
the 5th, the aim of his movements was "to 
reach the remnant of Lee's army wherever it 
may be found, by the shortest and most prac- 
ticable route," ^ the opportunity was oifered, then 
and there, by General Humphreys. 

It is competent and proper to notice here the 
undeniable effect had upon the ultimate result 
by the conduct of the Second Corps on the 7th. 
By detaining General Lee at Cumberland Church 
until the night of that date. General Humphreys 
enabled General Ord to reach Appomattox Court 
House in time to intercept the further retreat of 
the remnant of the Army of Northern Virginia. 
General Ord's infantry which checked the Con- 
federate advance as it was breaking through 
General Sheridan's cavalry lines, did not reach 
Appomattox Court House till ten o'clock in the 

1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., p. 556. 



268 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

morning of the 9th ; and but for the detention 
at Cumberland Church, General Lee could readily 
have reached Lynchburg before that time. 

It is proper also to note the fact that, at Cum- 
berland Church, on April 7, 1865, the last attack 
of the war upon the Army of Northern Virginia 
was made and maintained by the unsupported 
Second Corps under the command of General 
A. A. Humphreys. 

These facts have entirely escaped the notice of 
General Grant and his accredited historian. 

About half-past eight o'clock in the even- 
ing of the 7th, while General Humphreys, was 
pressing against the enemy still at Cumberland 
Church, General Seth Williams, Adjutant-Gen- 
eral of the Army of the Potomac, brought to 
him General Grant's first letter to General Lee, 
written from Farmville, with the request that 
it be delivered. General Humphreys at once 
sent it through his picket line, and authorized a 
truce for an hour to enable the enemy to carry 
in their wounded lying between the lines. Gen- 
eral Lee's answer was brought back within an 
hour, and General Williams returned with it via 
High Bridge to General Grant at Farmville. 

At half -past five o'clock in the morning of the 
8th the pursuit of the enemy was resumed by 
the Second Corps, followed by the Sixth. While 
on the march in the morning. General Williams 
brought to General Humphreys General Grant's 



JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 269 

second letter to General Lee. This was for- 
warded throiigli General Fitz Lee's cavalry rear- 
guard close in General Humphreys's front. Gen- 
eral Lee's answer to this second letter was re- 
ceived by General Humphreys about dusk and 
was delivered to General Grant about midnight 
by Colonel Whittier, Assistant Adjutant Gen- 
eral of the Second Corps. General Grant and 
General Meade had halted for the night at 
Curdsville, about ten miles to the rear. 

On the morning of the 9th, General Hum- 
phreys received General Grant's third letter to 
General Lee, written that morning at Curdsville. 
General Longstreet's command was about three 
miles distant in front of the Second Corps, and 
Colonel Whittier was sent forward with the let- 
ter. ^ Meeting first one of General Lee's couriers 
and immediately afterwards Colonel Marshall, of 
General Lee's staff, he was conducted by the 
latter to General Lee, to whom he delivered Gen- 
eral Grant's letter. General Lee dictated his 
answer to Colonel Marshall, who wrote it. Gen- 
eral Lee signed it and Colonel Marshall delivered 
it to Colonel Whittier. The letter was written 
about nine o'clock in the morning. Returning 
to General Humphreys, Colonel Whittier was 
sent to deliver General Lee's answer to General 
Grant. 

But, when nearing New Store that morning, 
General Grant had turned off from the road 
foUowed by the Second and Sixth corps, as Gen- 



270 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

eral Badeau states, " to join Sheridan's column/' 
apparently deeming his personal aid now neceS' 
sary to the commander of the advance of his 
left wing. 

Colonel Whittier, therefore, delivered General 
Lee's letter to General Meade at about ten 
o'clock. General Meade forwarded it, with a 
note from himself, to General Grant by Lieu- 
tenant Pease, of the headquarter staff of the 
Army of the Potomac. After a ride of twelve 
or fourteen miles from near New Store, Lieu- 
tenant Pease delivered the letters to General 
Grant, at 11.50 a. m., when about eight miles 
from Appomattox Court House. General Grant's 
answer was forwarded to General Lee through 
General Ord's and General Sheridan's lines. 
The world is familiar with accounts of the scene 
which soon foUowed, with General Grant and 
General Lee for the central figures. 

There is another scene connected with that 
day to which but little heed has yet been 
given. It will find proper place in history. 
Near three miles north-east of Appomattox Court 
House, on the road to Petersburg, stands New 
Hope Church. Covering the forks of the road 
just south and west of this church. General Long- 
street, w4th almost all that is left of the organ- 
ized Army of Northern Virginia, stands at bay in 
line of battle. 

With the letters sent to him for transmission 
to General Lee, General Humphreys had been 



JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 271 

notified that this correspondence was in no way 
to interfere with his operations. About half-past 
ten the Second Corps, with the Sixth following 
closely, began to overtake the rear of General 
Longstreet's troops. General Humphreys then 
received two urgent verbal requests from General 
Lee, by a staff officer bearing a flag of truce, 
that he would not continue to press forward, but 
halt and await the issue of pending negotiations 
for a surrender. Under the instructions he had 
received he did not feel authorized to comply 
with these requests; and, having so informed 
General Lee, he continued his advance. So 
urgent was General Lee's staff officer in making 
his last request, that General Humphreys was 
obliged to send him word twice that compliance 
was impossible, and that he must retire from the 
position he occupied on the road not a hundred 
yards distant from the head of the Second Corps 
column. At eleven o'clock the Second Corps 
came up with General Longstreet's intrenched 
position. Dispositions were at once made for 
attack, the Sixth Corps forming on the right of 
the Second. But at the moment the assault 
was about to be made. General Meade arrived 
upon the ground. 

There they stood, face to face for the last 
effort of the war. Comrades through fiery years 
confronted foemen grim with scars and staunch 
in war-won honors. Who can doubt the trial 
of that hour to General Meade ? Victory was 



272 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 

beckoning for his grasp^ — and dearly the soldier 
loves the laurel plucked from under battle clouds. 
No new order even was necessary. His match- 
less lieutenant was ready ; he had but to keep 
silent, and before the commander-in-chief could 
have answered General Lee, the prize must have 
been won. It would cost life and limb, of course, 
— but what of that ? Look back over the gory 
road from the Rapidan ! A few more graves, 
a few more darkened homes and broken forms, — 
what could they count beside the honor won? 

But General Meade had read the answer of 
General Lee before he forwarded it to General 
Grant. He knew the end would come, and — 
noblesse oblige — the truce was granted, the 
long carnage ended ; and Generals Meade, Hum- 
phreys, and Wright, with their veterans formed 
around them, waited further orders from the 
Lieutenant-General. Noblesse oblige f — Yes ; 
with them it was constitutional. 



INDEX. 



Alexander, General, 114. 

Ames, General, 67. 

Anderson, General R. H., cora- 
nxanding Longstreet's corps, 
49; crossed Po River, 50; 52, 
53 et seq.; 61, 62, 96, 109, 
112, 113, 141, 142 et seq.; 
153, 255, 259. 

Ayres, General, 149, 151, 153 et 
seq.; 157 et seq.; 179, 186, 
187, 198 et seq. ; 210, 214, 
265. 

Babcock, Colonel, 68, 206. 

Badeau, General, "Military His- 
tory " by, 5 ; Grant sustained by 
government, 8; Grant's head- 
quarters located, 12, 13 ; com- 
munication via Washington, 14 ; 
cooperation begun, 15 ; Grant 
and Meade, 17 ; Grant must di- 
rect A. of P. , 21 ; first visit to 
Meade 25 ; Meade discussed at 
Grant's headquarters, 27, 28 ; 
crossing of Rapidan, 32, 33 ; 
retrospect from Cold Harbor, 
39 ; Grant's political reasons for 
retaining Meade, 40, 41 ; esti- 
mate of Rawlins, 43 ; opening of 
Wilderness battle, 45, 46 ; move- 
ment to Spottsylvania C. H., 
47 et seq. ; Smith en route to 
Cold Harbor, 68, 69; Grant's 
orders in battle, 70; orders 
May 11, '64, 71 ; crossing of 



Chickahominy, 74; movement 
on Petersburg, 77 et seq. ; 
movement on Jetersville, 87 et 
seq. ; Warren in Wilderness 
battle, 101 ; Warren moving 
to Spottsylvania, 105; Warren 
at Spottsylvania, 107; assault 
May 10, '64, 119, 120; assault 
May 12, '64, 121, 122 ; Ewell's 
attack May 19, '64, 131 et 
seq. ; Cold Harbor, June 1, 
'64, 138 et seq.; 152, battle 
of White Oak Road, 157, 158 ; 
Grant's orders to Sheridan, 164, 
165 ; Sheridan did not want 
Fifth Corps, 168 ; force oppos- 
ing Sheridan at Five Forks, 
175 ; Grant invites Sheridan 
to relieve Warren, 206, 207; 
Sheridan's brilliant stroke, 233 ; 
April 2, '65, 236 et seq. ; change 
of direction April 6, '65, 253 ; 
257, Grant at Farmville, 261 ; 
265, 266, 269. 

Banks, General, 9, 22. 

Barlow, General, 80, 135, 136, 
255, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264. 

Bartlett, General, 109, 149, 151, 
182, 184, 189. 

Barton's brigade, 226. 

Benyaurd, Captain, 183. 

Birney, General, 131, 135, 136. 

Bratton, General John, report of, 
115, 128. 

Braxton, Lieutenant-Colonel, 135. 



274 



INDEX. 



Breekenridge, General, 111, 148. 
Burnside, General, 20, 45, 85, 

86, 124, 125, 141, 147, 149. 
Butler, General B. F., 8, 15, 16, 

22, 33; commended by Grant, 

41 ; Petersburg movement, 75 

et seq. ; 221, 225. 

Chamberlain, General, 157. 
Corse, General, 171, 189, 196, 

202. 
Coulter, Colonel, 200. 
Court of Inquiry, Warren, 159; 

Opinion, 160 et seq. ; Opinion, 

190 et seq.; Opinion, 211 et 

seq. 
Crawford, General, 109, 111, 112, 

126, 136, 149, 154 et seq.; 157 

et seq. ; 179, 180, 198 et seq. ; 

211, 214, 238, 241. 
Crittenden, General, 149. 
Crook, General, 9, 15, 93, 170 et 

seq.; 197, 204, 259, 261, 262, 

263. 
Custer, General, 172, 188, 197, 

203. 
Cutler, General, 109, 121, 125, 

149. 

Dana, Hon. Charles A., 107, 108, 
111, 116 et seq. 

Daniels, General, 126. 

Davies, General, 90, 170 et seq. ; 
224, 257. 

De Peyster, General, 266, 267. 

De Trobriand, division of Gen- 
eral, 260. 

Devin, General, 170, 171 et seq. ; 
189, 197, 204. 

Doles, General, killed, 149. 

Early, General, 18, 22, 49, 57, 
58, 62, 141, 143, 148, 150. 

Ewell, General, 32, 57, 62, 96, 
111, 126, reconnoissance May 
19, '64, 129 et seq. ; 255, 259. 



Ferrero, General, 181, 133. 
Field, General, 109, 128, 142, 144. 
Fitzhugh, Colonel, 204. 
Forrest, General, 23. 

Gibbon, General John, 135, 136, 
261. 

Gibbs, General, 172, 233. 

Gillespie, Captain, 197. 210. 

Gordon, General, 96, 150, 224, 
225, 232, 254, 255, 259, 260. 

Gracie's brigade, 226. 

Grant, General U. S., challenges 
the Record, 1 ; indorses Ba^ 
deau's "Military History," 4; 
ignores Humphreys's "Virginia 
Campaign," 5; assumes com- 
mand of armies of U. S., 7 ef 
seq. ; locates headquarters, 10, 
12 ; his field of operations, 13, 
14; communications cut, 16; 
imputes twofold difficulty to 
Warren, 19, 20; has not met 
Bobby Lee, 22 ; relations with 
Meade and A. of P., 24 et seq. ; 
on Shiloh-Corinth campaign, 
24; first visit to Meade, 26; 
commends Meade, 27 ; embar- 
rassed by Meade's position, 29, 
30 ; the campaign his, 32 ; es- 
timate of gain at Wilderness, 
38, 39 ; apology to Butler, 41 ; 
informed Meade, 45 ; move- 
ment to Spottsylvania C. H., 
51, 52; Smith's movement 
June 1, '64, 69, 70; order 
June 11, ' 64, 71 ; crossing of 
Chickahominy, 73 ; passage of 
James River, 75 et seq. ; Sheri- 
dan and Meade at Jetersville, 
91 et seq.; Warren in Wilder- 
ness and at Spottsylvania C. H., 
101 et seq. ; 115, assault May 
10, '64, 118; assault May 12, 
'64, 120 et seq.; 127, Ewell's 
attack May 19, '64, 129 et seq. ; 



INDEX. 



275 



Cold Harbor June 1, '64, 140 ; 
attacks on Warren and Burn- 
side June 2, '64, 147 ; battle of 
White Oak Hoad, 157 ; impu- 
tation in report, 159; not sus- 
tained, 160, 161 ; 163, instruc- 
tions to Sheridan, 164 ; regards 
Sheridan's preferences, 168, 
169 ; report of advance on Five 
Forks, 169 ; 170, 173, 174, 177 
et seq. ; invites removal of War- 
ren, 180, 181, 206; denies in- 
quiry to Warren, 181, 209 ; 183 
et seq. ; headquarters, 184 ; re- 
port of Sheridan's Richmond 
raid, 220 et seq. ; in error, 224 
et seq.; Wilson's raid, 230; 
Kilpatrick's Jonesboro raid, 
230, 231; mentions Hum- 
phreys, 231 ; narrative of 
April 2, '65, 234 et seq.; com- 
mends Miles, 239, 243, 246 et 
seq. ; change of direction April 
6, '65, 253 ; official report, 256 ; 
at FarmviUe, 261; 262, 263, 
264, 265, 266, 267 et seq. 

Grant, F. D., 1. 

Gregg, General, 48, 59 et seq. ; 113, 
171 et seq. ; 222, 226, 233, 263. 

Gregory, General, 157. 

Griffin, General Charles, at Je- 
tersville, 87 ; 91, 109, 121, 125, 
149 et seq. ; 153, 154 et seq. ; 157 
et seq. ; 177, 179, 180, 183, 185, 
188, 198 et seq. ; 211, 214, 231, 
253. 

Gwyn, General James, 155, 210. 

Halleck General, retired, 11 ; 24, 

25, 33. 
Hampton, General, 53, 59 et seq. ; 

228, 229. 
Hancock, General, 36, at Todd's 

Tavern, 57 ; 58, 61, 102, 104, 

120 et seq. ; 127, 130 et seq. ; 

137, 141, 148. 



Harris, General, 126. 

Haskell, Major, 114. 

Hays, General, 233, 238, 244, 
245. 

Heth, General, 148, 149. 

HiU, General, 141, 148. 

Hoffman, Colonel, 129. 

Hoke, General, 142, 143, 144. 

Humphreys, General A. A., 
"Virginia Campaign" by, 5, 
6 ; remarks on mixed command, 
30 ; on crossing Rapidan into 
Wilderness, 33 et seq. ; opening 
movements in Wilderness, 46; 
movement to Spottsylvania, 59 
etseq.; 106, Smith's movements 
June 1, '64, 67, 68; Warren's 
orders, June 11, '64, 73; move- 
ment on Petersburg, 79 et seq. ; 
Jetersville movements, 86 et 
seq. ; Fifth Corps at Spottsyl- 
vania C. H., 108 et seq. ; as- 
sault May 12, '64, 123 et seq. ; 
128, Ewell's attack May 19, '64, 
133 et seq. ; Cold Harbor June 

1, '64, 141 et seq. ; movements of 
Warren and Burnside June 2, 
'64, 147, 148 ; relieves Griffin 
March .30, '65, 154 ; attacks 
with Miles, 156; narrative of 
operations at Five Forks, 170 et 
seq.; 177, 184, on Warren, 207 ; 
narrative of Sheridan's Rich- 
mond raid, 225, 226; writes 
Wilson, 228 ; mentioned by 
Grant, 231; March 25, '65, 
232 ; March 31, '65, 233 ; April 

2, '65, 234 et seq. ; dates move- 
ments of Fifth Corps, 241, 242 ; 
narrative, 243 et seq. ; attacks 
Lee's rear April 6, '65, 252 ; 
254, 255, 259 et seq. ; 266, 267, 
268 et seq. 

Hunt, General Henry J., 205, 232. 
Hunter, General, 19, 22, 228. 
Hunton, General, 155, 156. 



276 



INDEX, 



Johnson's division, 166. 
Johnston, General A. S., claims 

denounced, 39. 
Johnston, General Jos. E. , 8, 9. 

Kautz, General A. V., 227. 
Kellogg, Colonel, 200 et seq. 
Kershaw, General, 126, 142, 143. 
Kilpatrick, General, 230. 
Kitching, Colonel, 135. 

Lee, General Fitzhugh, 53, 59, 63, 
64, 107, 112, 142, 148, 166 et seq.; 
224, 229, 258, 260, 264, 269. 

Lee, General R. E., 9, 22, position 
on Rapidan, 32, 33; deluded, 
49 ; reflections on, considered, 
52 et seq.; at Amelia C. H., 
87; 96, 124, 127, 138, 155, 
orders Fitz Lee to Five Forks, 
166; directs Pickett to hold 
Five Forks, 196; 243, 252, 
256, 257, 258, 261, 267 et seq. 

Lee, General W. H. F., 53, 96, 
166, 170 et seq, ; 190, 196, 203, 
229. 

Livermore, Colonel, 259. 

Locke, Colonel Fred. T., 98, 205, 
diary of, 242, 250, 

Lomax, General, 224. 

Long, General A. L., report of 
May 19, '64, 134, 135. 

Longstreet, General, 96, corps, 
111, 124, 125, 258, 269 et seq. 

Mackenzie, General, 89, 177, 197, 

204, 231, 241. 
Madill, Colonel, 246. 
Mahone, General, 148, 229, 264. 
Marshall, Colonel, 269. 
Mayo, Colonel, 196, 202. 
McClellan, General George B., 11. 
McCleUan, Major H. B., 53, 225. 
McDougall, General, 246. 
McGowan, General, 126, 155, 156, 

264. 



McGregor's battery, 196, 202. 

Meade, General George G. , 10, his 
delicate position, 25 ; Badeau's 
testimony, 26; Grant's official 
report on, 26, 27; embarrasses 
Grant, 30, 31 ; retained because, 
40, 41 ; no act of, specifically 
commended by Grant, 44; at 
Todd's Tavern, 48 et seq. ; 59 
et seq. ; 70, passage of James 
River, 75 et seq. ; JetersvUle 
movements, 87 et seq. ; accom- 
panies Grant, 102; 104, 115, 
assault May 10, '64, 118; or- 
ders Hancock to support Tyler, 
136; unjust at times, 158; 161, 
182 et seq. ; headquarters, 184 ; 
sometimes did not agree with 
Warren, 207; 232, 236, sends 
Humphreys to Miles' s aid, 246 ; 
at Jetersville April 6, '65, 252; 
261, 267 et seq. 

Merritt, General, 48, 50, 51, 59 et 
seq. ; 89, 91, 93, 108, 112, 113, 
167, 170, 197, 233, 235, 238, 
241, 259. 

MUes, General, 62, 154, 156, 233, 
April 2, '65, 234 et seq ; 243 et 
seq. ; 246 et seq. ; 250, 252, 260, 
264. 

Morgan, Colonel, 81. 

Morgan, General, 22. 

Mott, General, 233, 243 et seq. ; 
252, 261. 

Munford, General, 111 et seq. ; 
189, 196. 

New Jersey, Third cavalry (vet- 
eran), 134. 
Nugent, Colonel, 246. 

Ohio, Second cavalry (veteran), 

134. 
Ord, General, 92, 93, 99, 254, 256, 

257, 262, 267. 



INDEX. 



277 



Paris, Comte de, 38. 
Pearson, General, 182. 
Pease, Lieutenant, 270. 
Pegram's artillery, 196. 
Pegram's brigade, 129. 
Pendleton, General W. W., report 

of, 55, 56, 114. 
Penrose, General, 111. 
Pickett, General, 154, at Five 

Forks, 166; 170 et seq. ; 189, 

202, 204, 233, 243. 
Porter, Colonel, 206. 
Potter, General, 149. 
Price, General, 120. 

Kamseur, General, 126, 129, 133, 

150. 
Eanasey's brigade, 246. 
Ransom, General, 196, 201, 202. 
Rawlins, General, 43, 67, 205, 

206. 
Read, General Theodore, 256, 258. 
Richardson, Colonel, 203. 
Roberts, General, 166, 196. 
Robinson, General, 61, 108, 109. 
Rodes, General, 111, 149. 
Rosser, General T. L., 166, 170, 

190, 258. 

Sedgwick, General John, 101, 103, 
108, 110, 111. 

Sheridan, General, 19, 44, 47, or- 
ders of changed, 48 et seq. ; 58, 
order May 8, '64, 63 ; orders to 
May 7, '64, 65 ; at JetersviUe, 
87 et seq. ; 105, withdraws Wil- 
son from Spottsylvania C. H., 
113 ; at Cold Harbor, 142 ; at- 
tacked, 144; at Dinwiddie C. 
H. , 165 et seq. ; don't want Fifth 
Corps, 168, 177 ; relieves War- 
ren of conamand of Fifth Corps, 
180, 205 ; informed of aid sent 
him, 185 ; attack on Five Forks, 
197 et seq. ; imputations against 
Warren, 208 ; explains to Court, 



209 ; Richmond raid, 220 et 
seq. ; at White House, 228 ; to 
Wilson's relief, 230; April 2, 
'65, 234 et seq. ; 243, 246 et 
seq,; 253, 254, 257, 262, 265, 
267, 269. 

Sherman, General, 9, 10, 15, 44. 

Sigel, General, 9, 16, 22. 

Smith, General W. F., 67 et seq. ; 
75 et seq. ; 138, 144, 146. 

Spear, Colonel, 201, 

Stuart, GeneralJ. E. B., 47, 50, 
53, 54, 56, 57, 112, 221, 222, 
224, 225. 

Stewart, General, 196. 

Sweitzer, General, 149, 151. 

Tyler, General R. O., 130 et seq, 

Wallace, General, 196, 201, 202. 
Walker, General F. A., 83, 84, 86, 

87. 
Warner, Captain E. R., 205, 206. 
Warren, General G. K., 19, 20, 37, 
45, 52, 60, 61, 69, at Riddle's 
shop, 72 ; 101, 112, 120 et seq. ; 
128, EweU's attack May 19, 
'64, 130, 132, 138 ; at Cold Har- 
bor June 1, '64, 139, 142, 144 
et seq. ; 146, 151, movements 
March 29, '65, 152 et seq. ; so- 
called dilatory movements, 157 
et seq. ; vindicated and criticised 
by Court of Inquiry, 163 ; 177 ; 
sends aid to Sheridan, 181, 182 ; 
headquarters at, 184; receives 
additional orders, 185, 186; 
gets Ayres through to Dinwid- 
die C. H., 187; despatch from 
Sheridan, 188; criticised by 
Court of Inquiry, 191, 192, 193 
et seq. ; ordered to attack Five 
Forks, 197 et seq. ; sometimes 
modified plans, 207; Court 
granted by President Hayes, 
209; vindicated by Court, 213, 



278 



INDEX. 



215 ; Record of Five Forks, 216 

et seq. ; 265. 
Washburn, Colonel, 256, 258. 
Webb, General Alex. S., 157, 158, 

161, 162. 
Whittier, Colonel, 269, 270. 
Wickham, General, 224. 
Wilcox, General, 148. 
Willcox, General, 149. 
WiUiams, General Seth, 269. 



Wilson, General, 47, 51, 63, 74, 
108, at Spottsylvania C. H., 
113, 115, 116 ; 148, 222, 226, 
cavalry raid, 227 et seq. 

Winthrop, General Fred., 154 et 
seq. ; 205, 214. 

Wise, General, 155, 156. 

Wright, General, 17, 69, 120, 121, 
123, 125, 127, 139, 143, 170, 
253, 254, 261, 262, 272. 



^V P* ^* iHrClellam 



THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF MAJOR-GENERAL 
J. E. B. STUART, Commander of the Cavalry o£ the Army 
of Northern Virginia. By H. B. McClellan, A. M., 
Late Major, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief of 
Staff of the Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. 
With Portrait of Stuart and seven Maps. 8vo, ;^3.oo. 

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, 

Boston and New York. 




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